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Zusammenfassung
Im Zeitalter der Information und der Globalisierung nimmt die sichere Kommunikation
und der Schutz von sensiblen Daten gegen unberechtigten Zugriﬀ eine zentrale Stellung
ein. Die Quantenkryptographie ist derzeit die einzige Methode, die den Austausch ei-
nes geheimen Schlu¨ssels zwischen zwei Parteien auf beweisbar sichere Weise ermo¨glicht.
Mit der aktuellen Glasfaser- und Detektortechnologie ist die Quantenkrypographie auf-
grund von Verlusten und Rauschen derzeit auf Entfernungen unterhalb einiger 100 km
beschra¨nkt. Prinzipiell ko¨nnten gro¨ßere Entfernungen in ku¨rzere Abschnitte aufgeteilt
werden, die dafu¨r beno¨tigten Quantenrepeater sind jedoch derzeit nicht realisierbar. Eine
alternative Lo¨sung zur U¨berwindung gro¨ßerer Entfernungen stellt ein satellitenbasiertes
System dar, das den Schlu¨sselaustausch zwischen zwei beliebigen Punkten auf dem Glo-
bus mittels freiraumoptischer Kommunikation ermo¨glichen wu¨rde.
Ziel des beschriebenen Experiments war es, die Realisierbarkeit satellitengestu¨tzter
globaler Quantenschlu¨sselverteilung zu untersuchen. Dazu wurde ein freiraumoptisches
Quantenkryptographie-Experiment u¨ber eine Entfernung von 144 km durchgefu¨hrt. Sen-
der und Empfa¨nger befanden sich jeweils in ca. 2500m Ho¨he auf den Kanarischen Inseln
La Palma bzw. Teneriﬀa. Die kleine und leichte Sendeeinheit erzeugte abgeschwa¨chte
Laserpulse, die mittels eines 15-cm Teleskops zum Empfa¨nger geschickt wurden. Die
Empfangseinheit zur Polarisationsanalyse und Detektion der gesendeten Pulse wurde in
ein existierendes Spiegelteleskop fu¨r klassische optische Kommunikation mit Satelliten
integriert. Um die no¨tige Stabilita¨t und Eﬃzienz der optischen Verbindung trotz atmo-
spha¨rischer Turbulenzen zu gewa¨hrleisten, waren die Teleskope mit einem bidirektionalen
automatischen Nachfu¨hrungssystem ausgestattet.
Unter Verwendung des Standard-BB84 Protokolls wa¨re aufgrund hoher optischer Ab-
schwa¨chung und Streulicht ein sicherer Schlu¨sselaustausch mittels abgeschwa¨chter Laser-
pulse jedoch nicht mo¨glich. Die Photonenzahlstatistik folgt bei abgeschwa¨chten Laser-
pulsen der Poisson-Verteilung, sodaß ein Abho¨rer von allen Pulsen, die zwei oder mehr
Photonen enthalten, ein Photon abspalten und dessen Polarisation messen ko¨nnte, ohne
den Polarisationszustand der verbleibenden Photonen zu beeinﬂussen. Auf diese Weise
ko¨nnte er Informationen u¨ber den Schlu¨ssel gewinnen, ohne dabei detektierbare Fehler
zu verursachen. Um diesen Angriﬀ zu verhindern, wurde im vorliegenden Experiment
daher die ku¨rzlich entwickelte Methode der sog.
”
Ta¨uschpulse“verwendet, d.h. die Inten-
sita¨t der vom Sender erzeugten Pulse wurde auf zufa¨llige Weise variiert. Durch Analyse
der Detektionswahrscheinlichkeit der verschiedenen Pulse la¨ßt sich ein Abho¨rversuch
der beschriebenen Art erkennen. Dadurch konnte trotz der Verwendung abgeschwa¨chter
Laserpulse die Sicherheit des ausgetauschten Schlu¨ssels bei einer Abschwa¨chung von
ca. 35 dB im Quantenkanal gewa¨hrleistet und eine Schlu¨sselrate von bis zu 250 bit/s
erreicht werden.
Unser Experiment wurde unter realen atmospha¨rischen Bedingungen und mit ver-
gleichbarer Kanalabschwa¨chung wie zu einem erdnahen Satelliten durchgefu¨hrt. Daher
zeigt es die Realisierbarkeit von satellitengestu¨tzter weltweiter Quantenschlu¨sselvertei-
lung mit einem technologisch vergleichsweise einfachen System.

Abstract
In the age of information and globalisation, secure communication as well as the pro-
tection of sensitive data against unauthorised access are of utmost importance. Quantum
cryptography currently provides the only way to exchange a cryptographic key between
two parties in an unconditionally secure fashion. Owing to losses and noise of today’s
optical ﬁbre and detector technology, at present quantum cryptography is limited to
distances below a few 100 km. In principle, larger distances could be subdivided into
shorter segments, but the required quantum repeaters are still beyond current technol-
ogy. An alternative approach for bridging larger distances is a satellite-based system,
that would enable secret key exchange between two arbitrary points on the globe using
free-space optical communication.
The aim of the presented experiment was to investigate the feasibility of satellite-based
global quantum key distribution. In this context, a free-space quantum key distribution
experiment over a real distance of 144 km was performed. The transmitter and the re-
ceiver were situated in 2500m altitude on the Canary Islands of La Palma and Tenerife,
respectively. The small and compact transmitter unit generated attenuated laser pulses,
that were sent to the receiver via a 15-cm optical telescope. The receiver unit for polar-
isation analysis and detection of the sent pulses was integrated into an existing mirror
telescope designed for classical optical satellite communications. To ensure the required
stability and eﬃciency of the optical link in the presence of atmospheric turbulence, the
two telescopes were equipped with a bi-directional automatic tracking system.
Still, due to stray light and high optical attenuation, secure key exchange would not
be possible using attenuated pulses in connection with the standard BB84 protocol. The
photon number statistics of attenuated pulses follows a Poissonian distribution. Hence,
by removing a photon from all pulses containing two or more photons, an eavesdropper
could measure its polarisation without disturbing the polarisation state of the remaining
pulse. In this way, he can gain information about the key without introducing detectable
errors. To protect against such attacks, the presented experiment employed the recently
developed method of using additional “decoy” states, i.e., the the intensity of the pulses
created by the transmitter were varied in a random manner. By analysing the detection
probabilities of the diﬀerent pulses individually, a photon-number-splitting attack can
be detected. Thanks to the decoy-state analysis, the secrecy of the resulting quantum
key could be ensured despite the Poissonian nature of the emitted pulses. For a channel
attenuation as high as 35 dB, a secret key rate of up to 250 bit/s was achieved.
Our outdoor experiment was carried out under real atmospheric conditions and with
a channel attenuation comparable to an optical link from ground to a satellite in low
earth orbit. Hence, it deﬁnitely shows the feasibility of satellite-based quantum key
distribution using a technologically comparatively simple system.
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1 Introduction
“You see, wire telegraph is a kind of a very, very long cat. You pull his tail
in New York and his head is meowing in Los Angeles. Do you understand
this?
And radio operates exactly the same way: you send signals here, they receive
them there. The only diﬀerence is that there is no cat.”
Albert Einstein, asked to explain radio.
Today, nearly a century later, the “meow” would be sequenced into 0s and 1s. Data
digitalisation, and the rapid increase in the speed with which data can be sent and
processed, form the technological basis for the “information society” and “information
economy” in which we live and work [1]. With information becoming a more and more
important resource for companies and countries, the desire is growing to protect infor-
mation against unauthorised access. This is especially relevant in connection with the
rising interest in sharing information in a globalised world. We as individual people,
as well as the whole economy, heavily rely on the availability of electronic communica-
tions and electronic transactions — but also on its security. Against this background,
it is of utmost importance to provide the means for reliable and secure communication
channels.
This is the goal of cryptography. The name is derived from the Greek words κρυπτo´ς
for hidden, or secret, and γραϕη´ for writing. From the early beginnings some 4000
years ago, when ancient Egyptians used modiﬁed hieroglyphs to conceal messages, the
art of cryptography has undergone radical changes. The advent of computers has revo-
lutionised both code making and code breaking. Nowadays, electronic communications
rely on established and standardised encryption techniques, such as RSA and AES,
whenever sensitive data, for example, credit card numbers, or personal identiﬁcation
numbers, are transmitted [2]. The security of these techniques, however, rests on com-
plexity statements on the involved mathematical algorithms that are not yet proven.
The threat of the existence and discovery of simpler algorithms might be abstract at
present, just as is the menace of quantum computers becoming usable for realistic at-
tacks. However, it is a fact, that the computational power available for a given amount
of money still continues to rise exponentially, and thus the potential to crack longer
and longer cryptographic keys. Encryptions that are considered safe today will likely
be broken by a standard consumer PC in a few years’ time, just like it has happened
several times in the past [3, 4].
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Classical cryptography can indeed provide an unbreakable symmetric secret-key ci-
pher, the Vernam cipher [5], most often called one-time-pad. Provided the secret key
is purely random, as long as the message itself, and used only once, the one-time-pad
resists adversaries with unlimited computational and technological power [6]. The main
drawback of the one-time-pad is the necessity to distribute a large amount of secret key
material, and has prevented its wider use. It is at this point that quantum mechanics
can oﬀer a unique solution to the key distribution problem: Quantum key distribution
(QKD) [7–9] provides currently the only way to exchange a crytographic key between
two parties in an unconditionally secure fashion. Its security is not based on assumption
on the adversary’s limited technology, but rests on the validity of quantum mechan-
ics itself: Unlike classical information, an unknown quantum state cannot be perfectly
copied [10]. Thus, any eavesdropping attempt will disturb the transmitted quantum
states — leading to errors, that are detectable by the legitimate users. A fundamental
principle of QKD is that this error rate imposes a bound on the amount of information
an adversary could have on the raw key. If the error rate is too high and jeopardising
the secrecy of the key, the legitimate users discard the key and start anew. Otherwise,
they apply a classical privacy ampliﬁcation scheme to diminish the adversary’s partial
information on the ﬁnal key arbitrarily close to zero.
Quantum key distribution has been implemented in a number of experiments mainly
based on optical ﬁbres (see e.g., [11–15] and references therein). Being the ﬁrst tech-
nology of the ﬁeld of quantum information to have reached some state of maturity, ﬁrst
commercial ﬁbre-based QKD systems are already available on the market1. However,
owing to the noise of available single-photon detectors together with losses and deco-
herence eﬀects in the ﬁbre, the distance that can be bridged with current technology is
limited to the order of 100–200 km [16–20].
Several approaches have been proposed to overcome this problem. In principle, any
large distance can be subdivided into smaller segments by introducing intermediate
nodes. Secret keys are then exchanged ﬁrst between adjacent nodes, followed by subse-
quent bitwise XOR-steps that combine two keys from neighbouring links into a single
new one, until, ﬁnally, a secret key between the two initial end points is established.
For this scheme to work, all intermediate nodes must be trustworthy. When the dis-
tance is long, a large number of trusted nodes are required. The requirement of trust
can be dropped if the classical repeater stations are replaced by quantum repeaters to
faithfully transfer the unknown quantum states via entanglement teleportation, thereby
avoiding the conversion into classical information [21, 22]. Even though some of the
key techniques involved have been demonstrated (e.g., entanglement swapping and en-
tanglement puriﬁcation), it seems fair to say, that a fully functional practical quantum
repeater is still beyond current technology. Moreover, the individual segments between
repeater stations would by far not be of global scale. Hence, an impractical large number
of repeater stations would be required to bridge intercontinental distances.
1id Quantique, http://idquantique.com; MaqiQ Technologies, http://www.magiqtech.com
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To overcome the distance restrictions, a satellite-based global key exchange system
has been envisioned [23–27], allowing for key exchange between two arbitrary points on
the globe. The idea is to establish an optical free-space link from a ground station to
a dedicated satellite in earth orbit. As the satellite passes over diﬀerent locations on
earth, separate keys are exchanged with each ground station. Thus, a single satellite
may cover a large portion of the earth’s surface. Supposing that ground stations A
and B want to establish a secret key, the satellite would have to store the key from
ground station A securely until the ground station B came into view. This reduces
the problem of many trusted nodes (necessary for a ﬁbre-based connection) to just
one trusted satellite. It should be noted, that even the satellite wouldn’t need to be
trustworthy if an entanglement-based quantum cryptographic scheme was employed [12,
28–37]. In this case, however, the two ground stations wishing to exchange a key must be
in the satellites reach simultaneously. Depending on the speciﬁc orbit, and the location
of the ground stations, this requirement may reduce the duration and number of available
links drastically.
Free-space links between earth and a satellite beneﬁt from the fact that most of the
communication path is in empty space, where the photons can freely propagate, and
only a short section of the path is in earth’s atmosphere. Furthermore, the atmosphere
provides low absorption in the spectral range of 600–850 nm, where good single-photon
detectors are available, and exhibits almost no birefringence, which allows to encode the
quantum information into the polarisation degree-of-freedom of photons.
Up to now, the longest free-space QKD demonstrations covered distances one order
of magnitude shorter than in optical ﬁbres [37–40]. Moreover, implementations based
on entangled photons [37, 40, 41] or single photon sources [42–44] generally require a
rather complicated and delicate setup, which is less suited to the mass, power, and
complexity restrictions of a spaceborne transmitter module. A transmitter generating
attenuated laser pulses is technologically much simpler, but even for average photon
numbers well below one, the Poissonian nature of the laser photon statistics opens a
back door for a photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack [45–47]: By removing a photon
from all pulses containing two or more photons, and delaying the measurement of its
state after bases announcement, an adversary can learn a signiﬁcant portion of the key
without introducing errors. In conditions of low channel transmittance, he may even
obtain the full key. To avoid such leakage one has to strongly attenuate the laser pulses,
approximately proportional to the link eﬃciency. Therefore, former QKD experiments
using attenuated laser pulses did either not provide security against photon-number
splitting attacks, or suﬀered from poor eﬃciency.
The recently developed idea of decoy state protocols [48–50] provides an elegant solu-
tion to this problem. Instead of using a ﬁxed average photon number, the transmitter
creates additional “decoy” pulses of various intensities. By comparing the receiver’s
detection probability of the individual pulse classes, the PNS attack can be detected.
Thus, the decoy-state analysis opens the possibility for attenuated pulse systems to be
secure over larger distances with an eﬃciency close to single-photon QKD. Not long ago,
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decoy state protocols have seen ﬁrst demonstrations in optical ﬁbres [14,15,18,19] and,
at the same time, in free space [51].
The goal of the experiment presented in this thesis was to investigate the feasibility of
satellite-based global quantum key distribution. This work describes the distribution of
a quantum key over a real distance of 144 km between the Canary islands of La Palma
and Tenerife. This free-space link provides a realistic test bed for optical communication
to space: Even though the actual link distance is somewhat shorter than a link from a
satellite in low earth-orbit (LEO) to a ground station (typically close to 350 km), the
path length through atmosphere is already much larger. In fact, simulations suggest that
the expected link transmittance from a LEO satellite will be comparable [27]. The sim-
ple and lightweight transmitter setup, based on attenuated laser pulses in combination
with a decoy state scheme, was located on the island of La Palma. The quantum signal
was transmitted over 144 km optical path at a mean altitude of 2400 m to the island
of Tenerife. There, the quantum receiver was integrated into an existing telescope for
classical optical satellite communications, the European Space Agency’s Optical Ground
Station (OGS). To achieve the necessary link eﬃciency and stability in the presence of
slowly varying atmospheric inﬂuences, bidirectional active telescope tracking for contin-
uous optimisation of the channel transmittance was implemented. Still, due to stray
light and dark counts, secure communication over such a distance would not be possible
anymore with the standard BB84 protocol. However, using the decoy-state analysis, the
secrecy of the cryptographic key could be ensured.
Overview
This thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 establishes some required theoretical back-
ground on quantum key distribution. Diﬀerent classes of attacks on the quantum channel
are brieﬂy reviewed, with emphasis on the photon-number-splitting attack that plays an
important role in QKD schemes utilising attenuated pulses. This speciﬁc attack leads
to poor performance of the standard BB84 protocol in scenarios involving high losses
in the quantum channel. It is shown how this problem can be overcome with the help
of decoy states and a reﬁned data analysis. The speciﬁc protocol used in the experi-
ment is laid out in greater detail. The chapter concludes with a brief description of the
classical part of the protocol. Chapter 3 deals with the speciﬁc challenges of using the
atmosphere as the quantum channel. Some fundamental principles and relevant eﬀects
associated with the propagation of a laser beam through the turbulent atmosphere are
presented. Chapter 4 is devoted to the characterisation of the inter-island optical link.
Measured losses and turbulence parameters are compared with predictions based on the
theory presented earlier. The results indicate that active beam steering techniques are
required to mitigate the deleterious eﬀects of beam wander for our QKD experiment.
Finally, the implemented telescope tracking system is presented. Chapter 5 introduces
the experimental setup with its individual components. The ordering of the diﬀerent
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parts roughly reﬂects the temporal sequence of events, from the generation of the quan-
tum signal, its transmission, up to its detection at the receiver. The characterisation
of the individual building blocks allows to calculate the expected performance of our
QKD system. In chapter 6, the procedure and aspects of data analysis and processing
for the presented experiment are explained. The individual steps from the detection of
raw events to the distillation of secret key bits are presented and analysed in detail, and
associated problems are discussed. Chapter 7 summarises the experimental results and
places them into the context of satellite-based QKD. Remaining challenges and future
ﬁelds of work are identiﬁed as an outlook.
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2.1 Security in QKD
It is the goal of quantum key distribution (QKD) to enable two distant parties, tradition-
ally called Alice and Bob, to establish a common secret key, that is, a string of random
bits which is unknown to an adversary, Eve. An important diﬀerence to classical key
distribution schemes is that the security of the ﬁnal key can actually be proven under a
very limited number of logical assumptions. The strongest reasonable notion of security
is information-theoretic security (also called unconditional security), which guarantees
that an adversary does not get any information correlated with the key, except with
negligible probability. A weaker level of security is computational security, where one
only requires that it is diﬃcult (i.e., time-consuming, but not impossible) for an adver-
sary to compute information on the key. This is the type of security that is typically
sought-after in classical cryptographic algorithms.
Under the sole assumption that Alice and Bob are connected by a classical authenti-
cated1 communication channel, secret communication - and thus also the generation of a
secret key - is impossible [6]. This changes dramatically when quantum mechanics comes
into play. Bennett and Brassard were the ﬁrst to introduce a quantum key distribution
scheme, which uses communication over a — completely insecure — quantum channel
in addition to the classical channel [8]. This scheme is commonly known as the BB84
protocol, although foundations were already laid by Wiesner [7].
In general, a typical prepare-and-measure2 quantum key distribution protocol consists
of two phases:
Phase I: A physical apparatus generates quantum mechanical signals3, which are dis-
tributed to, and eventually measured by the communicating parties. The measure-
1To rule out a man-in-the-middle attack where Eve impersonates Bob to Alice, and vice versa, Alice
and Bob should authenticate the data sent in the classical channel. This requires a short pre-shared
key.
2In a prepare-and-measure protocol, Alice simply prepares a sequence of single photon signals and
transmits them to Bob. Bob immediately measures those signals; thus, no quantum computation
or long-term storage of quantum information is necessary, only the transmission of single photon
states.
3These signals are usually described by qubits. In practical QKD, ﬂying qubits are always realised
as photons. In the following, the term qubit is therefore often used equivalently with a two-level
degree-of-freedom of a single photon.
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ment results obtained by Alice and Bob represent classical data describing their
knowledge on the prepared signals.
Phase II: Using their authenticated classical channel, Alice and Bob exchange informa-
tion on their data, for example by sifting, error correction, or privacy ampliﬁcation
procedures.
A theoretical security and eﬃciency analysis of a QKD protocol provides statements on
how exactly to convert the data obtained in phase I into a secret key in phase II.
QKD is generally based on the impossibility to observe a quantum mechanical system
without changing its state. An adversary trying to wiretap the quantum communication
between Alice and Bob would thus inevitably leave traces, which can be detected. Hence,
a QKD protocol achieves the following type of security: As long as the adversary is
passive, it generates a secret key. However, in case of an attack on the quantum channel
jeopardising the security of the ﬁnal key, the protocol recognises the attack and aborts
the generation of the key with very high probability4. The public classical channel used
in the second phase of the protocol needs to be protected against a man-in-the-middle
attack. Otherwise, Alice may be unaware that she has accidentally exchanged a secret
key with Eve instead of Bob, for example. To prevent this attack, Alice and Bob have to
authenticate the data sent in the classical channel. Since the authentication of an N-bit
message requires only O(logN) secret bits [52], Alice and Bob can generate more secret
bits by QKD than bits are consumed for authentication during the protocol, provided
they share a short initial key. Consequently, one should rather speak of QKD as quantum
key growing.
2.2 QKD with the BB84 protocol
The BB84 protocol uses an encoding of classical bits in qubits, that is, two-level quantum
systems. The encoding is with respect to one of two diﬀerent orthogonal bases, called the
rectilinear and the diagonal basis. These two bases are mutually unbiased (maximally
conjugate) in the sense that any two states from diﬀerent bases have overlap probability
1/2. Thus, a measurement in one of the bases reveals no information on a bit encoded
with respect to the other basis. Very commonly, the signal states are realised as single
photons in linear polarisation states, where horizontal |H〉 and vertical |V 〉 polarisation
states form the rectilinear basis, and the diagonal basis consists of polarisations along
45◦, |+45〉, and 135◦, |−45〉.
In the ﬁrst step of the protocol, Alice chooses N random bits X1, ..., XN , encodes each
of these bits into qubits using at random either the rectilinear or the diagonal basis, and
transmits them to Bob via the quantum channel. Bob measures each of the qubits he
receives with respect to (a random choice of) either the rectilinear or the diagonal basis
4The abortion probability is a security parameter, that can be chosen arbitrarily close to unity.
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to obtain classical bits Yi. The pair of classical bitstrings X and Y held by Alice and
Bob after this step is called the raw key pair.
The remaining part of the protocol is purely classical, in particular, Alice and Bob
communicate only classically from here on. First, in the sifting step, Alice and Bob
announce their choices of bases used for the encoding and the measurement, respectively.
Since only bits where the basis is the same for the encoding and for the measurement
give a deterministic relation between signal and measurement outcome, they keep only
those bits of the raw key, discarding all other ones. The result is called the sifted key.
In an experimental implementation, noise is always present leading to a certain bit
error ratio in the sifted key even if the adversary is passive. However, as these errors are
not distinguishable, even in principle, from errors caused by an attack, they have have
to be attributed to eavesdropping activity. To be able to yield an error-free and secret
key, the key distribution protocol has to be amended by two steps:
The ﬁrst is the reconciliation (or error correction) step, leading to a key, shared by
Alice and Bob. In an either one-way or interactive procedure, Alice and Bob exchange
certain error correcting information on the sifted key strings X ′, Y ′. In order to quantify
the quantum bit error ratio5 (QBER), i.e., the fraction of positions i in which X ′i and
Y ′i diﬀer, Alice and Bob either compare some small randomly chosen set of bits of their
sifted key, or derive the QBER directly from the error correcting procedure. If the error
ratio is too large — which might indicate the presence of an adversary — the protocol
has to be aborted.
The second step deals with the situation that the eavesdropper has to be assumed
to be in possession of at least some knowledge about the reconciled string, originating
possibly both from an attack on the quantum signals, and from the error correcting infor-
mation. Therefore, in the ﬁnal step of the protocol, Alice and Bob apply two-universal
hashing [53] to turn the (generally only partially secret) string X ′ into a shorter but
secure key. This technique is the generalised privacy ampliﬁcation procedure introduced
by Bennett et al. [54].
2.3 Eavesdropping attacks on the ideal protocol
In order to ensure unconditional security for a QKD protocol, a security proof needs to
take into account all possible classes of attacks Eve might conduct. From the theoretical
point of view of quantum mechanical measurements, any eavesdropping attack can be
thought of as an interaction between a probe and the quantum signals. Eve then per-
forms measurements on the probe to obtain information about the signal states. In this
framework, three main classes of attacks are possible:
Individual attacks: The adversary is supposed to apply some ﬁxed measurement oper-
ations to each of the quantum signals, that is, Eve lets each of the signals interact
5This quantity is most often called “quantum bit error rate”, but it is actually a ratio, not a rate.
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with a separate probe (unentangled to the other probes) and measures the probes
separately afterwards.
Collective attacks: As in the individual attack, each signal interacts with its own in-
dependent probe. In the measurement stage of an collective attack, however, the
restriction for Eve to measure the probes individually is dropped: Eve is allowed
to perform measurements on all probes coherently.
Coherent attacks: In the most general (also called joint attacks), Eve can apply the
most general unitary transformation to all the qubits simultaneously. Eﬀectively,
this means that Eve has access to all signals at the same time.
A further diﬀerentiation of these attacks can be made by determining whether Eve may
delay the measurement of the probes till receiving all classical data, that Alice and Bob
exchange for error correction and privacy ampliﬁcation.
As shown in [55], individual attacks are generally weaker than collective attacks.
Hence, the security against individual attacks does not imply full security. Meanwhile,
methods have been developed to prove unconditional security, that is, security against
coherent attacks. However, it turns out that it is often suﬃcient to consider only collec-
tive attacks, since for typical protocols coherent attacks are not stronger than collective
attacks [56].
2.3.1 Some specific attacks
Intercept-resend attack
The intercept-resend attack is an individual attack, where Eve performs a complete
measurement on the signals, and subsequently prepares a new quantum state she sends
on to Bob. By removing Alice’s signal states from the quantum channel close to the
transmitting unit, and reinjecting the prepared quantum state close to Bob’s detection
device, Eve is able to circumvent all channel imperfections. The simplest example is
an intercept-resend attack in the BB84 protocol: Eve performs a measurement of each
signal state in one of the signal bases and prepares a state which corresponds to her
measurement result. This leads to an average error rate in the sifted key of 25%, com-
posed of events with 0% error whenever Eve uses the same basis as Alice and Bob, and
events with 50% whenever her basis diﬀers from theirs. In this way, Eve learns 50% of
the sifted key.
Optimal individual attack
A more advanced form of measuring for the adversary involves positive operator-valued
measures (POVMs) which allow to increase the ratio of gathered information per induced
disturbance. Lu¨tkenhaus investigated the use of POVMs under the restriction that
Eve performs her measurements before Alice reveals the basis [57]. A good indicator
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for the possibility to recover a safe cryptographic key is the comparison of the mutual
information IAB between Alice and Bob (after eavesdropping) to the mutual informations
IAE and IBE between Alice and Eve, and between Bob and Eve, respectively. If (whether
due to eavesdropping or channel noise) IAB ≤ min{IAE, IBE}, Alice and Bob cannot
establish a secret key any more, using only one-way classical post-processing6. In [57],
equality is reached for an error rate of ≈ 15%.
In [58], the use of a quantum cloning machine (restricted to a probe consisting of a
single qubit) is investigated, achieving a marginal advantage over the strategy mentioned
above. The optimal individual attack utilises two qubits as a probe and attains the best
possible ratio between Eve’s information gain and her induced disturbance [59,60]. The
threshold noise level for a potentially safe channel is therefore a QBER of (1−1/√2)/2 ≈
14.6%. The entangling-probe attack has been physically simulated recently [61] using
single-photon two-qubit quantum logic. There, Eve entangles her probe qubit with the
qubit that Alice sends to Bob, with the help of a controlled-NOT (CNOT) gate. Eve
then makes her measurement on the probe to obtain information on the sent signal state,
at the expense of imposing detectable errors between Alice and Bob. By preparing
the initial state of her probe qubit, Eve can adjust the strength of her interaction,
thereby determining the amount of information she can obtain and the error rate she
will inadvertently create.
2.4 Other protocols
Since the invention of quantum cryptography, a large variety of alternative QKD proto-
cols has been proposed. Some of them are optimised to be very eﬃcient with respect to
the secret-key rate, that is, the number of key bits generated per transmitted quantum
state. Others are designed to cope with higher noise levels, which makes them more suit-
able for practical implementations [62]. The structure of the protocols that are outlined
in the following, is largely very similar to the BB84 protocol.
Two-state protocol: B92
The B92 protocol [63] is conceptionally the simplest of all protocols, and shows that
two non-orthogonal states are already suﬃcient to implement secure QKD. In the case
of the qubits being realised as polarisation encoded single photons, Alice chooses ran-
domly between the horizontal polarisation state |H〉 and the diagonal polarisation state
|+45〉, which represent the bit values 0 and 1, respectively. Bob performs measurements
randomly either in the rectilinear or the diagonal basis. Detection outcomes |V 〉 and
|−45〉 allow Bob to infer the bit value with certainty, whereas the orthogonal results
are inconclusive. In the sifting step, Bob announces only on which signals he obtained
6That is, a post-processing scheme derived from a one-way entanglement puriﬁcation protocol. See
§2.4.1 for more details.
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conclusive results, but not the measurement basis, since this would eﬀectively reveal the
bit value itself. The inconclusive events are discarded for key generation.
In a system with losses, such a scheme is prone to an unambiguous state discrimination
attack [64,65]. Eve could perform measurements on the signal states similar to Bob, and
selectively block those photons on which she obtained inconclusive measurement results,
while re-sending photons she has identiﬁed with certainty on to Bob. If the latter is
done avoiding the channel losses, the eavesdropper can (in a certain parameter regime)
compensate the decreased transmission rate caused by the blocked signals, and stay
undetected. By incorporating the non-orthogonality between the states as a continuous
parameter of the scheme, the region of channel transmittance allowing for secure key
generation can be optimised [65].
The two-state protocol can also be realised using interference between a bright (ref-
erence) pulse and a dim pulse containing less than one photon on average [63, 66]. The
qubit is encoded in the relative phase shift between the dim pulse and the reference
pulse. This approach makes the protocol more resistant to eavesdropping in high loss
conditions: If Eve obtains an inconclusive measurement result, she cannot simply block
the strong pulse, because Bob can easily monitor its presence. Neither can Eve block
the dim pulse, since the interference of the reference pulse with vacuum results in errors.
Likewise, Eve would inevitably introduce detectable errors if she prepared her own dim
and/or strong pulse and sent them to Bob. Although the BB92 protocol can be made
unconditionally secure, Eve’s information gain for a ﬁxed disturbance of Alice’s qubits
is larger than for the BB84 protocol [59].
Six-state protocol
The six-state protocol [67,68] uses three conjugate bases for the encoding, but is other-
wise identical to the BB84 protocol. The three bases (rectilinear, diagonal, and circular
polarisation) are used with equal probability. Therefore, the probability for Alice and
Bob choosing compatible bases is only 1/3. On the other hand, eavesdropping causes
a higher error rate compared to a four-state protocol. This results in a higher noise
threshold that can be tolerated.
Generally, the probabilities for choosing the diﬀerent bases of a QKD protocol need
not be equal. On the contrary, the eﬃciency of the protocol is increased if one of the
bases is selected with probability almost one [69]. In this case, the choice of Alice and
Bob will coincide with high probability, which means that the number of bits to be
discarded in the sifting step is small. However, this advantage comes at the cost of a
decreased tolerable error rate, because also an adversary has higher probability to guess
the correct basis.
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SARG protocol
The idea of the B92 protocol to use a pair of non-orthogonal states to encode the
bit values 0 and 1 can be extended to more than one pair in order to enhance the
robustness of the resulting protocol to photon number splitting attacks compared to
BB84 (see §2.5.2). The SARG protocol [62] diﬀers from the BB84 protocol only in the
classical sifting procedure, but uses the same four quantum states. It allows to generate
unconditionally secure key not only from the single photon component of a weak laser
pulse source, but also from the two-photon signals [70]. This is not surprising from the
viewpoint of unambiguous state discrimination: unambiguous discrimination among N
states of a qubit space is only possible when at least N − 1 identical copies of the state
are available for measurement [71]. In the case of 4 states as in BB84, at least 3 copies
are required for Eve to distinguish the states. Hence, it is safe to use not only one-photon
signals, but also two-photon signals for key generation in the SARG protocol.
To implement the SARG protocol, Alice prepares randomly one of four quantum states
and Bob performs measurements either in the rectilinear or the diagonal basis exactly
as in the BB84 protocol. The classical part of the protocol, however, is modiﬁed: in-
stead of revealing the basis, Alice announces publicly which one of the four pairs of
non-orthogonal states {|H〉 , |+45〉}, {|+45〉 , |V 〉}, {|V 〉 , |−45〉}, {|−45〉 , |H〉} she used
for encoding the bit value, where |H〉 , |V 〉 represent 0, and |+45〉 , |−45〉 represent 1. If
Bob ﬁnds a state orthogonal to one of the two announced states, he learns the bit value
conclusively. For example, if Bob detects |V 〉, and Alice used the pair {|H〉 , |+45〉}, he
concludes that Alice has sent the state |H〉, corresponding to the bit value 0. Otherwise,
if Bob’s detection outcome is not orthogonal to the announced states, the event is dis-
carded (analogous to the B92 protocol). In comparison with BB84, the SARG protocol
allows secure key generation with attenuated laser pulses for higher channel losses. The
scheme can be extended to more than 4 sets of non-orthogonal states to enable key
generation from even higher multi-photon components [70].
2.4.1 Security proofs
Since the eavesdropper is allowed unlimited technological resources within the limits of
the laws of physics, he may perform the most sophisticated and general attack imagin-
able. Hence, developing a formalism that takes into account any eavesdropping strategy
is not easy, and so it took, from the invention of quantum cryptography, more than
a decade to prove the unconditional security of QKD, even for an idealised system.
Preferably, security should be achieved in the sense of a universally composable security
deﬁnition: This implies that the key can safely be used in any arbitrary context, except
with some small probability . The underlying idea is to characterise the security of the
secret key by the maximum probability  that it deviates from a perfect key (i.e., a key
that is uniformly distributed and independent of the adversary’s information).
The earliest ultimate, but rather complicated, security proof is due to Mayers [72,73].
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Since then, several diﬀerent techniques have been applied to the problem, originating
both from quantum theory and from information theory. The proofs by Lo and Chau [74]
required Alice and Bob to have a quantum computer. This condition could be dropped
in a subsequent important proof by Shor and Preskill [75], which uniﬁes the ideas of
Mayers and Lo and Chau. The key result of their work is that the security of QKD can
be expressed in terms of an underlying entanglement puriﬁcation protocol (EPP). This
is based on the following observations.
Instead of preparing her system in a certain state and then sending it to Bob, Alice
can equivalently prepare an entangled state, send one of the qubits to Bob, and later
measure her subsystem. Thus, she eﬀectively prepares Bob’s system from a distance.
If the joint system of Alice and Bob is in a pure state, then it cannot be entangled
with any third party; especially it cannot be entangled with any of Eve’s auxiliary
systems (monogamy of entanglement). Hence, simple measurements on the entangled
pair provide Alice and Bob with data totally unknown to Eve. Furthermore, if the state
shared by Alice and Bob is maximally entangled, then their measurement results are
maximally correlated. Therefore, Alice and Bob can obtain the desired secret bits by
performing some entanglement puriﬁcation protocol.
Since one is interested in the security of protocols implemented with available tech-
nology, one does not want to actually run a general entanglement distillation protocol,
because this would require the storage of quantum states and quantum computation
steps. The problem can be overcome by using the fact that certain entanglement distil-
lation protocols are mathematically equivalent to quantum error correction codes. One
example are the Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) codes, which have the property that bit
errors and phase errors can be corrected separately. Since the ﬁnal key is classical, its
value does not depend on the phase errors. Hence, Alice and Bob actually only have to
correct the bit errors, which is a purely classical task. In this way, the quantum protocol
becomes equivalent to the standard BB84 protocol; the decoding operation of the CSS
quantum error correction turns into classical error correction and privacy ampliﬁcation,
and no quantum manipulation capabilities are required. With this technique, Shor and
Preskill showed that BB84 is secure whenever the error rate is less than 11%. The proof
has been adapted to other protocols like B92, and the six-state protocol [76, 77].
The principle exploiting the entanglement puriﬁcation method uses eﬀectively only
one-way communication. This idea can be extended to two-way entanglement puriﬁca-
tion schemes, which tolerate higher noise levels in the channel than one-way EPPs. The
equivalent QKD protocols require two-way classical communication between Alice and
Bob in the post-processing step of classical data (i.e., in the error correction and privacy
ampliﬁcation stage)7.
It turns out that the detour via entanglement puriﬁcation is neither necessary nor
7In fact, any implementation of the BB84 (or six-state) protocol requires two-way classical commu-
nications anyway. For example, in the basis comparison step, it is necessary to employ two-way
classical communication. Of course, the “one-way” classical post-processing requires fewer rounds
of communication (and therefore less time) to complete.
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BB84 Six-state
one-way two-way one-way two-way
Upper bound 14.6% 25% 16.7% 33.3%
Lower bound 11.0% 20.0% 12.7% 27.6%
Table 2.1: Upper and lower bounds on the tolerable bit error rate for the ideal BB84 and
six-state protocols using one-way and two-way classical post-processing [81,82].
optimal. Secret key agreement might be possible even if the state describing Alice and
Bob’s joint system before error correction and privacy ampliﬁcation does not allow for
entanglement distillation. This newer class of security proofs is based on information-
theoretic arguments [78–80].
2.4.2 Bounds on performance
In QKD experiments, one is interested in maximising three quantities — the key gen-
eration rate, the tolerable error rate, and, closely related, the maximal secure distance.
Concerning the robustness with respect to noise, there are a number of upper and lower
bounds known for the allowable bit error rate.
Table 2.1 summarises known lower and upper bounds for the BB84 and the six-state
protocol, both for one-way and two-way classical communication. The upper bounds
are derived by considering some simple individual attacks, and determining when these
attacks can defeat QKD. The lower bounds can be determined by the unconditional
security proof assuming that Eve is performing an arbitrary attack allowed by the laws
of quantum mechanics and Alice and Bob employ some special data post-processing
schemes8. The upper bounds for one-way post-processing come from attacks based on
optimal approximate cloning machines. Although one-way error correction and privacy
ampliﬁcation alone cannot provide Alice and Bob with a secure key beyond this QBER,
the more general class of protocols utilising two-way communication can guarantee se-
crecy up to a higher level of QBER. The ultimate upper limit for two-way post-processing
originate from the intercept-resend eavesdropping strategy. For BB84, this attack re-
sults in the known error rate of 25%. For the six-state scheme, intercept-resend leads to
an error rate of 1/3. As stated before, the six-state scheme can intrinsically tolerate a
higher bit error rate than BB84.
The Shor and Preskill proof of security shows that BB84 with one-way communication
can be secure with a secret key rate of at least 1 − 2H2(e), where e is the QBER and
H2(x) = −x log2 x − (1 − x) log2(1 − x) is the binary Shannon entropy. The key rate
reaches 0 when e is roughly 11.0%. Gottesman, Lo and Chau showed [81, 82] that it
8The lower bounds in the one-way classical communication case can be improved to 12.4% and 14.1%
for the BB84 and the six-state protocol, respectively, if the legitimate users add some noise to the
sifted key as the ﬁrst classical postprocessing step [79, 80].
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is possible to create prepare-and-measure QKD schemes based on two-way EPPs, and
that the advantage of two-way EPPs to tolerate higher error rates can survive. The
resulting QKD protocol includes a pre-processing with two-way classical communication
before the conventional information reconciliation and can tolerate 20.0% error rate.
Also, the key rate is increased when the error rate is higher than about 9%. Recently,
this kind of two-way communication was applied to QKD protocols with weak coherent
pulses [83,84]. It should be noted that this kind of two-way preprocessing is also known
in the classical key agreement context, in which it is usually called advantage distillation.
The highest key rates for the ideal BB84 and six-state protocols up to now are achieved
by converting a two-way breeding EPP [85] into a QKD protocol [86] that is assisted
by one-time pad encryption with a pre-shared key [87]. The improvements in distillable
key are most noticeable in the regime of medium to high error rates, i.e., ∼ 8% to
∼ 13% QBER.
2.5 QKD with realistic devices
Up to now we have considered an idealised situation where Alice prepares perfect quan-
tum states, and Bob performs ideal measurements. Real-life QKD systems, however,
suﬀer from many types of imperfections. For instance, the detection apparatus is nor-
mally composed of so-called threshold (on/oﬀ) detectors, which just report the arrival
of photons, and do not tell how many of them have arrived. Moreover, detectors often
suﬀer false detection events due to background and intrinsic dark counts. Also, some
misalignment in the detection system is inevitable. The signal states — single-photon
Fock states — assumed by BB84 and its derivatives, are even more diﬃcult to realise
experimentally. It’s by no means a matter of course that the unconditional security of
QKD can be maintained under these circumstances, but with additional measures, this
is fortunately the case [88, 89].
2.5.1 QKD with attenuated pulses
Although single photon sources may well be very useful for quantum computing, they
are not required for QKD. Currently single photon sources are rather impractical for
QKD. Instead, attenuated laser pulses are often used as signals in practical QKD de-
vices. The electromagnetic ﬁeld can be well approximated by a monochromatic coherent
state, provided the spectral width of the laser pulses is much smaller than their mean
wavelength. Those attenuated laser pulses, when phase randomised, follow a Poissonian
distribution in the number of photons, i.e., the probability of having n photons in a
signal is given by
Pμ(n) =
μn
n!
e−μ, (2.1)
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where μ is the mean number of photons, and is chosen by the sender. In order to keep
the probability of emission of a multi-photon pulse low, μ is commonly set below 1. Still,
there is always non-zero probability of emitting two or more photons.
2.5.2 Photon-number splitting attacks
Employing attenuated laser pulses instead of perfect single photons calls for including
another attack strategy — in addition to the attacks presented so far — into the security
proof: so-called photon-number splitting (PNS) attacks [45–47,64]. However, the follow-
ing applies not only to attenuated pulse schemes, but aﬀects in principle all sources
having a ﬁnite probability of emitting more than one photon: Provided all photons
emitted in a multi-photon signal encode the same qubit, Eve can steal a copy of the
information without Alice and Bob noticing it. Nevertheless, we will concentrate in the
following on the combination ’BB84 protocol with attenuated pulses’.
Beam splitting attack
The concept of the beam splitting attack uses the idea that a lossy quantum channel
can be described as a combination of a lossless channel and a beam splitter, which
accounts for the losses of the original channel. Eve monitors the second output arm
of the beam splitter, while Bob obtains the transmitted part. If a multi-photon signal
is split at the beam splitter such that Bob and Eve get at least one photon of the
signal, the eavesdropper can gain complete knowledge of this sifted key bit via a delayed
measurement: Eve waits until Alice and Bob publicly communicate the polarisation
basis and then measures her photon(s) in the correct basis. In this way, Eve learns a
fraction of the sifted key deterministically, depending on the fraction of multi-photon
signals emitted by Alice that enter the sifted key. One can show that the fraction f of
the sifted key known to Eve is [88]
fBS = 1− e−μ(1−η), (2.2)
where η is the transmission of the original lossy channel. The fraction f is plotted versus
the channel transmission for a value of the mean photon number μ of 0.1 in Figure 2.1
(dashed red curve). It is clear that this attack cannot be excluded by Alice and Bob by
any additional test of the channel, since it represents the physical model of the channel.
However, the beam splitting attack is very ineﬀective when replacing channels with high
losses, that is, large transmission distances: the known key fraction saturates at a level
of order μ. In that case, for example, two-photon signals are more likely to see both
photons being directed to Eve (and therefore becoming useless) rather than being split.
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Figure 2.1: Eﬀectiveness of diﬀerent photon-number splitting attacks on Alice using atten-
uated pulses with mean photon number μ = 0.1: fraction of sifted key bits known to Eve as
a function of channel loss, if she performs a) the simple beam-splitting attack (dashed red
curve), or b) the full PNS attack (solid blue curve). In the latter case, secret key generation
in not possible for channel losses exceeding ηPNScrit .
PNS attack
In the beam splitting attack, the photons of the incoming signal states are redirected
statistically to Eve and Bob. In principle, Eve could arrange an improved eavesdropping
method called PNS attack [45–47]: Eve can ﬁrst measure the number of photons in each
pulse without disturbing the degree of freedom encoding the qubits using a quantum non-
demolition measurement. The measurement does not perturb the qubit, and in particular
it does not destroy the photons (Eve actually performs a measurement in the photon
number Hilbert space). Such a measurement is possible, because Eve knows in advance
that Alice sends a mixture of states with well-deﬁned photon numbers. Whenever Eve
ﬁnds a multi-photon signal, she deterministically splits one photon oﬀ, and forwards
the remaining photons to Bob. In order to prevent Bob from detecting a lower qubit
rate, Eve can use a channel with lower losses. Ideally, Eve uses a lossless channel, which
enables her, under certain conditions, to increase the probability that multi-photon
pulses reach Bob’s detector, while still keeping one photon for herself. Then, in order to
match the original loss in the channel, Eve may block some of the single-photon signals,
thereby reducing the fraction of signals that contribute to the key, but that she has not
full knowledge about. On those single-photon signals that she does not block, Eve may
perform any coherent eavesdropping attack. Consequently, all the errors in the sifted key
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arise from eavesdropping in single-photon signals. Ignoring eavesdropping on the single
photon pulses for the moment, the fraction of the sifted key known to Eve is then [46]
fPNS =
pmulti
pexp
=
1− (1 + μ)e−μ
1− e−ημ , (2.3)
which is plotted as solid blue line in Figure 2.1. Equation 2.3 states that if the probability
pmulti for a multi-photon pulse being emitted by Alice is larger than the probability pexp
that a non-empty pulse is detected by Bob, Eve will get full information of the sifted key
without introducing any errors. Hence, there exists a critical transmission ηPNScrit below
which no secure key can be generated, because Eve can aﬀord to block all single-photon
pulses:
ηPNScrit = 1−
1
μ
ln(1 + μ). (2.4)
Lu¨tkenhaus and Jahma investigated the possibility for Bob to detect a PNS attack
by monitoring the photon number statistics, which should change under the PNS at-
tack [90]. Although most detectors used in current experiments are not photon-number
resolving, at least some information on the photon number distribution can be inferred
with suitable detection schemes from the probability of coincidence events. It turns out,
however, that it is possible to extend the PNS attack such that the complete photon
number statistics, as seen by Bob, is indistinguishable from that resulting from atten-
uated laser pulses and a lossy channel. This can be achieved solely by introducing a
photon-number dependent loss in the channel and holds in a certain parameter regime
described by the implicit equation(
1 + μ +
μ2
2
)
e−μ − (1 + ημ) e−ημ ≤ 0. (2.5)
The region in the (η, μ)-plane where this condition is fulﬁlled, is the area below the red
curve plotted in Figure 2.2.
Evaluating the threat posed by the PNS attack, one must constitute that the PNS
attack in its ideal form requires substantial technological means, and might thus be
considered unrealistic, although it is certainly not unphysical. Eve needs not only to be
capable of performing a quantum non-demolition measurement of the photon number
[91], and of splitting the signal pulses deterministically, but also has to store her qubits
for a possibly very long time9. The latter may be achieved either with a quantum
memory (which does not exist today), or a lossless channel in a loop. Realising a lossless
channel avoiding fundamental physical eﬀects such as scattering and diﬀraction is also
diﬃcult.
On the other hand, approximations to the ideal PNS attack have been investigated
[92], concentrating on splitting processes that are within reach of current technology and
9Alice and Bob may wait with the announcement of the bases until the key is actually needed for
encryption.
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Figure 2.2: PNS attack on the BB84 protocol with attenuated laser pulses: as a function of
channel loss η and the source’s mean photon number μ, the fraction of sifted key bits known to
Eve is coded as grey levels, with the critical (η, μ)-combination marked as a dashed blue line,
where this fraction reaches 1. In the region below the red curve, Eve can additionally mimic
the full photon number statistics of the original channel.
that reduce the probability of splitting oﬀ more than one photon. For example, the input
state can be sent to a polarisation independent weak beam splitter. If no photons are
detected in the weakly coupled output arm, the signal is sent through an identical beam
splitter again. Otherwise the signal is transmitted through a perfect channel without
any further processing. With this technique, the authors constructed attacks that show
performance close to the full PNS attack, but with much simpler hardware.
In conclusion, it should be emphasised that multi-photon pulses do not necessarily
constitute a threat to key security, but they limit the key creation rate (because more bits
must be discarded during privacy ampliﬁcation) and the minimum channel transmission,
that is, distance, over which QKD can be made secure.
2.5.3 Security proof for attenuated pulse systems
The security of the BB84 protocol using attenuated laser pulses has been investigated
by Inamori et al [88], and Gottesmann et al [89]. Their result (often abbreviated as
ILM-GLLP) holds against the most general attack of Eve, the coherent attack where
Eve may delay her measurements. The elementary concept there is the so-called tagged
bits : These are signals received by Bob which might have leaked all of their signal
information to Eve, without causing Eve to introduce errors. In the case that Alice uses
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an attenuated pulse source, those raw bits caused by multi-photon pulses from Alice
are regarded as tagged bits, because Eve in principle can have full information without
causing any disturbance if she uses the PNS attack. The concept of tagged bits is,
however, much more general, and is able to describe also other device imperfections,
that leak information to Eve. The ILM-GLLP results show that, even if Alice has an
imperfect source, a secure ﬁnal key can be distilled if one knows an upper bound of the
tagged bits. This is possible because of two important observations: Firstly, the key
distillation does not need information about which raw bits are tagged. Secondly, the
key distillation does not need an exact value for the fraction of tagged bits. An upper
bound of the fraction of tagged bits among all initial bits is enough, albeit the tightness
of the bound determines the resulting key generation eﬃciency. The ﬁnal key rate (per
pulse) in the asymptotic limit of a long key is then given by
RWCP ≥ pexp
2
[
(1−Δ)− f(e)H2(e)− (1−Δ)H2
(
e
1−Δ
)]
, (2.6)
where Δ is the fraction of the tagged bits, e is the QBER measured by Alice and Bob,
f(e) is the eﬃciency of the error correction (see §2.7.1), and H2 is the binary entropy
function given by H2(x) = −x log2 x − (1 − x) log2(1 − x). Formula 2.6 shows that
after error correction, which consumes f(e)H2(e) of raw bits, the key must be reduced
by Δ + (1 − Δ)H2(e/1 − Δ) bits in privacy ampliﬁcation to guarantee security. For
Δ = 0, as in the case of a perfect single photon source, equation 2.6 reduces to the key
generation rate of the ideal BB84 protocol,
RSP ≥ pexp
2
[1− f(e)H2(e)−H2(e)] . (2.7)
The central task is to ﬁnd a faithful and tight estimate for the value of Δ. For security,
the estimate must be faithful so that the estimated Δ is never smaller than the true
fraction of tagged bits, whatever is Eve’s channel. For eﬃciency, the estimated Δ value
should be only a little larger than the true value in the normal case when there is no
Eve. As a worst-case estimate for Δ, one may use the fraction fPNS (equation 2.3) of the
raw key bits known to Eve if she perfoms the full PNS attack, i.e., splitting all multi-
photon pulses (while using a lossless channel to enhance their probability of detection by
Bob) and blocking a fraction of the single-photon pulses to match the original channel
transmittance,
Δ =
pmulti
pexp
= fPNS. (2.8)
Since pexp drops linearly with the channel transmittance, Δ quickly reaches unity (leaving
no untagged bits to generate a secret key), unless pmulti is adjusted accordingly by further
attenuating the pulses. This means that the mean photon number μ has to be chosen
roughly proportional to η. Overall, the key generation rate RWCP becomes proportional
to the square of the channel transmittance η, and thus drops quickly with increasing
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losses. This signiﬁcant performance limitation of attenuated pulse systems has led to
the belief that single photon sources would be indispensable for building eﬃcient QKD
systems. However, the decoy state method, which is described in §2.6, allows for a much
tighter bound, achieving an almost linear dependency of the key generation rate on the
channel transmittance. In this way, the technologically much simpler attenuated pulse
systems is again on a level with systems based on single photon sources.
2.5.4 Attacks on real world systems
Obviously, a theoretical description of a protocol — even one that includes certain
imperfections of the devices — is a mathematical idealisation. Any real-life quantum
cryptographic system is a complex physical system with many degrees of freedom. Even
a seemingly minor and subtle omission can be fatal to the security of a cryptographic
system. Especially the existence of side channels [93, 94] are not covered by security
proofs, because they do not depend primarily on the used protocol, but on the individual
implementation of the QKD system. For instance, Eve might gain information on Alice’s
prepared state or Bob’s measurement result by launching additional light pulses (“Trojan
horse”) into their devices and analysing the spectral and temporal properties of the
backreﬂected signal [95]. Another example of an attack, that does not act on the signal
qubits directly, is the possibility for the eavesdropper to create an eﬀective eﬃciency
mismatch between Bob’s detectors by tampering with the timing or wavelength of Alice’s
quantum signals [96–98], provided Bob’s detectors use some sort of time gating.
One can hope to protect against some of these eavesdropping strategies, at least par-
tially, with technical precautions. To ensure the security of a practical implementation
of a QKD system, it has to be scrutinised with regard to any potential side-channels,
and all imperfections have to be assessed quantitatively with respect to the additional
information an adversary could gain from them.
2.6 Decoy-state protocol extension
Given the ILM-GLLP formula 2.6 for the secure key generation rate, and taking into
account the possibility of tagged bits, one may ask, whether the fraction of tagged bits
Δ can be bounded in any better way than by worst case assumptions. A rather simple
— but nonetheless eﬀective — idea to counteract the PNS attack on QKD schemes using
weak laser pulses is the use of decoy states [48–50,99].
2.6.1 Principle
The idea is the following: In addition to the usual signal states of average photon
number μ, Alice prepares decoy states of various mean photon numbers μ1, μ2, ... (but
with the same wavelength, timing, etc.). Alice can achieve this, for instance, via a
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variable attenuator to modulate the intensity of each signal. It is essential that each
signal is chosen randomly to be either a signal state or a decoy state. Both signal
states as well as decoy states consist of pulses containing {0, 1, 2, ...} photons, just with
diﬀerent probabilities. Given a single n-photon pulse, the eavesdropper has no means
to distinguish whether it originates from a signal state or a decoy state. Hence, the
eavesdropper on principle cannot act diﬀerently on signal states and on decoy states.
Therefore, any attempt to suppress single-photon signals in the signal states will lead also
to a suppression of single-photon signals in the decoy states. After Bob’s announcement
of his detection events, Alice broadcasts which signals were indeed signal states and
which signals were decoy states (and which types). Since the signal states and the decoy
states are made up of diﬀerent proportions of single-photon and multi-photon pulses,
any photon-number dependent eavesdropping strategy has diﬀerent eﬀects on the signal
states and on the decoy states. By computing the gain (i.e., the ratio of the number
of detection events to the number of signals sent by Alice) separately for signal states
and each of the decoy states, the legitimate users can with high probability10 detect any
photon-number dependent suppression of signals and thus unveil a PNS attack.
As shown by Lo et al. [50], in the limit of an inﬁnite number of intensities μi of
the decoy states, the only eavesdropping strategy that will produce the correct gain
for all signal intensities, is the standard beam splitter attack (§2.5.2). Consequently,
the resulting key generation rate with decoy states is substantially higher and grows
basically like O(η), compared to O(η2) in the case of non-decoy protocols. An inﬁnite
number of decoy intensities is of course impractical for an application, especially in the
light of a ﬁnite number of pulses that contribute to a secret key in a real QKD system.
It turns out that the number of decoy intensities can be dramatically decreased without
sacriﬁcing too much tightness of the bound for Δ [100]. Several diﬀerent practical
protocols have been proposed, using between two [48] and four diﬀerent intensities [49,
101]. The ﬁrst experimental demonstrations of decoy state QKD has been done with
two diﬀerent intensities [14]. In practise, it is advantageous to employ the vacuum
state as an additional decoy state, since this allows a much better estimation of the
background count probability. In fact, it has been shown by Ma et al. [100], that of all
protocols using two decoy states, the vacuum+weak decoy state protocol, is optimal. The
resulting protocol oﬀers a good compromise between simplicity of implementation and
performance and was therefore chosen for the inter-island QKD experiment presented
in this thesis. In the following, the protocol is described in more detail.
2.6.2 Practical three-intensity decoy-state protocol
The security of the decoy-state method in combination with the BB84 protocol in the
GLLP framework [88,89] has been analysed by Lo et al. [50]. In particular, the ﬁnal key
10The actual probability is a security parameter and can be chosen arbitrarily close to 1.
22
2.6 Decoy-state protocol extension
rate (per pulse) can be calculated by the formula
R ≥ ns Qμ
2
[
1−Δ− f(e)H2(e)− (1−Δ)H2
(
e
1−Δ
)]
. (2.9)
Here, Qμ is Bob’s detection probability for pulses of intensity μ, and ns denotes the
fraction of signal pulses, that is, pulses that potentially contribute to the sifted key (as
opposed to decoy pulses, that only serve for parameter estimation). The goal is to ﬁnd
an upper bound for Δ, using only quantities that are measurable in the experiment.
In the protocol that was proposed by Wang [49] and further analysed by Ma [100],
weak coherent states with mean photon numbers μ and μ′ (where μ < μ′) are used for
signal pulses, and the vacuum state is used as decoy pulses. Since both μ and μ′ are
essentially of the same order of magnitude, pulses of both types can be used to distill
the ﬁnal key. Alice mixes randomly the positions of all classes of pulses.
To derive an upper bound for Δ, Alice and Bob analyse the individual counting rates
for the diﬀerent decoy and signal states. The analysis is most conveniently expressed in
terms of yield and gain: The yield Yn of an n-photon state is deﬁned as the conditional
probability of a detection event at Bob, given that Alice sends out an n-photon state.
The gain Qn of an n-photon state is deﬁned as the product of the probability Pμ(n) that
Alice emits an n-photon state, and the yield Yn:
Qn = Pμ(n) · Yn = μ
n
n!
e−μ · Yn. (2.10)
The essence of the decoy-state method consists in the fact, that Yn must be the same
both for the signal and decoy states. After a number of pulses have been sent, Bob
announces which pulses caused a detection event in his detector. Since Alice knows
which pulse belongs to which class, Alice can calculate the gains of each class of pulses,
that consist of the individual n-photon contributions:
Qμ =
∞∑
n=0
Pμ(n)Yn = e
−μY0 + μe−μY1 + M (2.11)
Qμ′ =
∞∑
n=0
Pμ′(n)Yn = e
−μ′Y0 + μ′e−μ
′
Y1 +
μ′2e−μ
′
μ2e−μ
M + r, (2.12)
where M :=
∑
n≤2 Pμ(n)Yn = Δ ·Qμ. From the vacuum decoy pulses, Alice can compute
the value Q0, that corresponds to the background probability Y0 of Bob’s detector. After
eliminating Y1 and solving for M , one can ﬁnd a lower bound for the term containing r,
using the inequality μ < μ′. Finally, this results in an upper bound for M , or, normalised
to Qμ, for Δ:
Δ :=
M
Qμ
≤ μ
μ′ − μ
(
μe−μQμ′
μ′e−μ′Qμ
− 1
)
+
μe−μY0
μ′Qμ
. (2.13)
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Likewise, and given the fact that Y1 is the same for both classes of pulses, one obtains
an upper bound for the fraction of tagged pulses of the μ′-class:
Δ′ ≤ 1−
(
1−Δ− e
−μY0
Qμ
)
Qμμ
′
Qμ′μ
eμ−μ
′ − e
−μ′Y0
Qμ′
. (2.14)
Numerical values of the expected key generation rate for a linear channel model will be
presented in §2.6.4.
As pointed out by Lo et al. [50,100], a higher key generation rate can be achieved by
using a stronger version [89] of equation 2.9:
R ≥ ns Qμ
2
[1−Δ− f(eμ)H2(eμ)− (1−Δ)H2(e1)] , (2.15)
where e1 is the QBER of detection events by Bob that have originated from single-
photon signals emitted by Alice. In contrast to the simpler method described above,
equation (2.15) does not make the worst case assumption e1 = e/(1−Δ), but requires
a separate estimation of e1. Again, it is possible to ﬁnd a (lower) bound on e1 with the
help of the decoy method, leading to higher key generation rates than equation (2.9).
The increase is usually on the order of a few percent, but reaches much higher values
close to the maximal secure channel attenuation.
If qubit losses are considerable, then Bob will receive many empty pulses, and dark
counts from his detectors will induce a high error rate. A further improvement is given by
the following observation (which is independent of the decoy state method). For the class
of events, where Bob does not receive Alice’s signal (because it was lost on the quantum
channel), but records a dark count in one of his detectors, no privacy ampliﬁcation is
needed: The eavesdropper cannot have any a priori information about these bits, since
the dark count events are independent of Alice’s and Eve’s actions [102–104].
R ≥ ns 1
2
[Q0 + Q1 −Qμf(eμ)H2(eμ)−Q1H2(e1)] (2.16)
However, this is true only for erroneous events that are purely accidental and strictly
not under the control of an adversary. Hence, Q0 refers only to the intrinsic dark counts
of Bob’s detector, not to background counts due to stray light, since the latter could
have been manipulated by Eve. It is therefore necessary to determine a lower bound
on the intrinsic dark count probability, for example by blocking the detection unit and
estimating Q0 from these results.
2.6.3 Statistical fluctuations due to finite data
Any real-life experiment is done in a ﬁnite time. In particular, for a QKD system to be
practical, a secret key should be provided within a reasonable time. This means that the
number of exchanged qubits, and hence the data set of detection events are inevitably of
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ﬁnite size. Equations (2.13) and (2.14) hold strictly only for the asymptotic case, where
— thanks to an inﬁnite amount of detection events — the values of Qμ, Qμ′ and Y0 are
precisely known. In reality, Bob can compute these values only up to a certain statistical
uncertainty [49, 100, 105, 106]. In general, as the distance of QKD increases, larger and
larger data sets will be needed for the reliable estimation of Δ and e, thus requiring
a longer QKD experiment. Statistical ﬂuctuations of the count rates recorded by Bob
can be accounted for by Gaussian error propagation. Strictly speaking, this technique
is based on normal probability distributions, whereas the count rates follow a binomial
distribution. However, the normal distribution is a good approximation to the binomial
distribution for reasonable count rates  1. The uncertainties δQμ, δQμ′ , δY0 lead to an
uncertainty δΔ of the fraction of tagged bits according to
δΔ =
√(
∂Δ
∂Qμ
)2
δQ2μ +
(
∂Δ
∂Qμ′
)2
δQ2μ′ +
(
∂Δ
∂Y0
)2
δY 20 . (2.17)
The behaviour of δΔ is mainly governed by the choice of the relative frequency of the
diﬀerent pulse classes. This can be assessed quantitatively if we assume some channel
model, which is done in the next section.
In general, additional sources of ﬂuctuations may exist, that were not considered here.
For example, the intensity of Alice’s laser pulses may be ﬂuctuating. This problem has
been investigated in [107]. The author concludes, that, given the intensity error of
each pulse is random, the decoy state method can still work eﬃciently even with large
intensity ﬂuctuations. In addition, Eve has a non-negligibly small probability to treat,
by chance, n-photon pulses from diﬀerent classes a little bit diﬀerently, even they have
the same state. In other words, the yields Yn for the signal states might be slightly
diﬀerent from the yields Y ′n of the decoy states.
Notwithstanding the presented approach, the question of how to properly take into
account the statistical eﬀects of ﬁnite key lengths is currently still under investigation
and discussion [108–113] and not yet solved conclusively.
2.6.4 Key generation rates
In order to compute expected key generation rates for diﬀerent protocols, it is necessary
to make assumptions on certain experimental parameters.
It is common to assume a linear model for the quantum channel, which means, that
the absorption probabilities for diﬀerent photons are statistically independent. In other
words, for pulses of mean photon number μ, the probability for the detection of n photons
at the end of the quantum channel with transmittance η becomes
Pμ,η(n) =
(μη)n
n!
e−μη. (2.18)
Here it should be noted, that this may not be exactly the case in reality, in particular with
free-space quantum channels (see §3.4.5). However, a deviation aﬀects only predictions
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Figure 2.3: Upper graph: Asymptotic key generation rate for the BB84 protocol with ideal
single photon source, BB84 with attenuated laser pulses, and the asymptotic decoy state
protocol, depending on the transmission of the quantum channel. Without the decoy state
extension, attenuated pulses allow secure communication only up to about 20 dB channel loss,
for experimental parameters Y0 = 6 ·10−6, etech = 2%. Lower graph: Inﬂuence of multi-photon
pulses in dependence of the attenuation. The actual fraction of tagged bits (solid red) is upper
bounded by a worst-case estimate (dotted blue) in the case of simple BB84, and by a much
tighter approximation in the decoy protocol (dashed green). The lower graph is plotted for a
ﬁxed mean photon number μ = 0.4.
of the expected key generation rates and of veriﬁed values of Δ. It does not endanger
the security of the decoy state method, because Eve is always assumed to possess full
control over the quantum channel, which includes, in particular, to change the channel
transmission at will and for each pulse, according to the result of a photon-number
quantum non-demolition measurement. As a good approximation, the quantum channel
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shall still be characterised in the following solely by its transmittance η.
The dark count probability is a property mainly of Bob’s detector, but also of the level
of stray light, that inevitably enters Bob’s apparatus. As the dominant noise source at
large transmission distances, the dark count probability governs the maximum distance
over which secure QKD is possible.
The technical error is due to imperfections of the optical components and alignment
and is accounted for by the constant etech contributing to the overall QBER.
For the following plots, realistic parameters similar to the values found in the inter-
island experiment are assumed: Dark count probability Y0 = 6 · 10−6, technical error
etech = 2%, eﬃciency of error correction f(e) = 1.22 (weakly dependent on the overall
QBER, see §2.7.1).
The most important parameter of a real-life QKD system is, of course, the secure key
rate B, measured in exchanged key bits per second, between Alice and Bob:
B = νR, (2.19)
where ν is the repetition frequency of Alice’s source and R is the secure key generation
eﬃciency, which is normalised to the number of emitted pulses.
The upper graph of Figure 2.3 compares the asymptotic secure key generation eﬃ-
ciency of the decoy state method with the pure BB84 protocol, using either a true single
photon source (dashed red curve), or weak coherent pulses with mean photon number
μ = μopt (dotted blue curve), according to equations 2.15, 2.7, and 2.6, respectively.
The ideal single photon source constitutes an upper limit to the secure key rate taking
into account the above mentioned background probability and alignment errors. The
performance curve of a practical QKD system utilising attenuated pulses and the stan-
dard BB84 protocol exhibits the known O(η2) dependency, which puts severe limits both
to key rate and achievable distance. Employing the ideal decoy state method with an
inﬁnite number of decoy states allows precise calculation of Δ and e1, and results in a
key rate that scales equally to the case of the single photon source, as well as in a much
higher distance for unconditionally secure QKD. The lower graph of Figure 2.3 illus-
trates the role of multi-photon signals (computed for ﬁxed μ = 0.4) as a function of the
channel attenuation. Plotted in red is the fraction of tagged bits arriving at Bob when
no eavesdropper is present. The drop at very large attenuation is due to the increasing
inﬂuence of background events, which are shown in purple for comparison. Without
the decoy method, one has to assume the worst-case scenario (dotted blue curve), that
is, Eve blocks as many single-photon pulses as possible, and lets the tagged photons
pass. This leads to the fast drop of the secure key rate proportional to η2. Utilising
the decoy method, one obtains a much better upper bound for Δ, that reaches the true
value in the limit of inﬁnitely many decoy states. The dashed green trace represents the
estimate derived from using only 3 diﬀerent intensities. For a wide transmission region,
this estimate is roughly constant and thus enables a key generation rate similar to the
single photon case.
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Figure 2.4: Upper graph: Key generation rates for decoy state protocols with inﬁnitely
many decoy states (dashed green), and 3 diﬀerent intensities (μ, μ′, 0), if both signal and decoy
states are used for key generation (solid red). For a real key exchange of limited length, the
achievable key rate is decreased due to statistical eﬀects (dotted blue, plotted for N = 1 · 107).
Lower graph: Estimate of the fraction of tagged bits Δ as a function of channel attenuation.
To account for limited counting statistics, the asymptotic estimate is increased by an error
margin of 4.4 standard deviations according to the chosen security parameters.
Figure 2.4 compares the performance of diﬀerent decoy state protocols. The asymp-
totic limit of optimal performance for this class of protocols (dashed green line) is reached
in the limit of inﬁnitely many decoy states. However, the protocol described in §2.6.2
with just 3 diﬀerent intensities (one of which is eﬀectively the vacuum state) performs
close to the optimum, if both signal and decoy states are used for key generation (solid
red curve). Assuming a ﬁxed number of transmitted pulses of N = 1 · 107 in a real ex-
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periment, the key rate drops especially towards high channel losses due to poor counting
statistics. This is further illustrated in the lower graph of Figure 2.4. To account for the
statistical uncertainty of Δ due to the limited number of recorded events, the expected
value for Δ (solid green curve) has to be increased by an error margin of 4.4 standard de-
viations (dashed blue curve), calculated in accordance with a conﬁdence limit of 1−10−5
(see §6.1.3). The sum of these quantities (dash-dotted red line) can then be used as a
faithful upper bound in equation 2.9.
2.7 Supporting classical procedures
After the quantum transmission and the measurement of the quantum signals, Alice and
Bob each possess a classical bit string. This is the raw key, from which the ﬁnal secure
key is extracted by applying classical procedures. First, errors in the raw key need to be
corrected for the key to be useful. This is done by error correction codes, which exchange
additional information over the classical channel. Since messages sent over the classical
channel are not encrypted, this information is available to Eve as well. Therefore, Eve
can gain knowledge of the key not only from eavesdropping on the quantum channel,
but also from listening in on the classical channel. To erase Eve’s information, in the
second step Alice and Bob compress their corrected strings, using, for example, a hash
function. After this privacy ampliﬁcation, the key will be shorter, but unknown to Eve.
2.7.1 Error correction
For simplicity, one may assume that the errors in the raw key are uniformly distributed
and symmetric, that is, each bit is ﬂipped independently with some propability p. This
model is called binary symmetric channel. The lower limit (called Shannon limit) for
the amount of information that needs to be exchanged — and by that, disclosed — in
order to correct a certain amount of errors in a string sent over a binary symmetric
channel [114], is ndis,min = nsif ·H2(p), where H2(p) is again the binary entropy function.
The probability p corresponds to the average QBER of the quantum transmission. In
a real-life QKD experiment, the errors might occur in bursts, because Eve may choose
to eavesdrop on a certain block of quantum signals, or because the attenuation of the
quantum channel ﬂuctuates. For this reason, Alice and Bob need to agree on a random
permutation of their raw keys before starting the error correction to make the errors
uniformly distributed.
A number of classical error correction codes exist, which diﬀer, among other things,
in their closeness to the Shannon limit, the level of (interactive) communication and
computational resources required, the correctional probability, and their robustness to
changing error rates. Diﬀerent protocols may be optimal depending on the encountered
error rate. Which protocol should be chosen for a speciﬁc QKD system therefore depends
on a number of factors, such as availability and capacity of the classical channel, or
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computational resources available at Alice and Bob. For a comparison of several error
correction protocols, based on simulated data of a free-space QKD system, see [115].
CASCADE and LDPC are the most widely used schemes in connection with QKD
systems.
The CASCADE protocol was suggested by Brassard and Salvail [116]. It works close
to the theoretical Shannon limit. The protocol uses interactive communication between
Alice and Bob and works by the principle of comparing parities between blocks of key
bits. This enables detection of blocks with odd numbers of errors. When such a block
is found, a binary search inside the block reveals the position of an error.
The Low Density Parity Check (LDPC) code was discovered by Gallager in 1962 [117]
and recently adapted to QKD by Pearson [118]. The algorithm protects transmitted
data from errors by using a large sparse matrix representing diﬀerent parity checks.
LDPC codes have the advantage of low interactive communication and a high correc-
tional capability. However, the codes are sensitive to changes in the error rate. Since
correctional information can be sent by Alice at the same time as Bob is decoding pre-
vious bits, LDPC codes are well suited for continuously running systems, that beneﬁt
from the fast decoding.
Any error correction code exchanges information over the public channel, thus ex-
posing it to Eve. By listening to the correction information, she will gain ndis bits of
information about the key. These bits can be either speciﬁc information on the value of
certain bits, or the parity of a block of bits, depending on which error correction code
is used. Of course, the smaller ndis, the better. However, the Shannon limit gives the
lower bound for ndis. The eﬃciency of an error correcting scheme is described by the
factor f(e), by which it exceeds the Shannon limit: ndis = f(e)H2(e)nsif .
2.7.2 Privacy amplification
After the quantum transmission and key reconciliation, a proportion of the (corrected)
key might have leaked to the adversary due to her eavesdropping. This amount depends
on her strategy of eavesdropping on the quantum channel, and on the error correction
code used. Both contributions depend on the qubit error rate e. The method of reducing
Eve’s information of the ﬁnal secure key to an arbitrary small amount is called privacy
ampliﬁcation and was introduced by Bennett et al. [54, 119]. They used the concept of
universal hashing, following the ideas of Carter and Wegman [53]. The hash function
spreads the input in a chaotic manner; as little as a single bit-error in the input string
will multiply and produce a signiﬁcantly diﬀerent output string. Thus, Eve, having
many errors or uncertainties in her input string, will obtain an output string, that is
almost uncorrelated to Alice and Bob’s key.
Formally, if a function g is randomly chosen from a class of universal2 functions
H = {g : {0, 1}i → {0, 1}j, i > j}, the probability that g(x) = g(y), given that x 
= y,
is upper bounded by (1
2
)j for g : {0, 1}i → {0, 1}j. When using privacy ampliﬁcation,
the partially secure string X ′ is shortened by an amount depending on our estimation of
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Eve’s knowledge about the string, and a security factor, s. This makes Eve’s informa-
tion exponentially small in s. Assuming Eve gains at most k bits of information from
eavesdropping on the quantum channel, and learns at most l bits from the reconciliation
phase, then r = nsif−k− l−s is the length of the ﬁnal key, and Eve’s information about
it is upper bounded by 2−s/ ln 2.
Since the function g has to be chosen randomly, Alice and Bob have to agree on g
anew in each round of QKD. g can be represented by an r × nsif matrix, but gener-
ating and exchanging r · nsif random bits each round is not very eﬃcient. Therefore,
Toeplitz matrices are often used for hashing messages. The family of Toeplitz matrices
are universal2 functions that can be generated from only r + nsif − 1 bits, that have to
be chosen randomly and communicated between Alice and Bob.
2.7.3 Authentication
To ensure that Eve may listen but cannot modify the information sent over the classical
channel, Alice and Bob need to use unconditionally secure message authentication. This
is also essential to rule out a man-in-the-middle attack. One way to authenticate the
classical channel is for Alice and Bob to share a short initial secret string. Using this
string together with a hash function, they can create a tag from each message they wish
to exchange [52]. The other party will only accept the message if he computes the same
tag using the initial string. After one round of QKD, Alice and Bob use some of their
generated secret key for authentication in the next round (“quantum key growing”).
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channel
We know from everyday life, that rain, snow, fog, etc. aﬀect the viewing of distant ob-
jects. The same atmospheric factors also inﬂuence the transmission of electromagnetic
radiation through the atmosphere (particularly optical waves), and have to be consid-
ered when using the atmosphere as transmission channel for quantum communications.
This chapter is intended to review brieﬂy the relevant aspects of atmospheric optics,
and calculate expectation values for vital experimental parameters, such as attenuation,
beam spot size, etc. For this purpose, and not least to illustrate the theory with some
tangible numbers, parameters from the 144 km free-space test bed will be applied. The
theoretical values are compared with actually measured quantities. The last part of this
chapter deals with the means of adaptive optics to compensate at least partially the
eﬀects induced by the turbulent atmosphere. The active tracking system that was im-
plemented for the inter-island experiment is described and characterised and an outlook
to the potential of higher-order adaptive optical systems is given.
3.1 Free space propagation of Gaussian-beam waves
Before presenting the description of optical waves under the inﬂuence of atmospheric
turbulence, the free propagation in vacuum shall be recalled. The electric ﬁeld E of a
propagating electromagnetic wave must be a solution of the wave equation
∇2E = 1
c2
∂2E
∂t2
. (3.1)
Most often, the standard solutions, such as the unbounded plane wave or the spherical
wave, are investigated. In free space optical communication, the electromagnetic ﬁeld
is emitted into a speciﬁc direction (typically by a laser), and one is most interested in
the ﬁeld close to the optical axis. Under the paraxial approximation, equation (3.1) is
solved by the set of Gaussian-beam waves [120]. The intensity proﬁle of the lowest order
Gaussian-beam wave TEM00 is described by
I(r, z) =
2P
πw2(z)
exp
(
− 2r
2
w2(z)
)
, (3.2)
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Figure 3.1: Fundamental parameters of a Gaussian beam wave: w0 is the minimum beam
waist, zR is the Rayleigh length, and Θ is the divergence half angle in the limit z → ∞. The
transversal intensity proﬁle is Gaussian shaped for all values of z.
where r denotes the distance from the optical axis, P is the power of the laser, and w(z)
is the local (1/e2) beam radius at the distance z in propagation direction zˆ:
w(z) = w0
√
1 +
z2
z2R
(3.3)
A Gaussian beam (see Figure 3.1) is therefore characterised by its minimum beam radius,
or beam waist, w0, which is related to the characteristic beam divergence length (called
Rayleigh length) zR by zR = πw
2
0/λ. For values z  zR the beam divergence half angle
Θ is asymptotically equal to
tanΘ = lim
z→∞
w(z)
|z| =
w0
zR
=
λ
πw0
, (3.4)
and the wave front radius of curvature R(z) can be expressed as
R(z) = z
(
1 +
z2R
z2
)
. (3.5)
At the beam waist (z = 0), the wave front is planar. The wave front curvature increases
to a maximum at (z = zR) and then decreases again towards planarity for (z →∞).
Figure 3.2a depicts the beam spreading as a function of propagation distance L for
diﬀerent initial beam diameters 2w0 ∈ {1 cm, 7.5 cm, 20 cm} in a double logarithmic plot.
In an optical communication scheme, one is interested to maximise the transmittance
by keeping the beam spread as low as possible, but is often limited by the diameter of
the transmitting telescope. Graph 3.2b shows the beam radius wL after propagation
over diﬀerent distances L (100 m, 1 km, 10 km, and 100 km) as a function of the initial
beam radius w0 at the transmitter. There’s an optimal initial beam radius for each
distance that results in the best combination of minimum beam radius and minimum
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Figure 3.2: Gaussian beam propagation in vacuum at 850 nm wavelength. (a) Beam radius
as a function of propagation distance for diﬀerent beam waists. (b) Beam radius as a function
of initial beam waist for diﬀerent values of ﬁxed propagation distance.
beam spread over the given distance. Analytically, this value is wopt0 =
√
λL/π and
produces a beam spread wL/w0 =
√
2.
Beam spreading in vacuum is a consequence of diﬀraction. In the presence of atmo-
spheric turbulence, there is additional beam spreading, causing a larger beam spot size
than diﬀraction alone. Generally speaking, three processes aﬀect optical wave propaga-
tion in the atmosphere:
• Absorption,
• scattering,
• and refractive index ﬂuctuations (“optical turbulence”).
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Absorption and scattering are usually treated separately from optical turbulence theory,
where a “clear atmosphere” is assumed.
3.2 Absorption and scattering
Absorption and scattering give rise to wavelength-dependent attenuation of electromag-
netic radiation. Absorption and scattering can be further subdivided into two classes,
according to the size of the interacting particles: molecular eﬀects and eﬀects caused by
aerosols, that is, larger particles. The resulting attenuation, or extinction, of electro-
magnetic radiation is described by the Beer-Lambert law
I(λ, z) = I0(λ) exp(−z αext(λ)), (3.6)
where αext(λ) = αabs(λ) + αsca(λ) is the wavelength dependent extinction coeﬃcient
consisting of the sum of extinction coeﬃcients due to absorption and scattering [121]. For
our purpose, both αsca and αabs are assumed to be homogeneous over spatial separations
on the order of λ, otherwise additional diﬀractive eﬀects would have to be considered.
Absorption
Absorption is a quantum process, where atmospheric molecules absorb energy from inci-
dent photons, altering the electronic, vibrational, and/or rotational state of the molecule.
The absorption spectrum of molecules therefore consists of a series of discrete absorption
lines, the shape of which depends on several line-broadening eﬀects, such as Doppler
broadening, and pressure broadening. For wavelengths in the visible to near-infrared
spectral range, vibrational spectra are of greatest relevance.
The extinction coeﬃcient for a speciﬁc wavelength can be computed from detailed
molecular spectra (that have been measured in laboratory experiments), and from the
mixture of molecules present in the atmosphere. This can be accomplished with the
major atmospheric transmission programs, such as LOWTRAN, MODTRAN, or FAS-
CODE [122]. LOWTRAN and MODTRAN are both band models, whereas FASCODE
is a line-by-line model, which provides spectra of higher resolution than the band models.
Scattering
Rayleigh scattering is elastic scattering of the optical radiation due to the displacement
of the weakly bound electronic cloud surrounding the gaseous molecule, which is per-
turbed by the incoming electromagnetic ﬁeld. Rayleigh scattering is associated with air
molecules and haze, that are small in comparison with the wavelength λ of the radia-
tion. The scattering coeﬃcient is proportional to λ−4, known as the Rayleigh law. For
air molecules, scattering is negligible at λ > 3μm. At λ < 1μm, Rayleigh scattering
produces the blue colour of the sky, because blue light is scattered much more than red
light.
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Figure 3.3: Optical transmittance of the atmosphere for a vertical propagation path
between ground and space. Data from the Natural Environment Research Council,
http://www.soc.soton.ac.uk/RSADU/.
Mie scattering, also known as aerosol scattering, is scattering by particles comparable
in size to the radiation wavelength. Scattering losses decrease rapidly with increasing
wavelength, eventually approaching the Rayleigh scattering case. An aerosol particle is
larger than a molecule, but still small enough to remain suspended in the atmosphere for
an extended period of time. The diameter range of atmospheric aerosols covers roughly
2 nm to 100μm. Aerosols originate both from natural and man-made sources, among the
many examples are rock and soil debris, sea salt, and particles formed from gaseous emis-
sions. Radiation extinction caused by a single aerosol depends on the particle’s size and
composition. Thus, in order to evaluate aerosol-induced extinction, the aerosol compo-
sition, concentration, and particle size distribution have to be known. Since this poses
considerable experimental diﬃculties, models have been developed describing aerosol
conditions as a function of meteorological or local environmental parameters.
Figure 3.3 depicts the optical transmittance of the so-called standard atmosphere for
a vertical propagation path, decomposed into extinction contributions from Rayleigh
scattering, aerosol scattering, and molecular absorption, in the wavelength range from
300 nm to 1100 nm. Water vapour, CO2, NO2, CO, and ozone are the primary radiation
absorbers that are present in the atmosphere. Absorption by the ozone O2 and O3 es-
sentially eliminates propagation of radiation for λ < 0.2μm. Little absorption occurs at
visible wavelengths (0.4 to 0.7μm) except for H2O absorption between 0.65 and 1.0μm.
Both CO2 and water vapour are radiation absorbers at infrared wavelengths [123]. Ob-
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viously, the actual attenuation for a speciﬁc propagation path through the atmosphere
depends heavily on local humidity and environmental conditions, in particular for long
horizontal paths at low altitude.
Depolarisation
Especially in the case of multiple scattering, depolarisation of the incident light can
occur [121]. The depolarisation factor depends on the anisotropy of the scatterer, that is,
on the deviation from the spherical form. In fact, depolarisation measurements of back-
scattered light can be used to determine the physical composition of cloud constituents,
such as the relative ratio of water vapour or ice crystals in a cloud. However, quantitative
measurements over horizontal propagation paths in the lower clear atmosphere [124,125]
indicate that the polarisation of a propagating wave is only minimally aﬀected, often
below the sensitivity of the apparatus.
3.3 Kolmogorov theory of turbulence
Turbulence of a viscous ﬂuid is fundamentally a nonlinear process and described by the
Navier-Stokes equations. Because of mathematical diﬃculties in solving these equations,
Kolmogorov developed a statistical approach of turbulence [126], that relies on certain
simpliﬁcations, but still allows to deduce important implications for wave propagation
in random media. A comprehensive treatment of the topic can be found, for example,
in [127].
Fluid mechanics distinguishes two types of motion in a viscous medium: laminar and
turbulent ﬂow. While the associated velocity ﬁeld is continuous in laminar ﬂow, it loses
these characteristics in turbulent ﬂow, and dynamic mixing with random subﬂows (called
turbulent eddies) occurs. The state of motion is described by the dimensionless Reynolds
number Re = v l/ν, where v and l are a characteristic velocity and a characteristic
dimension of the ﬂow, respectively, and ν is the kinematic viscosity. The transition
from laminar to turbulent conditions takes place at a critical Reynolds number, which
depends on the exact ﬂow conﬁguration and must be determined empirically (common
values range from 1 to 103). Under atmospheric conditions typically prevailing close to
the ground (l ∼ 1m, v ∼ 1 − 5m/s), the Reynolds number reaches easily large values
on the order Re ∼ 105, which means that the motion of the air is highly turbulent. The
source of energy in atmospheric turbulence is either wind shear (i.e., a wind gradient) or
convection. The wind velocity increases until the critical Reynolds number is exceeded.
At that point, local unstable air masses are created (large eddies), that break up into
smaller eddies because of inertial forces. As the eddies become smaller and smaller, the
relative energy dissipated by viscous forces increases until it matches the supplied kinetic
energy: the eddies disappear, and the remaining energy is dissipated as heat. Thus, a
continuum of eddies from a macroscale L0 (outer scale of turbulence) to a microscale l0
37
3 The atmosphere as a quantum channel
(inner scale of turbulence) is formed. The outer scale L0 denotes the scale size below
which turbulence properties are independent of the parent ﬂow. In the surface layer up
to 100 m, L0 grows roughly linearly with the height above ground h and is approximately
of the same order as h, whereas l0 is typically 1− 10mm [127].
According to Kolmogorov’s work [126], the turbulence on scales between l0 and L0
(called the inertial subrange) can be described by statistical means under the assumption
of statistical homogeneity and isotropy of the random velocity ﬁeld. This means that the
mean value of wind velocity is constant over the considered region, and that correlations
between random ﬂuctuations from one point to another depend only on the absolute
value of the vector connecting the two observation points. If such correlations of a
property x between two diﬀerent points R1 and R2 are locally homogeneous, they can
be described by structure functions Dx, deﬁned as
Dx(R1,R2) ≡ Dx(R) = 〈[x(R1)− x(R1 + R)]2〉,
where the brackets 〈 〉 denote an ensemble average and R := R2−R1. The longitudinal
structure function of wind velocity (parallel to the vector R) is found to satisfy the
power laws
DRR(R) = 〈[v(R1)− v(R2)]2〉 =
{
C2vR
2/3 : l0  R  L0
C2v l
−4/3
0 R
2 : R  l0, (3.7)
Here, C2v is the velocity structure constant, that is dependent on the average energy
dissipation rate. Since only eddies of scale sizes smaller than L0 are assumed statistically
homogeneous and isotropic, by deﬁnition no general prediction of DRR exists for R > L0.
For instance, in altidudes above ∼ 100m, eddies of greater size than L0 are often much
larger in horizontal dimension than in vertical dimension because of stratiﬁcation. Hence,
the turbulence is generally nonisotropic on that scale. Likewise, a temperature structure
function DT (R) exists, that obeys the same power laws as the velocity structure function
DRR(R), but has a diﬀerent structure constant C
2
T .
Optical wave propagation in a transparent medium is governed by the index of re-
fraction, which is sensitive to small-scale temperature ﬂuctuations. At any point R,
the index of refraction of the atmosphere can be written as the sum of its mean value
n0 = 〈n(R)〉 and the random deviation n1(R) from the mean value
n(R) = n0 + n1(R)
 1 + 7.76 · 10−5(1 + 7.52 · 10−3 λ−2) p(R)
T (R)
(3.8)
 1 + 8 · 10−5 p(R)
T (R)
, (3.9)
where λ is wavelength in μm, p is pressure in mbar, and T is temperature in Kelvin.
The wavelength dependence is small for optical frequencies, so expression (3.8) is a
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good approximation for visible and infrared wavelengths. Since pressure ﬂuctuations are
negligible, index of refraction ﬂuctuations are essentially due to temperature ﬂuctuations.
Applying the statistical description to the random ﬁeld of ﬂuctuations in the refractive
index Dn(R), one obtains again an inertial subrange [l0, L0] and the power laws
Dn(R) = 〈[n(R1)− n(R2)]2〉 =
{
C2nR
2/3 : l0  R  L0
C2nl
−4/3
0 R
2 : R  l0. (3.10)
C2n is called refractive index structure constant or better structure parameter, since it is a
measure of the strength of ﬂuctuations of n. Path-averaged values of C2n and inner scale
l0 can be obtained simultaneously by optical measurements over a short path length
(∼ 100m) using a scintillometer ( [128] and references therein). Typical values of C2n
range from 10−17 m−2/3 in weak turbulence up to 10−13 m−2/3 in “strong” turbulence.
While it may be reasonable to assume C2n to be roughly constant (at least over short
time intervals) at a certain height above a uniform terrain, it varies as a function of
height for vertical or slant propagation paths, for example from ground to a satellite.
In this case, C2n can be described by altitude proﬁle models (e.g., the Hufnagel-Valley
model), that have been developed for both night and day time conditions from a series
of measurements [129].
3.4 Atmospheric Propagation
Random space-time redistribution of the refractive index causes a variety of eﬀects on
an optical wave related to its temporal intensity ﬂuctuations (scintillation) and phase
ﬂuctuations. When an electromagnetic wave propagates through a random medium like
the turbulent atmosphere, both the amplitude and phase of the electric ﬁeld experience
random ﬂuctuations caused by small, random changes in the refractive index. Since the
wavelength λ in the visible and infrared spectral region is much smaller than the smallest
scale of turbulence l0, scattering by refractivity ﬂuctuations is conﬁned to a narrow cone
about the progation direction. Although this observation allows some simpliﬁcation,
the wave equation cannot be solved analytically. Perturbative approaches using the
Born approximation or Rytov approximation allow quantitative statements, at least for
so-called weak ﬂuctuation conditions, that is, when
σ21 < 1 and σ
2
1Λ
5/6 < 1, with (3.11)
σ21 = 1.23C
2
nk
7/6L11/6 Rytov variance (3.12)
Λ =
2L
kw2L
Fresnel ratio at receiver. (3.13)
Here, k = 2π/λ is the wave number, L is the propagation distance (not to be mixed
with the turbulence outer scale L0), and wL = w(z = L) is the beam spot size at the
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receiver without turbulence. Strictly speaking, most of the relations given in the fol-
lowing are only accurate under weak ﬂuctuation conditions. Additionally, it is assumed
that the structure parameter C2n is constant over the propagation path, which restricts
the applicability to horizontal line-of-sight paths near ground.
3.4.1 Beam wander and beam spreading
In the absence of turbulence, a Gaussian beam is broadened by diﬀraction and has, in
the far ﬁeld, a beam radius wL as discussed in §3.1. When analysing the beam radius
in a turbulent medium, the situation is more complex, and it is usually necessary to
distinguish between the short-term and the long-term beam spread. Generally speak-
ing, when a ﬁnite optical beam interacts with refractive index inhomogeneities due to
atmospheric turbulence, it is found that those turbulent eddies which are large compared
to the diameter of the beam tend to deﬂect the beam, whereas those eddies that are
small compared with the beam diameter tend to broaden the beam, but do not deﬂect
it signiﬁcantly. Consequently, if one observed the laser spot on a screen in the plane of
the receiver aperture, and took a very short exposure picture, one would observe a laser
spot which is broadened (due to the small eddies) to some radius wst, and is deﬂected
by some distance rbw from the optical axis. Because the turbulent eddies are ﬂowing
across the propagating beam, the centroid of the short-term beam spot will be randomly
deﬂected in diﬀerent directions (Figure 3.4). This eﬀect is called beam wander or beam
steering and takes place on time scales on the order of
τbw =
beam size
v⊥
, (3.14)
where v⊥ is the transverse ﬂow velocity of the turbulent eddies. The strength of beam
wander is characterised by the root-mean-square value of the beam displacement from
the long-term centre, which is for a collimated Gaussian beam
< r2bw >
1/2=
√
2.87C2nL
3w
−1/3
0 . (3.15)
Beam wander is, in general, smaller for divergent beams and larger for (initially con-
vergent) beams with an intermediate focus along the propagation path. The maximum
beam wander occurs for beams focused at ∼ 35% of the path [130].
When taking a long-term exposure of the beam spot, averaging over time scales much
longer than τbw, one sees a broadened spot with a mean-square radius w
2
eﬀ given by
〈w2eﬀ〉 = 〈w2st〉+ 〈r2bw〉. (3.16)
The mean intensity proﬁle at the receiver plane remains still approximately Gaussian,
i.e.
< I(r, L) > w
2
0
w2eﬀ
exp(
−2r2
w2eﬀ
), (3.17)
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Figure 3.4: Short term and long term beam radius at the receiver for weak turbulence
conditions: the dark shaded circles represent the short-term size wst of the beam; additional
beam wandering on a scale 〈r2bw〉 results in an eﬀective long-term beam size weﬀ , marked by
the large, light shaded circle. (Figure adapted from [131])
where the long-term, or eﬀective beam radius, weﬀ is given [132] by
weﬀ =
λL
πw0
√
1 +
(
w0
ρsp
)2
. (3.18)
Here, ρsp denotes the spherical wave transverse coherence radius deﬁned by
ρsp =
[
1.46k2L
∫ 1
0
(1− ξ)5/3C2n(ξL) dξ
]−3/5
, (3.19)
where the variable ξ = s/L is the normalised distance along the path from the trans-
mitter to the receiver. The term (1 − ξ)5/3 under the integral reﬂects the fact that
the turbulence contained in path segments close to the transmitter has a pronounced
eﬀect on the beam wander behaviour. For a ﬂat proﬁle of the refractive index structure
parameter C2n(s)=const, equation (3.19) reduces to
ρsp =
[
0.55k2LC2n
]−3/5
. (3.20)
Note that equation (3.18) is valid under both weak and strong ﬂuctuation conditions.
The value for the short-term beam radius wst can be calculated using equations (3.16)
and (3.18), yielding
wst =
λL
πw0
√√√√1 + (w0
ρsp
)2 [
1− 0.62
(
ρsp
w0
)1/3]6/5
. (3.21)
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Unfortunately, the model given above only holds in the limit when turbulence is
relatively weak. When turbulence is strong, the beam no longer wanders signiﬁcantly,
but breaks up into multiple beams. In this case a short exposure picture of the received
spot would not consist of a single spot, but of a multiplicity of spots at random locations.
The long-exposure picture, however, would be a blurred version of the short exposure,
but with approximately the same total diameter weﬀ [132]. For L kw20 and w0/ρsp 
1, it is found that in homogeneous turbulence
〈r2bw〉  C8/5n k−1/15L37/15, (3.22)
which is small compared with weﬀ . However, knowledge of 〈r2bw〉 and weﬀ does not yield
a prediction about how many bright patches will be formed.
3.4.2 Angle-of-arrival fluctuations
The light propagating through the atmosphere from a distant transmitter is eventually
collected by a lens of diameter D and focused onto some kind of detector. Atmospheric
turbulence eﬀects on the propagating beam wave thereby translate into a degradation
of the image formed in the focal plane. This is of course a well known phenomenon for
astronomers using ground-based telescopes [133], where the achievable angular resolution
does not grow indeﬁnitely with the telescope diameter.
α
f
phase front
Figure 3.5: Angle-of-arrival and im-
age jitter.
The image degradation eﬀects are associated pre-
dominantly with phase ﬂuctuations of the incoming
wave. Large scale turbulence cells induce an over-
all tilt of the wave front (i.e. ﬂuctuations in the
angle-of-arrival α), which subsequently causes the
image to jitter or “dance” in the focal plane as
large eddies move across the beam path, driven by
the predominating atmospheric ﬂow (Figure 3.5).
Long-term image blur is caused by a superposition
of small-scale turbulence eﬀects and large-scale im-
age jitter. Thus, image dancing and image blur are
the image counterparts of beam wander and beam
spreading.
Hence, small-scale and large-scale eﬀects have diﬀerent inﬂuence on image quality,
depending on the exposure time: large eddies comparable in size to the receiver aper-
ture move across the aperture within a time D/v⊥, where v⊥ is the mean wind speed
perpendicular to the propagation path. In contrast to this, motion of the smallest ed-
dies is usually estimated by the inner scale size l0. Accordingly, a long time exposure
is determined by the time required to average over a number of large eddies, whereas
exposure times much smaller than D/v⊥ are considered short. Consequently, a short
exposure does not include the motion of large eddies responsible for image dancing, but
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is dominated by the phase front distortions arising from the small-scale turbulences on
the inner scale size l0. The resulting image exhibits a “speckle pattern” similar to that
produced by a laser that is scattered oﬀ a rough surface.
Quantitatively, one obtains the following expression for the angle-of-arrival variance
of a plane wave in nearly homogeneous turbulence [132]:
〈α2〉 
{
2.19
2.92
} ∫ L
0
C2n(x) dx
D1/3
,
l0  D  ρpl
ρpl  D  L0. (3.23)
Equation (3.23) is valid under strong ﬂuctuation conditions, it represents a good estimate
also for the plane wave and for a beam wave (except in the focal plane).
In §4.4 the possibility of adaptive methods to compensate for angle-of-arrival ﬂuc-
tuations will brieﬂy be discussed; in this respect, the temporal spectrum of the angle-
of-arrival ﬂuctuations are of major importance because it dictates the speed of actua-
tors and the control loop. Assuming frozen turbulence (see §3.4.5), the angle-of-arrival
spectrum Wα(f) for a spherical wave propagating in homogeneous turbulence is given
by [132]
Wα(f) =
{
0.0326
0.0652
}
v
5/3
⊥ C
2
nL
D2
⎡
⎣1− sin
(
2πfD
v⊥
)
(
2πfD
v⊥
)
⎤
⎦ f−8/3[
1 +
(
1.07v⊥
2πfL0
)2]4/3 l0  D 
√
λL
D  √λL
(3.24)
A plot of the angle-of-arrival spectrum (Figure 3.6), normalised to the average angle-of-
arrival 〈α2〉, shows that nearly all of the angle-of-arrival ﬂuctuations are contained in
the frequency interval
0.01v⊥
2πD
≤ f ≤ 10v⊥
2πD
, (3.25)
provided that D  L0.
3.4.3 Fried parameter
A quantity often used for the characterisation of the strength of atmospheric turbulence,
especially in connection with astronomical imaging, is the Fried parameter r0 [133]. For a
known structure constant proﬁle C2n(s) along the propagation path, the Fried parameter
is given by
r0 =
⎡
⎣0.423 k2 ∫
Path
C2n(s) ds
⎤
⎦
−3/5
=
[
0.423 k2LC2n
]−3/5
, (3.26)
where k = 2π/λ, and the integral is taken over the entire path from the emitter to
the receiver telescope; the last expression applies for the case of constant C2n along the
path. The loss of spatial coherence of an electromagnetic wave propagating through
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Figure 3.6: Normalised angle-of-arrival spectrum for a spherical wave received by an aperture
with D/L0 = 0.1.
atmospheric turbulence is characterised by the transversal coherence radius. Because r0
is related to the transversal coherence radius ρpl of a plane wave propagating through
turbulence by r0 = 2.1ρpl, the Fried parameter r0 is also called atmospheric coherence
length.
The signiﬁcance of r0 is particularly illustrative in astronomical imaging. The image
of a point source, like a star, in an ideal telescope without atmosphere depends solely
on diﬀraction and is described by an Airy function. Since the ﬁrst dark ring appears
at an angular distance of 1.22λ/D from the centre, the ratio λ/D equals roughly the
angular extent1 (seeing angle β) of the star image, and is often taken as a measure for
the resolution of an ideal telescope. Under the inﬂuence of atmospheric turbulence, the
seeing angle is limited by
β = 0.98λ/r0. (3.27)
Historically, the Fried parameter was initially introduced in this phenomenological way.
Since the atmospheric coherence length at sea level is roughly r0 = 2...15 cm for visible
and IR wavelengths, even in best conditions, a large diameter telescope without adaptive
optics does not provide better resolution than a telescope with a diameter on the order of
r0. It is apparent from equation (3.26), that r0 scales with the wavelength like r0 ∝ λ6/5,
therefore it is important to indicate the corresponding wavelength when specifying the
Fried parameter.
3.4.4 Pulse propagation
Just as a Gaussian beam wave undergoes spatial broadening in atmospheric turbulence, a
pulse of electromagnetic radiation propagating under atmospheric inﬂuence is also spread
1technically, the FWHM of the point spread function
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in the time domain. Temporal spreading is mainly caused by two mechanisms [134]: ﬁrst,
the scattering process of the medium, that is, dispersive spreading due to the existence
of multiple paths, and, second, the “wandering” in the time domain, meaning a time
jitter of the arrival time about its mean value within the ensemble. The latter is the
dominant eﬀect in weak turbulence. Assuming an initial Gaussian temporal shape of
the pulse
I(t) = I0 exp(−2t2/T 20 )
with length T0, the combined eﬀects from the two mechanisms result in
〈I(L, t)〉  I0T0
T1
exp
[
−2(t− L/c)
2
T 21
]
. (3.28)
Thus, the centre of the pulse still arrives at the usual time delay t = L/c, but the shape
of the pulse is broadened. Applying the usual von Karman spectrum for the refractive
index ﬂuctuations, the temporal broadening in weak turbulence can be estimated by
T1 =
√
T 20 + 〈δT 2〉, with 〈δT 2〉 
3.127
c2
L
5/3
0
∫ L
0
C2n(x) dx. (3.29)
Greenwood and Tarazano [135,136] proposed a diﬀerent spectral model, that was derived
empirically from actual atmospheric measurements, and that gives a more realistic value
of the pulse broadening [137]:
〈δT 2〉 = 26.31
c2
L
5/3
0
∫ L
0
C2n(x) dx. (3.30)
In the derivation of the turbulence induced quantity 〈δT 2〉, the broadening originates
from a pure phase eﬀect. Consequently 〈δT 2〉 is independent on the wavelength, general
beam characteristics, and initial pulse width. The mean arrival time remains unchanged
L/c compared to the undisturbed case. Liu and Yeh performed a calculation [138] based
on the concept of temporal moments and obtained expressions that can not only be
applied in the case of scattering by the continuous turbulent atmosphere, but also for
discrete random scatterers, e.g., in the presence of clouds, rain, or fog. They conclude
that, for optical frequencies, atmospheric turbulence does only severely aﬀect the tran-
sient behaviour of the pulse when the pulse length is on the order of a few picoseconds
or shorter. Only under very strong scattering conditions, such as in cloads, the multiple
scattering of the propagating wave results in a signiﬁcant extra time delay, and the pulse
broadening can become substantial.
3.4.5 Fourth order statistics: Scintillation
Fluctuations in the received intensity resulting from propagation through atmospheric
turbulence are commonly referred to as scintillation. A well known manifestation of this
phenomenon is the twinkling of stars.
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There is comprehensive literature about the subject of scintillation (for an introduc-
tion, see e.g. [127]), and it is beyond the scope of this chapter to summarise in some
generality the many ﬁndings and cases investigated in the literature. Instead, some
mechanisms associated with scintillation shall be introduced qualitatively.
The term scintillation usually includes not only the temporal variation in received
intensity, but also the spatial variation within a receiver aperture (like speckle). The
temporal spectrum of the intensity ﬂuctuations is an important source of noise in classical
optical communication systems. Strong scintillation can lead to temporary signal fades
that have to be taken into account at signal recovery level and at communication protocol
level. Scintillation characteristics can be deduced from the 4th order moment of the
optical ﬁeld. The scintillation index σ2I is deﬁned as the normalised intensity variance:
σ2I =
< I2 >
< I >2
− 1. (3.31)
Under weak turbulence conditions, the scintillation index grows linearly with C2n (or
the Rytov variance σ21 = 1.23C
2
nk
7/6L11/6), until it reaches a maximum value greater than
unity in the regime characterised by random focusing, so called, because the focusing
caused by large-scale inhomogeneities achieves the strongest eﬀect (Figure 3.7). With
increasing path length (or turbulence strength) the focusing eﬀect is weakened and the
ﬂuctuations begin to decrease, saturating at a level for which the scintillation index
approaches unity from above. Saturation occurs because multiple scattering causes the
optical wave to become increasingly less coherent as it propagates, eventually appearing
Figure 3.7: Qualitative behaviour of the scintillation index for a collimated beam as a function
of the square root of the Rytov variance (Figure taken from [131]).
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like extended multiple sources all scintillating with distinct random phases [131].
For weak ﬂuctuations, there can be a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the on-axis and
oﬀ-axis scintillation index: for a Gaussian beam wave, the scintillation index grows
quadratically with the distance r from the optical axis. Far from the centre of the beam,
beam wander actually plays a signiﬁcant role for scintillation. As the strength of the
turbulence increases due to long path lengths, beam wander becomes less important as
the beam breaks up into a multitude of irregular shaped spots [127].
Naturally, a large receiver aperture decreases the measured scintillation strength, since
the detector then averages over a certain spatial region of the beam. The characteristic
scale in this respect is the lateral width (correlation length) of the intensity ﬂuctuations,
that can be estimated by the size of the Fresnel length
√
L/k for weak ﬂuctuations, and
by the spatial coherence radius ρ0 for strong turbulence.
Scintillation is usually not measured as spatial, but as temporal intensity ﬂuctuations.
Spatial and temporal statistics are connected by Taylor’s “frozen turbulence“ hypothesis:
It assumes that temporal variations of an atmospheric quantity at a point are produced
by advection of these quantities by the mean wind speed ﬂow and not by changes in
the quantities themselves. The turbulent eddies are supposed to be ”frozen“ over short
periods of time while they are blown across the observation path, very much like clouds
moving along with little change of shape. Thus, one can convert directly from spatial
statistics to temporal statistics using the mean transverse wind speed v⊥. By further
application of a Fourier transform, one can then deduce the power spectrum of the
temporal intensity ﬂuctuations, for example. However, Taylor’s hypothesis fails when
v⊥ is signiﬁcantly less than the magnitude of turbulent ﬂuctuations in wind velocity,
which may happen when the mean wind speed is nearly parallel to the line of sight. In
thas case, the temporal statistics cannot be easily inferred from the spatial ﬂuctuations.
Change of photon statistics
In close analogy to intensity scintillations, the photon counting statistics of laser radia-
tion are aﬀected by propagation in the turbulent atmosphere. Under weak scintillation
conditions, the Kolmogorov model predicts a log-normal photon counting distribution.
For long propagation paths near ground, however, the intensity scintillations are ex-
pected to saturate because of multiple-scattering eﬀects. In a recent (QKD) experi-
ment [39] over a 10 km horizontal path, the counting distribution at the receiver due to
the emitted highly attenuated laser pulses was found to be highly non-Poissonian and
could be ﬁtted reasonably well under the assumption of a log-normal distribution [139].
The usual assumption, that the probability for transmission of photons through the
quantum channel is statistically independent, is therefore not strictly justiﬁed. The
probabilities of detection for any photons propagating within a small time interval (in
particular, in the same pulse) depend on the same refractive-index conﬁguration. Hence,
there are strong correlations of photon’s trajectories, and thus, of detection events within
a short time interval [140].
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At an early stage of the experiment, an evaluation of possible trial sites was undertaken.
Key requirements for a trial site are:
• suitable infrastructure at the ’transmitter’ and the ’receiver’ location
• a large aperture telescope (> 0.5 m) at the receiver location capable of pointing
at the transmitter location (horizon pointing)
• a line-of-sight location for the transmitter situated > 100 km from the receiver
• high altitude beam path for low attenuation and turbulence beam wander
’Suitable infrastructure’ comprises requirements such as accessibility, availability of elec-
trical power and, preferably, internet connection.
A trial site close to the ideal was identiﬁed on the Canary Islands, namely between
the islands of La Palma and Tenerife (see Figure 4.1). On both islands, the Instituto
de Astrof´ısica de Canarias (IAC) runs astronomical observatories which are situated at
2400 m above sea level well above the ﬁrst inversion layer (clouds), and are renowned
for their outstanding meteorological conditions. The sites provide seeing conditions (see
§3.4.3) of sub-arcsec quality over long time periods and high atmospheric transmission.
Furthermore, the site has been used for (classical) optical free-space communication
experiments before [141].
The transmitter was located on a platform next to the Nordic Optical Telescope (NOT)
on La Palma, which is one of the few places on the Observatorio del Roque de los
Muchachos with direct line of sight to Tenerife. The transmitter telescope (consisting
of a 150 mm diameter achromatic lens to collimate the light emitted from a bare single-
mode ﬁbre) was mounted on a heavy workbench to keep vibrations at a minimum. At
the other end of the 144 km optical path, the Optical Ground Station (OGS) of the
European Space Agency (ESA) on Tenerife served as the receiver. The 1-m telescope
is located at the Observatorio del Teide, Izan˜a, and was designed for classical optical
communication experiments with satellites. From the geographic coordinates of the
transmitter and the receiver location
• NOT parking lot: N 28◦45’26.0”, W 17◦53’05.8”, altitude 2381 m
• OGS: N 28◦17’58.3”, W 16◦30’36.4”, altitude 2393 m
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Figure 4.1: Satellite image of the Canary Islands. The arrow indicates the optical path from
the transmitter on La Palma to the receiver on Tenerife. (Image by ESA/Envisat)
one calculates a cartesian distance between the two sites of 143.63 km and the course
from NOT to OGS to be 110.4◦.
In this chapter, properties of the free-space link between the Roque de los Mucha-
chos and the Optical Ground Station will be presented and discussed. The data were
collected during a total of ﬁve trial campaigns between May 2005 and September 2006
and can therefore be at most representative for the warmer half of the year. Besides,
the collected data don’t allow conclusive statements about atmospheric conditions with
statistical signiﬁcance, but merely characterise the conditions that were encountered at
the time. The trial site and the individual parts of the experimental setup, including the
transmitter and receiver telescopes, will be described in more detail in the next chapter.
4.1 Beam spreading and other losses
Applying the theory of Gaussian beam propagation in vacuum with the parameters of the
inter-island link (link distance Z=143.6 km, beam radius at the transmitter w0=3.75 cm,
wavelength λ=850 nm), the beam radius at the receiver would be wZ=1.04 m, corre-
sponding to a divergence half angle of Θ0=7.2 μrad. For shorter wavelengths the beam
divergence would be even smaller. Using an alignment laser at 532 nm, it was possible
to project the transmitted beam onto the outside wall of the OGS building. Very rough
estimates of beam full widths between 3 m and 6 m were seen, corresponding to a turbu-
lence enlarged divergence half angle ΘT ∼10-20 μrad. The observation that turbulence
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induced beam spreading was much larger than diﬀraction beam spreading also occurred
when trying to collimate the beam by optimising the focus of the transmitter telescope:
a large uncertainty in the optimal focus position was found, over which the beam spot
size did not change signiﬁcantly. However, the eye has logarithmic sensitivity, so a more
precise method is to image the beam onto a camera and to observe the image jitter and
image blur. If the camera frame rate is not fast enough to separate these two eﬀects,
one may estimate an eﬀective long term divergence angle ΘT under turbulence from the
image spot 1/e2 radius of a long exposure image according to
ΘT =
r1/e2
f
, (4.1)
where f is the focal length of the camera imaging system. Two diﬀerent cameras of
the OGS were used for measurements: the wide ﬁeld camera (WFC) was mounted on a
separate 300 mm aperture Maksutov telescope bore sighted with the OGS. The Coude´
camera (CC) was placed at a subsidiary Coude´ focus accessed by a removable mirror
on the optical bench. While the CC took single pictures with various exposure times,
the WFC allowed continuous recording at a rate of 25 frames/s. Estimates of the long-
term eﬀective beam radius weﬀ at the receiver were computed from CC images with 1 s
exposure time and from 1 min averages of WFC spot radii; the latter can be considered
worst case values.
Since the OGS telescope aperture is smaller than the eﬀective beam width, geometrical
losses occur at the receiver. If the beam was perfectly centered around the optical axis
of the receiver telescope (primary mirror diameter DM1 = 1.0m, central obscuration by
secondary mirror DM2 = 0.33m), a fraction
PR
PT
= exp
[
−2(DM2/2)
2
w2eﬀ
]
− exp
[
−2(DM1/2)
2
w2eﬀ
]
=: LT (4.2)
of the transmitted power would be collected by the receiver. This fraction is referred to as
turbulence loss LT in the following. End-to-end transmission losses Lee were determined
from comparing the intensity before the transmitter lens and after the OGS telescope
optics in the Coude´ focus, using identical optical power meters. Altogether, there are 4
distinct loss mechanism contributing to Lee:
L0: beam spreading loss due to diﬀraction, that is present even in vacuum
LA: atmospheric losses due to scattering and absorption by air molecules
LT : turbulent atmospheric losses, i.e., turbulence induced beam spreading
LI : losses due to imperfections of optical components
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Date λ ΘT weﬀ Lee LT LA camera &
(nm) (μrad) (m) (dB) (dB) (dB) integration time
13/5/05 532 70 10 35.3 23.5 7.8 WFC, 1 min
16/5/05 57 8.2 34.5 21.8 8.7 CC, 1 s
75 10.8 24.2 6.3 WFC, 1 min
18/5/05 13.6 2.0 31.7 9.8 17.9 CC, 1 s
23.6 3.4 14.2 13.5 WFC, 1 min
14/5/05 850 39.6 5.7 41.5 18.7 18.8 WFC, 1 min
18/5/05 13.0 1.9 23.2 9.4 9.8 CC, 10 s
Table 4.1: Summary of beam propagation measurements over the inter-island link for wave-
lengths 532 nm and 850 nm: measured long term beam radii weﬀ , optical end-to-end trans-
mission losses Lee, decomposed into turbulence induced losses LT and losses due to absorp-
tion/scattering LA. The range of values illustrates the strong dependency on weather condi-
tions.
The transmitter and receiver telescope optics up to the Coude´ focus accounted for an
attenuation of LI ∼ 4 dB. With these values, one can attempt to decompose the end-to-
end transmission into contributions from the individual eﬀects1. Table 4.1 summarises
the results for wavelengths 532 nm (alignment laser) and 850 nm (quantum signal). It
is apparent from the large range of obtained values, that weather conditions have a
huge impact on beam spreading and overall transmittance. However, due to the limited
observation time, systematic dependencies cannot be derived reliably from the data.
The absorption and scattering induced losses LA appear to range between 6 dB and
18 dB for 532 nm, and between 10 dB and 19 dB for 850 nm light. If one concentrates
on good atmospheric conditions, a value around 10 dB seems realistic for 850 nm, which
implies a loss of ∼ 0.07 dB/km, in good agreement with values in the literature [38,
39, 142]. There, atmospheric transmission losses were found to be 0.04-0.08 dB/km at
altitudes above 2000 m.
The overall transmittance values listed above are time averaged values over several
minutes of measurement time. Figure 4.2 (a) shows the received power at the Coude´
focus as a function of time, with measurement intervals of 250 ms, (b) depicts the
corresponding propability distribution using 1 μW wide bins. Despite the aperture
averaging eﬀect of the 1-m receiver telescope, strong scintillations in the received optical
power are observed. The average received power was 16 μW (equivalent to 25.9 dB link
attenuation), with RMS ﬂuctuations of 9.45 μW, which corresponds to a scintillation
index of 0.35. However, this value contains only ﬂuctuations up to a frequency of 4 Hz
and is certainly too low. Still, it indicates the dominance of beam wander.
1More precisely, diﬀraction beam spreading was not subtracted from LT , because due to the central
obscuration of the OGS, the computed value for L0 would imply a much higher eﬀect on Lee than
it really has.
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Figure 4.2: Scintillations of the optical power collected by the OGS: (a) received power as
a function of time, measurement intervals 250 ms. The dashed line indicates the mean value
of 16.2 μW. (b) The normalised probability distribution of the received power has asymmet-
ric shape, extending farther to high transmittance than to low transmittance values. The
transmitted power at 808 nm wavelength was 6.3 mW.
4.2 Angle-of-arrival fluctuations and long-term
beam drift
The angle-of-arrival ﬂuctuations can be deduced from the time-dependent displacement
of the beam spot centroid on the WFC. One has to keep in mind, however, that the
ﬂuctuation spectrum is limited to a frequency equal to half of the WFC frame rate
(25Hz). An example of a measured spectrum is shown in Figure 4.3 as a solid blue
line. In order to estimate the angle-of-arrival ﬂuctuations over the full spectrum, a
theoretical turbulence model [132] was ﬁtted to the measured part of the spectrum by
varying the atmospheric parameters L0 and C
2
n. The resulting theoretical spectrum
(green crosses in Figure 4.3) agrees well with the measured part and can therefore be
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Figure 4.3: Power spectral density of angle-of-arrival ﬂuctuations: example of calm night
conditions on the inter-island link. Solid blue line: measured spectrum (up to 12.5 Hz); green
crosses: theoretical prediction and extrapolation according to atmospheric turbulence model.
considered a reasonable extrapolation of the measured data. Table 4.2 summarises
results collected under various atmospheric conditions. Angle-of-arrival ﬂuctuations (full
spectrum) between 15 μrad and 36 μrad were found, corresponding to a beam wander
between 2.2m and 5.2m.
The focal length of the Coude´ focus is quite long at 39.1m and can lead to problems in
connection with the given magnitude of beam wander: a wavefront tilt of some 50μrad
Date λ 〈α2〉1/2meas 〈α2〉1/2full Comment
(nm) (μrad) (μrad)
13/5/05 532 7.7 25.8
16/5/05 532 6.8 28.0
18/5/05 532 2.0 15.2 low wind v⊥ ∼ 0.1 m/s
14/5/05 850 14.5 22.4
15/5/05 850 7.6 (29.1) model did not match data
16/5/05 850 7.7 36.5
18/5/05 850 4.6 19.5 low wind v⊥ ∼ 0.1 m/s
Table 4.2: Summary of angle-of-arrival ﬂuctuations over the inter-island link for wavelengths
532 nm and 850 nm: the measured angle-of-arrival ﬂuctuations 〈α2〉1/2meas up to 12.5 Hz were
extrapolated to the full spectrum value 〈α2〉1/2full based on a Kolmogorov turbulence model.
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(equals ∼ 10 arcsec) causes a beam displacement of ∼ 2mm at the Coude´ focus, which is
much larger than the diameter of the active area of the single photon detectors (500μm).
Therefore, the received beam was not imaged directly onto the detectors, but a focal
length reducer was used, bringing the receiver optics to an eﬀective f/5 system where
the beam displacement at 50μrad wavefront tilt is 0.25mm.
To verify the eﬀectiveness of this optical layout, a camera was placed at the detector
position, and the size and displacement of the beam spot were investigated. Figure 4.4
shows a sequence of images acquired at exposure times on the order of milliseconds,
which can be considered short with regard to the time scale of large turbulences D/v⊥
from §3.4.2. As expected, one observes blurred beam images exhibiting a pronounced
speckle pattern, that is induced by small eddies. Comparing the images from frame
to frame (temporal separation several seconds), the ”dancing“ of the beam centroid
position because of overall wavefront tilts is apparent. The measured beam spot size
was between 100μm and 350μm, ﬁtting well onto the active detector area and conﬁrming
the suitability of the receiver’s optical design for the turbulence conditions on the inter-
island link.
A long-term measurement of the beam wander (Figure 4.5a) over 55 minutes reveals
a systematic drift of the beam position as much as 600μm. Due to the internal beam
guidance optics of the OGS, the graph coordinate system is rotated by approx. 45◦,
that is, the beam drift takes place eﬀectively along the vertical direction. The temporal
evolution of the distance of the beam from its initial position at t=0 (Figure 4.5b)
shows that random ﬂuctuations are superimposed by a systematic drift taking place
largely within 2-3 min. The explanation for this behaviour is most probably a changing
temperature gradient in the atmosphere, on which the beam was diﬀracted. Such changes
in the atmospheric layering take place on an irregular basis and pose a problem, since
they can give rise to much larger beam deﬂections than ordinary beam wander, which is
by deﬁnition isotropic. Therefore, a bidirectional active tracking system (see §4.4.2) was
implemented on both transmitter and receiver telescope to compensate such eﬀects.
Figure 4.4: Series of beam images, recorded in the detector focal plane with short exposure
times of a few milliseconds, show strong mode ﬂuctuations. The temporal separation between
the images was several seconds.
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Figure 4.5: Long term measurement of beam spot position in the detector focal plane. (a)
beam centroid positions over full measurement time of 55 min; the circle indicates the diameter
of the detector active area. (b) Temporal evolution of the beam spot’s distance from its starting
position at t=0. A systematic drift due to atmospheric temperature gradients is observed on
a time scale of several minutes.
4.3 Atmospheric turbulence parameters
The gathered data was used to calculate estimates of diﬀerent atmospheric turbulence
parameters to further characterise the inter-island link. Table 4.3 summarises some
results, the respective derivations are laid out in the following.
The long time exposures taken with the Coude´ camera, and accumulated frames from
the wide ﬁeld camera, provided measurements of the long-term spot radius of the trans-
mitted beam, which can be considered to be approximately a point-like source. The
measured FWHM of the recorded long-exposure images can be directly substituted into
the deﬁnition (3.27) of the Fried parameter to obtain r0. The measured values between
1 cm and 5 cm for 850 nm wavelength are well within the expected range for a horizontal
propagation path. In a survey over the same free-space link [141], r0 values of typically
between 1.5 cm and 2.4 cm for 830 nm wavelength were obtained. It can be concluded,
that — even under best conditions — the aperture of the transmitter telescope (150mm)
is suﬃciently large for the beam diameter at the receiver to be turbulence limited.
Assuming homogeneous distribution of turbulence along the entire propagation path,
the refractive index structure constant C2n can be estimated from the measured Fried pa-
rameter using Eq. (3.26). Results range from∼ 5·10−16 m−2/3 under moderate conditions
to ∼ 4 · 10−17 m−2/3 under best conditions. Taking into account the orographical proﬁle
under the horizontal path, these values are in good agreement with an adjusted night-
time turbulence model for La Palma and Tenerife [141], which predicts C2n ∼ 10−14m−2/3
near the surface and C2n ∼ 5 · 10−18m−2/3 at 2400 m altitude. The high turbulence on
both path ends certainly contributed signiﬁcantly to the observed mean value.
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Date λ r0 C
2
n 〈δT 2〉1/2 Camera and
(nm) (cm) (m−2/3) (ps) integration time
13/5/05 532 0.6 5.5 · 10−16 7.1 WFC, 60 s
16/5/05 532 0.8 3.9 · 10−16 6.0 CC, 1 s
532 0.6 6.1 · 10−16 7.4 WFC, 60 s
18/5/05 532 3.2 3.6 · 10−17 1.8 CC, 1 s
14/5/05 850 1.8 2.5 · 10−16 4.8 WFC, 60 s
18/5/05 850 5.4 3.9 · 10−17 1.9 CC, 10 s
Table 4.3: Summary of measured and estimated atmospheric parameters of the inter-island
link for wavelengths 532 nm and 850 nm: Fried parameter r0, refractive index structure con-
stant C2n, and estimated time-of-arrival jitter 〈δT 2〉1/2.
Having knowledge about the values of C2n and L0, the expected jitter in the arrival
time of the weak coherent pulses can be estimated according to Eq. (3.30). Assuming
a typical value for the outer scale of L0 ∼ 100 m, which is in good agreement with the
measured angle-of-arrival spectrum, and applying the C2n values inferred from the Fried
parameter measurements, yields a time jitter in the range of a few picoseconds. Hence,
given a weak coherent pulse duration of ∼ 1 ns, atmospheric path length ﬂuctuations
should not contribute signiﬁcantly to arrival time uncertainties.
Not surprisingly, with values on the order of between 10 and 100, the Rytov variance σ21
falls far beyond the limit of 0.3 for weak turbulence conditions. Hence, weak turbulence
theory is likely to produce inaccurate results. In fact, for fairly good conditions like
on 14/5/05 (σ21 ≈ 90), equations (3.21), (3.15), and (3.18) yield for the short-term
beam radius at the receiver wst ∼ 2.0m, for the mean centroid shift 〈r2bw〉1/2 ∼1.9 m,
and for the eﬀective long-term beam radius weﬀ ∼2.8 m, which is not too far from
the values estimated by visual inspection of the beam on the OGS building. For the
given turbulence parameters, theory actually predicts the beam rather to be broken up
into multiple irregular patches exhibiting negligible beam wander. However, this does
not reﬂect the visual impression; the discrepancy is probably due to the existence of
particularly turbulent zones close to the transmitter.
4.4 Adaptive optics
Refractive index inhomogeneities of the turbulent air cause wave front distortions of
optical waves propagating through the atmosphere, leading to such eﬀects as beam
spreading, beam wander, and intensity ﬂuctuations (scintillations). Wave front distor-
tions can be mitigated, in principle, by adaptive optics, that is, real-time wave front
control. However, adaptive optics technologies, currently primarily used in astronomical
imaging, need to be adapted to the requirements of free-space optical communications
systems. For example, astronomical observatory sites are selected speciﬁcally in view
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of low turbulences, and observations are usually made of objects at higher elevation
angles. In contrast, free-space communications scenarios are typically characterised by
much stronger turbulence eﬀects near ground.
Conventional (non-adaptive) classical laser communications systems typically use a di-
vergent beam for transmission, so that a suﬃciently large beam footprint at the receiver
end of the communication link eliminates the need for precision tracking. However, the
wave front distortions arising from the inhomogeneities may still severely impact the
performance of classical free-space optical communications systems by the deterioration
of the communication link: the bit error rate depends on both electronic circuit related
noise and on turbulence-induced, longer-term link disruptions known as atmospheric
signal fading. While the short-term errors from random electronic noise can be recov-
ered using various data encoding techniques, atmospheric signal fading is a challenging
problem, which cannot be solved easily by data coding methods without sacriﬁcing the
system’s data throughput rate. In contrast to classical systems, with quantum com-
munications systems one is less concerned with occasional deep signal fades, since the
establishment of the (random) quantum key does not require complete transmission of
data packets. Despite this diﬀerence, free-space quantum communications system can
proﬁt signiﬁcantly from adaptive optics techniques developed for classical laser commu-
nications systems, because they enhance not only signal stability but also the overall
link transmittance.
4.4.1 Principle of adaptive optics
Systems that use mechanical means to sense and correct for atmospherically induced
wave front deformations in real time are called adaptive optics systems. In order to
remove the phase errors, all adaptive optics systems make use of the principle of phase
conjugation: by applying the reverse phase to the distorted wave front, phase errors can
be removed.
A conventional adaptive optics system, regardless whether it is used for imaging or for
laser beam propagation, consists of three principal components (Figure 4.6): a wavefront
sensor to detect the optical disturbance, an active or deformable mirror to correct for
the optical disturbance, and an actuator command electronics to acquire the sensor
information, compute the required corrective action, and to control the active mirror
[143].
Adaptive optics can be used in diﬀerent ways in free-space optical communication
terminals [144]. The most straight-forward approach is the adaptive receiver: Here, the
distortions of the received beam are compensated by the adaptive optics allowing for a
better focusing of the optical beam onto a small detector area. Compensating only the
lowest order abberations, that is, wave-front tip and tilt, stabilises the beam centroid
location in the focal plane and may be suﬃcient if the detector area is large enough not
to clip the focal spot. If the received beam is to be coupled into an optical ﬁbre, high
resolution phase compensation is required in addition to beam steering. The potential
57
4 The inter-island link
xxxxxx
xxxxxx
xxxxxx
xxxxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
x
xxxxxx
xxxxxx
xxxxxx
xxxxxx
xxxxx
xxxxx
xxxxx
xxxxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xxxxx
xxxxx
xxxxx
xxxxx
xxxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xxxxx
xxx
xxx
xxxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx xxxx
xxxxxxx
xxxxxxx
xxxxxxx
xxx
xx
xx
xx
xxxx
xxxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xx
xx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
x
xx
xxx
xxx
xxxx
xxxxxxx
x
xxx
xx
xx
xxx
x
xxxxx xx xxx
xxxx xxxx
xx
xx
xx
x
xx
xx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
x
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
x
xx
xx
x
xxx
xx
Wave front sensor
Imaging
detector
Deformable mirror
Telescope
Turbulence Distorted
wave front
Command
electronics
Figure 4.6: Generalised schematics of an adaptive optics system. Atmospherically induced
wave front distortions on the incoming beam are sampled by a wave front sensor; based on
its output the command electronics computes a corrective signal for the deformable mirror
to ﬂatten the wave front. The result is a much sharper image of the beam on the imaging
detector.
of the adaptive receiver is limited though, since it allows only to compensate distortions
of light waves that enter the receiver aperture. In order to increase the total power
collected by the receiver telescope, an adaptive transmitter is required, which mitigates
the turbulence induced beam spreading by precompensation of the transmitted wave.
An adaptive transmitter can be realised in diﬀerent ways. One approach is to use feed-
back from the receiver end to optimise the precompensation of the transmitted beam.
In this case, data on the sensed wave front distortions have to be transmitted from the
receiver terminal to the transmitter terminal. The feedback signal’s inherent latency
due to the propagation time represents a fundamental constraint of this approach, and
limits its practicability to shorter link distances. The second way for realisation of an
adaptive transmitter uses a beacon from the receiver terminal to obtain information
about the wave front distortions during propagation between the terminals. Control
of the adaptive optics is performed by maximisation of the beacon’s beam quality, and
the transmitted beam is sent in the opposite direction through the same adaptive op-
tics elements. Because of the reciprocity of the turbulent atmosphere (at a ﬁxed time
t) [145], the wave front correction for the received beam is simultaneously the optimal
precompensation for the outgoing beam [146]. However, for this scheme to work prop-
erly, the round-trip (receiver-transmitter-receiver) propagation time must be short com-
pared to the timescale on which atmospheric ﬂuctuations take place (typically ∼ 1ms,
cf. §3.4.2). This condition is satisﬁed by near-ground paths up to ∼ 150 km length and
space-ground-space paths, but is not satisﬁed by ground-space-ground paths.
By nature of quantum optical communications, the power of the transmitted signal
beam is extremely low, which makes direct sensing of wave front distortions on the
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quantum signal virtually impossible. Therefore, an additional beacon propagating from
the transmitter terminal to the receiver terminal has to be employed for the detection
of wave front distortions on the signal beam.
4.4.2 Active tracking on the inter-island link
The measurement of long-term beam wander (§4.2) gave evidence, that a stable oper-
ation of the inter-island link was impossible without employing active beam steering
techniques. Changing refraction eﬀects due to diurnal variations of the average index-
of-refraction vertical gradient would have caused large beam pointing errors, degrading
the link transmittance substantially, eventually beyond the limit for quantum key dis-
tribution. Therefore, a bi-directional tip-tilt correction was implemented to compensate
slowly varying atmospheric inﬂuences. The realised active tracking system shall be de-
scribed in the following. More details can be found in [147].
The realised tracking system (Figure 4.7) worked with two beacon lasers, one shining
from the transmitter telescope towards the OGS on Tenerife, and a second one in the
opposite direction. Compact diode-pumped solid-state laser modules emitting at 532 nm
were attached to the transmitter telescope breadboard and to the side of the OGS
telecope tube, bore sighted to the respective main telescopes. The laser modules’ output
beams measured roughly 1 mm in diameter and were defocused to have about 0.2 mrad
divergence to ensure constant illumination of the remote wave front sensors.
On the transmitter side (Alice), the beacon laser from Tenerife was collected by a
150 mm achromatic lens (f=400 mm) and focused onto a CCD camera with 4.5μm
pixel size (see §5.1.4 for details). By calculating the centre of mass of the intensity
distribution, the spatial resolution was enhanced to ∼ 1.5μm, which is equivalent to
a beam shift at the receiver by 0.5m and suﬃcient for this application. The stepping
motors acting on the pointing direction of the transmitter telescope were controlled by
Tenerife
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Figure 4.7: Overview of the tracking system for the inter-island link experiment.
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a closed-loop, proportional control algorithm implemented in LabView. One cycle of
image readout, algorithm execution, and motor movement required about 1 second on
average. The reference point on the CCD camera was optimised on the basis of the
measured end-to-end transmission values.
Figure 4.8 shows the diﬀerence in transmission losses with and without active tracking
of the transmitter. The top viewgraph displays the attenuation of the optical link
(grey: measured data; red: moving average over 50 data points). When the tracking
loop was disabled (orange vertical line), the link transmission dropped within minutes
from ∼ 30 dB to ∼ 45 dB. At the same time, the position of the beacon on the CCD
(blue curves) moved away from the reference point by 3 pixels, corresponding to a
beam wander of ∼4.5 m, or roughly one beam diameter, at the receiver. A comparison
between horizontal and vertical perturbations shows that the observed eﬀect is much
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Figure 4.8: Comparison of the optical link eﬃciency with and without active tracking.
Changes on the seconds to minutes time scale in the atmospheric temperature gradients cause
the optical beam to wander. This movement is recorded with the beacon laser on the CCD.
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more pronounced in the vertical direction, which is plausible because the atmospheric
structure largely consists of horizontally homogeneous layers.
For the active pointing of the receiver telescope (Bob), the slow part of the tracking
facilities of the OGS were used. The light of the beacon laser from La Palma was
directed through the OGS telescope onto the Coude´ camera, using a dichroic mirror to
separate the beacon light from the weak coherent beam. Owing to the high sensitivity
of the Coude´ camera and long exposure times, the beacon laser on La Palma could
be attenuated to about 0.1 mW output power to prevent saturation of the camera. A
long integration time of 2 s was chosen to reduce errors of the spot position due to
fast turbulences. The tracking/guiding software OGSTracking was provided by ESA
and directly interfaced with the telescope drive controller. The software made use of
a number of external programs to acquire images from the Coude´ camera, process the
image data, ﬁnd the beacon image, and to display the calculated pointing corrections.
Figure 4.9 shows a screenshot of the output window with the image acquired by the
Coude´ camera, deviation of the beacon from its target position, and the calculated
corrections, expressed in the telescopes coordinate system hour axis (HA) and declination
angle (Dec). One loop of the image grabbing, calculating and executing the corrections
of the telescope position took ∼10 s. This speed turned out to be suﬃcient to ensure a
stable signal beam position well within the active area of the single photon detectors.
4.4.3 Potential of higher-order adaptive optics
The active tracking system described above was designed to compensate slow beam
wander and beam drifts that would have led to a loss of the optical link. Of course,
the transmitted quantum signal could be used much more eﬃciently with a narrower
beam, using fast beam-steering and higher-order wave front precompensation techniques
in an adaptive transmitter conﬁguration. Possible realisations, and the potential of such
methods shall be brieﬂy investigated in this section.
The conventional adaptive optics approach for atmospheric compensation is based on
wave front sensing and reconstruction. When applied to free-space laser communica-
tions, a part of the received beam (or, alternatively, a beacon beam) is directed to a
wave front sensor, for instance a Shack-Hartmann sensor, or a Shearing interferometer.
The wave front is reconstructed from the measured data and used to calculate the con-
trol signals for the actuators of the wave front corrector, usually a deformable mirror
of some kind. This scheme has been successfully implemented in a number of mostly
astronomical systems [148, 149] before its potential for horizontal path optical commu-
nications was investigated. In [150], Levine et al. calculated the power spectral density
for various Zernike polynomial modes2 [151] to determine the degree of the expected
corrections that can be accomplished by means of modal correction. There is, however,
2Virtually any realistic wave front Φ(r, θ) can be decomposed into a 2-dimensional Fourier series of
Zernike polynomials. Low order Zernike modes correspond to piston, tilt, focus, astigmatism, coma
errors, and so on.
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Figure 4.9: Example of the OGS tracking software output. Top left: Image acquired by the
Coude´ camera during twilight. Next to the bright spot of the beacon laser the silhouette of
the NOT dome is visible; the dark ring around the centre is the iris in the plane of the Coude´
focus. Bottum left: deviation of the beacon from its target position. Right top and bottum:
calculated corrections of telescope coordinates.
a fundamental diﬀerence to astronomical systems, where the turbulence-induced wave
front perturbations occur near the receiver telescope, and where intensity ﬂuctuations
are relatively weak: In laser communication applications, the beam-aﬀecting turbulence
is distributed along the entire propagation path [150,152]. In this case, both phase and
amplitude of the propagating wave get corrupted, requiring, strictly speaking, a com-
pensation of phase as well as amplitude. Although phase-only correction of the wave
front is theoretically suﬃcient only for a propagation distance in the near ﬁeld, it has
nevertheless been demonstrated to provide signiﬁcant improvement in the transmitted
beam quality for large distance optical communications [150]. Applied to the central
ﬁgure of merit in laser communications, it was found that the bit-error rate can be im-
proved by more than an order of magnitude even with lower-order compensation up to
40 Zernike modes [153, 154].
More recently, adaptive optical systems with more than one phase correction device
have been proposed, that can compensate for both amplitude and phase abberations that
result from propagation through a turbulent medium [155–157]. This class of multicon-
jugate adaptive optical (MCAO) systems is distinct from an earlier approach to MCAO
62
4.4 Adaptive optics
systems, which aimed at increasing the compensated ﬁeld of view beyond the isoplanatic
angle, using multiple wave-front sensing beacons and a tomographic approach based on
the geometrical optics approximation.
Yet, with scintillation conditions becoming stronger, experiments showed a signiﬁcant
degradation in the correction achievable by conventional phase-conjugate adaptive optics
systems [152]. The primary identiﬁed reason for this is that strong intensity ﬂuctuations
make wave front reconstruction in practice very diﬃcult in zones with almost no intensity.
In mathematical terms, strong scintillation leads to the occurrence of a large number
of branch points in the phase of the optical ﬁeld, that cause the phase reconstruction
algorithm to produce results that do not adequately match the actual phase [158].
In strong scintillation conditions, it is desireable to avoid wave front measurements
completely. As an alternative approach, it can be attempted to control the wave front
corrector by ”blind“ (model-free) optimisation of a system performance ﬁgure of merit,
called metric, or cost function. The general idea is to minimise or maximise the cost
function by making small adjustments to the phase correction devices, measuring the
eﬀect on the cost function to calculate a derivative, and then following the gradient that
will minimise or maximise the cost function. A common choice for the metric is the
Strehl ratio, which denotes the ratio of the peak intensity in the far ﬁeld spot to the
peak intensity of the spot formed by an equivalent, diﬀraction limited, aberration free
system. One diﬃculty with the model-free optimisation technique is its iterative nature
to ﬁnd the optimum control signal, which imposes speed requirements both on the com-
putational speed of the control algorithm and on the control bandwidth of the phase
actuator. On the other hand, a useful performance metric, like the received power level,
or the coupling eﬃciency into an optical ﬁbre, may readily be available in typical laser
communications systems. With a microelectromechanical deformable mirror (MEMS),
and a highly integrated microcontroller system implementing a stochastic parallel gra-
dient descent algorithm, speeds up to 11.000 iterations/s have been achieved [159,160],
which seems suﬃcient for real-time compensation of atmospheric turbulence.
The subject of maximising the useful transmitted power in a two-telescope system
was more generally addressed in a paper by Barchers and Fried [161]. They found that
if one uses an adaptive optical system in each telescope, and simply uses the received
beam as the wave front sensing beacon, a natural convergent iteration occurs, leading
to maximum transmission of power through a turbulent medium. Any combination of
means of controlling adaptive optical systems in each telescope will solve the optimal
power transmission problem. Simulations indicate that for a uniform distribution of the
strength of turbulence, 95% transmission of laser power is attained when both telescopes
can achieve full-wave compensation, provided that the aperture diameter D of the two
telescopes is greater than twice the Fresnel length
√
λL.
In conclusion of this short overview, the use of higher-order adaptive optics could help
achieve higher link eﬃciency in the future, even with smaller optics. This is, of course,
highly attractive for any free space quantum key distribution system, and in particular
for satellite-based QKD.
63
5 Experimental setup
The experimental setup of a QKD experiment is naturally divided into three building
blocks, namely the transmitter (Alice), the quantum channel, and the receiver (Bob).
While the linking quantum channel has been characterised in the preceding chapter, this
chapter describes the individual parts of the experimental setup in detail. Alice’s signal
states were generated as laser diode pulses, which were strongly attenuated to an average
photon number below one photon per pulse. The transmitter setup utilised a separate
diode for each linear polarisation, taking advantage of the high intrinsic polarisation
of the diodes. The beams were overlapped and routed to the transmitter telescope
via a single-mode ﬁbre. At the receiver end, a large diameter receiving telescope was
employed to collect as many photons of the turbulence-spread beam as possible. The
collected light was directed to the receiver module, where the signal pulses were detected
and their polarisation was analysed. This measurement was performed with the help
of polarisation optics and a set of four Silicon avalanche photodiodes for single photon
detection. The exact arrival time of each pulse is recorded to allow for properly assigning
the detected events to the sent signals.
5.1 The transmitter
The transmitter setup consists of the transmitter module, which generates the signal
pulses, and the transmitter telescope to collimate and direct the light over the free-space
optical channel to the receiver. Two diﬀerent versions of the transmitter module were
used during the experiments: The initial version had 4 laser diodes, and decoy pulses
were created by switching on two laser diodes simultaneously. The second generation of
the transmitter module was extended to 8 laser diodes to provide separate sets of laser
diodes for signal pulses and brighter decoy pulses. The two versions of the transmitter
module are presented and characterised separately in §5.1.2; the transmitter telescope
is described in §5.1.4.
5.1.1 Location and infrastructure
The transmitter for the Canary Island experiment was located on the grounds belonging
to the Nordic Optical Telescope (NOT) at the Observatorio del Roque de los Muchachos
(ORM) on the island of La Palma. The place was chosen because of the direct line of
sight to Tenerife, especially to the telescope of the Optical Ground Station. This direct
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Figure 5.1: Map of the Roque de los Muchachos area on La Palma; the insert shows the
location of the portacabin and the transmitter telescope on the NOT site. The dashed arrow
indicates the direction to OGS.
line of sight is available only at a few locations on the ORM, and the most suitable place
was chosen, which is the north-eastern corner of the driveway to the NOT telescope (see
Figure 5.1).
Power and internet access was obtained from the NOT infrastructure. An open ended
container (“portacabin”) was installed to provide shelter from wind, rain, and dust.
Sensitive components (i.e., transmitter module, lasers, electronic equipment) were set
up in the container. The transmitter telescope remained outside linked to the source
by ﬁbre optics, because placing the telescope inside the container would have greatly
deteriorated the beam quality at the warm-to-cold interface.
5.1.2 Alice module
The purpose of the transmitter module (in the following often called “Alice module”)
is to generate faint pulses of light of distinct linear polarisation. This is achieved by
driving a laser diode with a short electrical pulse, and heavily attenuating the optical
output. To keep the complexity of the apparatus as low as possible, a separate laser
diode for each of the desired polarisation states (4 in the case of BB84) was used, and
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Figure 5.2: (a) Cut through the centre of the Alice module revealing the two conical mirrors
that reﬂect the light from the laser diodes (orange) to the top of the housing where the single
mode ﬁbre coupler is attached. Outer dimensions are roughly 5x5x5 cm3. (b) Photograph
of the laser diode mounting (with convex mirror in the centre), and the concave mirror with
thread for the coupling lens.
their outputs were combined into a single spatial mode deﬁned by a single mode optical
ﬁbre. Due to the fabrication process, most laser diodes emit light of a high intrinsic
linear polarisation (typically 1:1000), which means that additional polarising optics is
not necessary.
Figure 5.2 shows a CAD drawing and a photograph of the mechanical structure form-
ing the transmitter module. The mounting of the laser diodes in the chassis allows
individual tip-tilt adjustment of each diode to optimise coupling eﬃciencies indepen-
dently. Each laser diode is rotated in the mounting head by 45o with respect to the
neighbouring ones. In this way, the arrangement can produce light of one of the po-
larisations {0◦, 45◦, 90◦, 135◦}, in the following rather denoted by the polarisation states
{|H〉 , |+〉 , |V 〉 , |−〉}. The light of each diode is reﬂected by a concave-convex pair of
conical mirrors and fed jointly into a single mode ﬁbre (cut-oﬀ wavelength 830 nm),
which is connected directly to the module. A small high-aperture lens (focal length
f=11 mm, NA=0.25) is placed in front of the ﬁbre tip. Apart from the obvious need for
routing the light from the Alice module to the transmitter telescope, the single mode
ﬁbre serves an additional purpose: it is essential to ensure that the spatial intensity
proﬁle of all polarisations is identical; otherwise the eavesdropper could infer the polari-
sation of a photon by measuring its k vector. The use of a single mode ﬁbre by deﬁnition
guarantees the indistinguishability of the output beams.
The opto-mechanical design of the Alice module results in a coupling eﬃciency of
roughly 10−7 from the laser diode into the single mode ﬁbre, thus providing enough
attenuation for optical output pulses on the single photon level — additional neutral
density ﬁlters are not needed.
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In a straightforward extension of the mechanical design from four to eight laser diodes,
every two facing diodes produce identical polarisations. This conﬁguration (see Fig-
ure 5.2b) was used to implement a second “decoy source” in addition to the “signal
source” as described in §2.6.2.
Electronics
The laser diode driving electronics is integrated on a small printed circuit board that
is attached directly to the Alice module in order to keep signal lines to the diodes
as short as possible. This dedicated circuitry is controlled (via additional interface
electronics, Figure 5.3) by a personal computer, which provides the bit pattern (i.e.,
random numbers with interspersed synchronisation sequences) to be sent out by the
transmitter. The interface electronics buﬀers the parallel data provided by a digital I/O
card (NuDAQ PCI-7200 ) in a ﬁrst in, ﬁrst out memory (FIFO), and translates them into
serial data, that is sent synchronously to the pulse electronics. An ovenized oscillator
(Trimble Tunderbolt), that is disciplined by the time signal of the Global Positioning
System (GPS), provides the actual 10 MHz clock pulse for the laser driver electronics.
It is of paramount importance to use a “true” random number generator (i.e., a piece
of dedicated hardware) for quantum cryptography, and not software-generated pseudo-
random numbers. The latter are created from mathematical functions using an initial
starting number called seed, and give, for every seed, a seemingly chaotic, but purely
deterministic series of numbers. Due to their underlying structure, such pseudo-random
sequences have reduced entropy content, which would undermine the security of the
quantum key. Ideally, random numbers are therefore generated via a well-understood
physical process, the quantum nature of which creates the randomness [162–164]. In our
experiment, a random number generator based on thermal noise was used [165]. Because
the random number generator provided random numbers at a lower rate than required
by our QKD system, random numbers were created before the experiment and stored
on the PC’s harddrive.
In the course of the experiment, it emerged that the ﬁrst generation of circuitry used
in the June trial did substantially limit the performance of the key generation system
and was therefore replaced by an improved design that was employed in the September
trial. Due to their impact on the experimental results, these electronic drivers are brieﬂy
described and characterised in the following.
1st generation pulse electronics (4 channels)
The design of the ﬁrst generation pulse driver (Figure 5.3) is based on ECL (emitter
coupled logic) technology to produce a one-shot logic signal of approximately 1 ns dura-
tion on every rising edge of the 10 MHz clock pulse. This pulse form is then ampliﬁed by
an RF transistor and AC coupled to the pre-biased laser diode, resulting in an voltage
increase of ≈ 0.5V at the diode. For the short duration of the pulse, the voltage at the
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Figure 5.3: Schematic of the 1st generation transmitter electronics with 4 channels. The ran-
dom bit sequence provided by the Alice PC is buﬀered and interfaced to the pulse electronics,
that drives the laser diodes synchronously with the external clock.
laser diode is raised above the lasing threshold. To control the intensity of the optical
output pulse, the bias voltage for each of the 4 channels can be adjusted with poten-
tiometers. The duration of the electrical pulse can be tuned using a variable capacitor.
One important condition for secure QKD is the correct timing and pulse shape of
the signal pulses. Figure 5.4a shows the electrical output pulses of the 4-channel pulse
electronics, measured with a 20-GHz oscilloscope. The pronounced voltage ripple after
the main pulse is essentially a measurement artefact due to the connection of the probe
head to the circuit. The duration of the electrical pulses are very similar and around
0.9 ns FWHM. However, it is apparent that the four channels have a relative delay of
up to 0.8 ns, which is a result of diﬀerent signal propagation times on the printed circuit
board.
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Figure 5.4: (a) Electrical output of the 1st generation laser diode driver. The individual
channels are slightly delayed relative to each other. (b) Resulting typical optical pulse emitted
by the laser diode.
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Figure 5.4b shows the resulting time-resolved optical pulse from a 10 mW laser diode
(Laser Components LCQ85010S5, slope eﬃciency 0.73 mW/mA), recorded with a broad-
band photodiode (rise time 70 ps). The full width at half maximum duration is 0.8 ns.
Since the amplitude of the electrical pulse is ﬁxed, the integrated intensity of the optical
pulse can either be tuned via the pulse length, or by raising the bias voltage, which,
however, results in an undesired increase of the background level.
2nd generation pulse electronics (8 channels)
The second generation pulse electronics (Figure 5.5) oﬀers the possibility to drive 8
laser diodes to implement the decoy state protocol with two diﬀerent intensities. For
this purpose, the PC generates an additional decoy ﬂag to switch between the two sets
of laser diodes. Bias and modulation current of each laser diode can be controlled
electronically by the Alice computer to match the desired mean photon number. The
amplifying transistor was replaced by a commercial laser diode driver IC, which has a
faster rise time and can provide a higher modulation current than the transistor-based
design. Additionally, digital delay circuits have been included for channel deskewing
down to a resolution of 17 ps. The laser diodes may also be run in continuous-wave mode
to provide a brightness increase of around 100 to aid in the ﬁne alignment procedure.
Figure 5.6 shows typical optical output pulses of diﬀerent peak intensities and dura-
tions with a full width at half maximum of 0.27 ns, 0.54 ns, and 0.90 ns. Given a ﬁxed
Alice PC
Random numbers
on hard drive
Laser
diodes
N
uD
AQ
PC
I-7
20
0
di
gi
ta
l I
/O
ca
rd
GPS clock
10 MHz
32
Interface electronics
Shift Reg.
FIFO
Shift Reg.
Shift Reg.
Shift Reg.
Buffer
Pulse electronics
Clk Delay
Delay
Delay
Delay
Delay
Delay
Delay
Delay
Quad
AND/
NAND
8
Shift Reg. Decoy Flag
D
ec
oy
D
io
de
s
Si
gn
al
D
io
de
s
Bias+Mod.
Control DAC
16
Pulse
Shaper
Clock
Recovery
Figure 5.5: Schematic of the improved transmitter electronics with 8 channels. An additional
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pulse attenuation, which is deﬁned by the opto-mechanical design of the Alice module,
independent tuning of the pulse length and the modulation current allows to vary the
pulse intensity over a wide range of mean photon numbers. The double peak structure
of the longer pulses hints at imperfect impedance matching of the driving electronics
with the laser diode. Relative delays between the individual channels were matched to
better than 25 ps using the digital delay stages (for clarity not shown in Figure 5.6).
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Figure 5.6: Optical pulses generated with the 2nd generation laser diode driver at diﬀerent
modulation currents.
5.1.3 Characterisation of the transmitter
A fundamental prerequisite for the security of the QKD system is the assumption that
the information is only encoded in the polarisation degree of freedom of the signal
states. Other properties, like wavelength, spatial emission proﬁle, and timing, must be
independent of the bit value and basis choice.
Wavelength
Various ways of ensuring that the laser wavelengths are indistinguishable are available.
In the simplest approach, this can be achieved though the variation of laser current
and operating temperature. The approach in this experiment was to select laser diodes
that operate at the same wavelength and the same temperature, and to mount all laser
chips on the same heat sink. Figure 5.7 compares the individual spectra of the 4 laser
diodes producing the signal states in the 1st generation Alice module. The spectra are
centred around 850.5 nm with an average spectral width of ∼ 1.5 nm. To improve
indistinguishability, the lasers could be passed through a narrow-band ﬁlter (< 1 nm)
at the transmitter. However, laser diode emission wavelengths typically drift by about
0.12 nm/K, thus a temperature control is required to ensure the matching of the ﬁlter
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and the laser wavelengths. Since a temperature control system was not yet implemented
at the time, narrow-band ﬁltering had to be abandoned.
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Figure 5.7: Spectra of the four transmitter laser diodes, operated in pulsed mode.
Polarisation
Figure 5.8 shows the integration of the Alice module into the transmitter setup. The
mean photon number of the signal and the decoy states was adjusted and monitored
with a calibrated single photon detector at one of the output ports of a 50:50 ﬁbre beam
splitter before coupling the transmitter output to the telescope. Bright alignment lasers
of visible and infrared wavelengths were coupled optionally into the second input port
of the beam splitter to provide a stronger signal for initial alignment of the optical link.
The single-mode ﬁbre to the transmitter telescope was ﬁrmly taped to solid material
to keep polarisation ﬂuctuations small. To measure the birefringence along the ﬁbre,
single-photon polarisation analysis was performed inside the transmitter telescope with
a rotatable polarising ﬁlter and a single-photon detector. Compensation was done with
a ﬁbre polarisation controller. For the transmission of signal pulses to the receiver, the
polarisation analysis setup was removed from the transmitter telescope.
Figure 5.9 shows a full polarisation analysis of the transmitter diodes after carefully
compensating the ﬁbre birefringence. The resulting visibilities of the individual laser
diodes are summarised in Table 5.1. Since the polarising ﬁlter had an extinction ratio
of better than 1:1000, imperfect visibility was mainly due to ﬁnite intrinsic polarisation
of the laser diodes and residual errors in the ﬁbre compensation. The orientation of the
laser diodes was accurate to about ±2◦. Overall, the transmitter’s contribution to the
quantum bit error rate is expected to be 0.3% to 0.6%.
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Figure 5.8: Transmitter setup in the conﬁguration for polarisation compensation. For quan-
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Figure 5.9: Polarisation analysis of the ﬁbre-coupled transmitter module with 4 laser diodes.
5.1.4 Transmitter telescope
The Alice module was coupled via single-mode ﬁbre to the transmitter telescope (Fig-
ure 5.10), which was mounted on a heavy workbench outside the portacabin, where
Alice’s optics and control electronics were placed. The light emitted from the bare ﬁbre
was collimated in the telescope by a 150 mm diameter f/2.7 achromatic lens. To enable
focussing without touching the telescope setup, and to enhance repeatability, the ﬁbre
coupler’s translation in z -direction was motorised and controlled from the user interface
of the tracking software. In particular, this was necessary to compensate for residual
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Diode Visibility Vi Angle θi
H 99.6% 0.0◦
V 97.6% 91.5◦
+45 99.5% 47.5◦
−45 98.9% -43.0◦
Table 5.1: Characterisation of the transmitter module: visibilities (dark count corrected) and
polarisation angles for the four laser diodes of the Alice module. The values are inferred from
ﬁtted sine functions as depicted in Figure 5.9.
chromatic abberations of the lens when switching between diﬀerent wavelengths (e.g.,
of the diﬀerent alignment lasers). In order to allow for ﬁne adjustments of the pointing
direction of the telescope, the breadboard with the optical assembly was mounted onto
a stable tip-tilt stage equipped with stepper motors (PI Stepper-Mike) for both horizon-
tal and vertical axis. The use of large high precision ball bearings ensured a suﬃcient
stability of the setup. The sensitivity of the setup to local vibrations was tested by a
person jumping next to the supporting workbench, which produced no noticeable eﬀect
on the beam wander at the receiver station. The inﬂuence of wind, aﬀecting the setup
more directly, however, was diﬃcult to separate from atmospheric turbulence eﬀects,
and could not be evaluated.
The bidirectional tracking technique required two beacon beams, one of them shin-
Figure 5.10: Transmitter telescope. The large lens on the right collimates the outgoing weak
coherent beam, the second front lens collects the incoming light from the laser beacon. A
heavy ball bearing and stepper motors allow for pointing adjustments.
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ing from the quantum optical transmitter to the receiver, and the other one vice versa.
Hence, a 532 nm laser module with 35mW output power was ﬁtted to the transmit-
ter telescope setup. Since the 532 nm radiation was generated by internally frequency
doubling, the laser had considerable output in the infrared, which was ﬁltered out by
reﬂecting the output beam a few times oﬀ a pair of dichroic mirrors before sending it to
Tenerife. Neutral density ﬁlters were used to adjust the brightness of the beacon beam
to the required level.
Likewise, an additional lens to collect and focus the light from the other beacon laser
(shining from OGS to the transmitter) was required. It was of the same kind as the
transmitter telescope’s front lens and mounted next to it on the same breadboard. In
this way, both transmitter lens and collecting lens always moved together. To record
the apparent direction to the quantum optical receiver, a CCD camera was placed in the
focal plane of the collecting lens, feeding its images via ﬁrewire to a personal computer
for data processing. The tracking technique is explained in detail in §4.4.2.
5.2 The receiver
The light from the quantum optical transmitter was sent over 144 km optical path at
a mean altitude of approx. 2400 m to the Optical Ground Station (OGS) on Tenerife,
which is part of the Observatorio del Teide on the mountain ridge Izan˜a (Figure 5.11).
An overview of the optical setup at the receiver station is given in the next section; the
design of the quantum optical receiver is covered in §5.2.2.
Figure 5.11: Map of the Observatorio del Teide. The dashed arrow indicates the direction
from NOT on La Palma.
74
5.2 The receiver
5.2.1 The Optical Ground Station
The ESA facility of the OGS consists of an observatory building with a dome and the
associated infrastructure, and a reﬂective telescope including a control system. The
telescope used in the OGS is a Zeiss 1-m Ritchey-Chre´tien/Coude´ telescope supported
by an English mount. The telescope can either be used in Cassegrain focus (intended
mainly for observation of space debris) or in Coude´ focus conﬁguration designed for
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Figure 5.12: Schematic cut through the Optical
Ground Station. In Coude´ conﬁguration, the light
collected by the primary mirror is guided through
the mount and the south pillar to the Coude´ ﬂoor.
optical communication experiments.
Figure 5.12 shows the optical ar-
rangements of the Cassegrain and the
Coude´ focus of the telescope. The
Coude´ focus is located in a dedicated
laboratory, one ﬂoor below the tele-
scope ﬂoor. To avoid turbulence ef-
fects due to the temperature diﬀer-
ences between the two ﬂoors, the op-
tical path from the telescope ﬂoor to
the Coude´ laboratory leads via an
evacuated feed-through. The Coude´
laboratory provides a stabilised and
well suited environment for optical ex-
periments and accommodates a per-
manent setup for optical communica-
tion experiments with satellites like
ARTEMIS and SMART-1.
There are basically two options for
placing a quantum optical receiver
module: at the Cassegrain focus or
at the Coude´ focus. A lightweight
receiver could be installed at the
Cassegrain focus, attached directly to
the telescope, where optical transmis-
sion losses are lowest. This option
has major disadvantages, however:
Access to the receiver for mainte-
nance, adjustment and troubleshoot-
ing would be delicate since the telescope’s optical axis runs about 5 m above the ﬂoor
when the telescope is pointed to the horizon. Secondly, this option rules out the simul-
taneous use of the Coude´ camera (CC) for tracking and other purposes, like monitoring
angle-of-arrival ﬂuctuations. Lastly, a major use of the telescope at the time was the
observation of space debris which involves a liquid nitrogen cooled, large format CCD
camera mounted at the Cassegrain focus. The removal and careful reattachment of this
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heavy instrument requires the help of a crane and an experienced operator. The option
to use the Cassegrain focus was therefore discarded.
The Coude´ focus on the other hand is easily accessible in a well controlled, clean, and
temperature stabilised environment. Moreover, the design of the Coude´ beam path is
such that changes to the polarisation are minimised [166]. The focus point is 30 cm
above a high quality granite optical bench, that is available for temporary experimental
setups. Even though the installed instrumentation includes actuators and detectors for
a full Pointing, Acquisition, and Tracking (PAT) system, for practical reasons it was
only possible to take advantage of the existing Coude´ camera for tracking purposes.
The Coude´ camera is a Peltier-cooled, large-format CCD camera (1242 × 1152 pixels,
pixel size 22.5 μm × 22.5 μm) located behind a collimator to observe the full Coude´
ﬁeld-of-view of 8 arcmin.
Background photons from stray light (especially during full moon) limit the perfor-
mance of the QKD system. Therefore, a variable iris diaphragm was inserted in the
Coude´ focus plane to allow for adjustment of the telescope’s eﬀective ﬁeld of view (Fig-
ure 5.13). A dichroic mirror, placed shortly after the focus point, was used to separate
the infrared photons originating from Alice (signal channel, wavelength 850 nm) from
the green tracking beam (wavelength 532 nm). The dichroic mirror had a reﬂectivity of
>99.9% at 850 nm and <1% at 532 nm, providing a high isolation between the tracking
light and the quantum signal. In the infrared (reﬂected) arm, the linear polarisation
from La Palma was rotated by a halfwave plate in front of the single photon detection
unit (Bob module) to match the analysing basis to the transmitted one. This was nec-
essary because the internal reﬂecting optics in the optical path from the telescope to
the Coude´ ﬂoor give rise to a variable polarisation rotation, depending on the pointing
direction of the telescope. Finally, an achromatic lens (f=400 mm) collimated the beam
before it entered the single photon polarisation analyser setup.
5.2.2 Single photon polarisation analysis
The task of the single photon polarisation analyser setup (in the following called Bob
module) is to analyse the polarisation of the incoming infrared photons. In principle, the
polarisation measurement is performed by directing the incident photons — depending
mainly on their polarisation state — to one of four single photon detectors. The result of
the polarisation analysis consists in the information which of the four detectors produced
a “click”.
For secure key generation, the polarisation measurement of the incoming photons has
to be performed with a random choice of the detection basis, either H/V or ±45◦ in
the case of BB84-type protocols. One key idea to simplify the optical setup is to use a
nonpolarising beam splitter to decide passively in which basis a photon will be measured
[167, 168]. This avoids the need for a combination of a random number generator and
a fast active polarisation control device. The polarisation detection itself is done in a
straight-forward way with a pair of polarising beam splitters (Figure 5.13). Thus, a
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Figure 5.13: Optical setup of the receiver. Light collected by the OGS telescope is guided
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to the single-photon polarisation analysis setup, light of the tracking beacon is transmitted to
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77
5 Experimental setup
photon behind the reﬂected output of the beamsplitter is analysed in the H/V basis,
whereas photons in the transmitted arm pass a half wave plate at 22.5◦ in front of the
polarising beamsplitter, and are eﬀectively analysed along ±45◦. Each analysis path
contained an interference ﬁlter (centre wavelength 850 nm, FWHM 10 nm) attached to
the single photon detector units, in order to suppress stray light both from the sky and
from light sources in the Coude´ room.
Atmospheric turbulence caused signiﬁcant beam wander in the focal plane of the
telescope of up to 3 mm on timescales too fast to be compensated by the active tracking
system. To prevent the beam from wandering oﬀ the detectors, a focal length reducer
was required to reduce the beam diameter to below 0.5mm, the diameter of the active
detector area. This was realised by collimating the beam after the Coude´ focus with
a 400mm achromatic lens and refocusing with 40mm lenses placed in front of each
detector. The collimated beam had a diameter of 10.5mm, which enabled usage of oﬀ-
the-shelf 20mm cube beam splitters. The additional optics shrunk the focus uncertainty
circle by a factor of 8 and changed the eﬀective numerical aperture from f/40 to f/5. If
the Bob module had been placed directly at the Coude´ focus, a considerable fraction of
the photons would have missed the detectors.
Characterisation
In order to measure the contribution of the Bob module to the QBER, linearly polarised
light with the same beam parameters as the light collected by the telescope was generated
locally and sent to the Bob module. The emitting source, a 850 nm laser diode of the
same kind as used in the Alice module, was attenuated with neutral density ﬁlters and
coupled to single mode ﬁbre for mode cleaning. After the ﬁbre, a linear polarisation
state was deﬁned by a thin ﬁlm polariser (extinction ratio better than 1:500). This ﬁxed
polarisation was then rotated by diﬀerent angles by means of a half wave plate mounted
in a motorised rotation stage. The polarisation angle was varied in steps of 1.5◦, and,
for each step, the number of detection events for each detector was recorded for a ﬁxed
integration time of 1 second. Figure 5.14 shows the number of detections as a function
of the polarisation angle of the incident light. Fitting cosine functions to each data set,
one obtains the visibilities of the four detectors. Table 5.2 lists the darkcount-corrected
visibilities Vi and the angles γi deﬁning the measurement bases.
From the visibilities Vi one can easily obtain the individual contributions to the total
QBER in a quantum key distribution experiment. Since the residual error of the input
polarisation has negligible impact on the measured visibilities Vi, we can calculate the
contribution of the polarisation analysis setup to the QBER, for example, for horizontal
polarisation from:
QBER|H〉 =
nV (|H〉)
nV (|H〉) + nH(|H〉) ,
where ni |ψ〉 denote the countrates of detector i for the incident polarisation state |ψ〉.
This is a stricter deﬁnition than the general relation QBERi = (1 − Vi)/2, especially if
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Figure 5.14: Characterisation of the polarisation analysis setup with highly linearly polarised
light: Count rates of the individual single-photon detectors as a function of the polarisation
angle of the incoming light.
Detector Visibility Vi Angle γi
H 98.0% 0.7◦
V 98.9% 90.4◦
+45 97.5% 44.7◦
−45 98.5% -45.7◦
Table 5.2: Characterisation of the polarisation analysis setup: visibilities (dark count cor-
rected) and bases angles for the four detectors of the Bob module. The values are inferred
from ﬁtted cosine functions to the data depicted in Figure 5.14.
the detection eﬃciencies of the individual detectors diﬀer. Calculating the mean QBER
of all four input polarisations {|H〉 , |V 〉 , |+45〉 , |−45〉}, one expects a contribution of
the polarisation analysis of the Bob module to the total QBER of QBERBob = 0.85%. A
second source of error, that has to be attributed to the receiver optics, is the imperfect
matching of the analysing basis reference frames to the transmitted one, that is, a relative
rotation of the polarisation coordinate systems. Figure 5.15 shows the dependence of
the contributions to the total QBER as a function of the angle mismatch. From this
plot, it is apparent that a good alignment technique to keep the angle mismatch as low
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as possible is crucial for operating a QKD system at the lowest QBER possible1. In the
experiment, this was achieved by inserting a polariser into the transmitter telescope (as
depicted in Figure 5.8, but without the additional lenses and detector), and optimising
the rotation angle of the half wave plate in front of the Bob module (see Figure 5.13)
for maximum extinction ratio in the rectilinear detection basis.
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Figure 5.15: Eﬀect of angle mismatch between transmitter bases and analyser bases on the
QBER for the used polarisation analysis setup (see text). The plot shows both the individual
contributions of each of the four polarisations and the mean QBER (assuming all polarisations
are detected with equal probability) versus the angle mismatch.
5.2.3 Single photon detection
The detection of single photons was based on Silicon Avalanche Photodiodes (Si-APD)
operated in Geiger mode, also known as photon counting mode. Si-APDs oﬀer both a
high detection eﬃciency in the visible to infrared spectral region, as well as low intrinsic
dark noise.
Essentially, APDs are p-n junctions operated in reverse direction. In the Geiger mode,
a bias voltage Vbias exceeding the breakdown voltage Vbr by an amount called excess bias
voltage VE is applied. At this bias, the electric ﬁeld across the junction is so high
that a single charge carrier injected into the depletion layer can trigger a self-sustaining
avalanche (Geiger shower). The current rises within a fraction of a nanosecond to a
1Especially for future satellite-based QKD systems this is a critical point, since the relative motion of
transmitter and receiver demand accurate and fast adjustment of rotation angle.
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macroscopic level in the milliampere range [169]. If the primary carrier is photogen-
erated, the leading edge of the avalanche pulse marks the arrival time of the detected
photon. The current continues to ﬂow until the avalanche is terminated by lowering
the bias voltage to Vbr or below. Then, the bias voltage is restored, in order to be able
to detect another photon. This operation requires a so called quenching circuit. For
low counting rates — as expected in this experiment — a simple passive circuit using a
quenching resistor in series with the APD is suﬃcient [170, 171].
One of the freely available Si-APD models2 is the diode C30902S (manufactured by
Perkin Elmer), that was used for this experiment. The diode has a fairly large active area
of 0.5mm in diameter. For this experiment, the diodes were cooled thermoelectrically
to an operating temperature around -25◦C reducing the dark count rate to about 200−
300/s. To prevent condensation of air moisture on the diodes, they were enclosed in
individual sealed housings, that also contained the necessary electronics for temperature
stabilisation, biasing, and signal recovery. The APDs were thoroughly characterised in
[172]; the parameters important for this experiment shall be summarised in the following.
Detection eﬃciency. For a photon detection event, it is necessary that the pho-
ton is absorbed in the active volume of the detector and generates a primary carrier (an
electron-hole pair), as well as that the primary carrier does actually initiate an avalanche.
Although conditions are such that, on the average, the number of carriers in the mul-
tiplying region increases exponentially with time, some just start a chain of ionisations
that terminates before catastrophic multiplication takes place [174]. The eﬃciency of a
photon detection increases with excess bias voltage since a higher electric ﬁeld enhances
the probability to trigger an avalanche [174, 175]. The photon detection eﬃciency ηdet
can thus be written as
ηdet = ηqPbr,
where ηq is the quantum eﬃciency (number of generated primary electron-hole pairs
per incident photon), and Pbr is the breakdown probability, that is, the chance that a
photoelectron will produce a complete discharge of the diode. It depends on the reverse
bias voltage Vbias and is between 50-80% in the useful voltage range [176].
Accurate knowledge of ηdet is crucial for the calibration of the mean photon number
of the transmitter. However, the absolute detection eﬃciency ηdet is not trivial to mea-
sure accurately without reverting to a precalibrated reference single photon detector.
Therefore, ηdet was measured with a technique utilising photon pairs, that are emitted
into two spatially separated modes by a type-II spontaneous parametric downconver-
sion source (SPDC) [177]. In this setup, the detection of a photon in the “trigger”
arm guarantees with certainty the existence of a photon in the second arm (containing
the detector to calibrate). Therefore, any missed detection there can only be due to
nonideal eﬃciency of the detector under test. The measured fraction of coincidences is
therefore a direct measure for the absolute detection eﬃciency. For more details, see,
for instance [178–181].
2Although a large variety of APDs are oﬀered, only very few are optimised for Geiger mode.
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Figure 5.16: Properties of the Si-APD type C30902S. (a) Absolute detection eﬃciency at
808 nm as a function of bias voltage for diﬀerent diode temperatures. At a photon ﬂux of
≈ 3 · 105 s−1, the detection eﬃciency saturates around 0.47 for bias voltages  20V above
breakdown. (b) Dark count rates as a function of bias voltage for diﬀerent temperatures.
(c) Typical spectral quantum eﬃciency (from [173]). (d) Dark count rate as a function of
temperature for ﬁxed excess bias voltage, exhibiting the expected exponential behaviour.
For our APDs, the detection eﬃciency rises with the bias voltage (above Vbr), and
saturates around 47% eﬃciency for excess bias voltages of VE  30V, independent of
the device temperature, as can be seen in Figure 5.16a. This measurement was taken at
a photon ﬂux of approx. 3.4 · 105 s−1 and at 808 nm wavelength. To obtain the absolute
detection eﬃciency at the signal wavelength of 850 nm, the values of plot a) have to be
rescaled using the spectral dependency of the quantum eﬃciency ηq (Figure 5.16c, [173]),
whereas the breakdown probability Pbr is essentially independent of the wavelength [176].
In this way we have to correct the values measured at 808 nm with a factor of 0.87, from
which we obtain a photon detection eﬃciency at 850 nm of around 38% for VE = 20V.
For the ﬁve diﬀerent detectors investigated, a small variation of ηdet between 36.5% and
39.2% was found.
Dark count rate. Thermal generation of electron-hole pairs produce current pulses
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even in the absence of illumination, and the Poissonian ﬂuctuation of these dark counts
represent the internal noise of the detector. According to the thermal origin, the APD
dark count rate grows exponentially with temperature (Figure 5.16d). As illustrated
in Figure 5.16b, the dark count rate also increases with excess bias voltage. Therefore,
going to very high bias voltages does not give an advantage. As a compromise, the
detectors used in this experiment were biased with 20 V above their respective breakdown
voltages, giving a mean detection eﬃciency of ηdet = 38% and an average dark count
rate of ∼ 250/s.
Time jitter. Intrinsic darkcounts and stray light raise the error rate of the QKD
system. Their impact can be reduced by choosing a narrow detection time window Δt.
Therefore, the time jitter of the detector is an important parameter, as it may constitute
a limitation to the minimal practical value of Δt. Both the APD itself and the pulse de-
tection electronics contribute to the detector time jitter. The relevant parameter for the
performance of the QKD system is, in this respect, the time jitter of the complete detec-
tor module, including detector electronics. It was measured using the down-conversion
setup. Because in SPDC both photons are emitted within a time interval of the order
100 fs (determined solely by the bandwidth of the downconverted light [182, 183]), the
relative time delay of the detector signals in the two arms of the downconversion is com-
pletely dominated by the time jitter of the two detectors. The detector under test was
characterised together with a ﬁbre-coupled detector, the time jitter of which had been
determined earlier. A Gaussian function was ﬁtted to the histogram of the recorded rela-
tive time delays, reproducing the measured data quite well (Figure 5.17). Deconvoluting
the ﬁt function with a second Gaussian (FWHM 540±50 ps) of the known detector, one
calculates the width (FWHM) of the time jitter τDet = 400± 50 ps for T = −25 ◦C and
VE = 20V.
5.2.4 Data recording and processing
In order to enable key generation from the stream of detection events, proper mapping of
detected photons to the pulses originating from Alice is essential. Furthermore, accurate
synchronisation to timescales shorter than the time duration of a transmission pulse is
necessary in order to maintain a narrow detection time window to curb the inﬂuence
of background events. This requires to establish a common time base or synchronisa-
tion procedure between transmitter and receiver. In the experiment, this was achieved
by deducing the clock rate and starting time of Alice’s transmission directly from the
detected photoevents. A prerequisite for the software synchronisation algorithm is, of
course, the assignment of a digital timetag to each detection event. Such timetags were
generated by a dedicated electronics (timestamp unit), transferred to Bob’s PC, and
later used to realise a software based synchronisation algorithm.
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Figure 5.17: Measurement of detector time jitter: Histogram of the relative time delay
between the signals of detectors placed in each arm of the downconversion setup.
Timestamp unit
The timestamp unit has four standard NIM logic inputs, that were connected to the
four single-photon detectors of the receiving unit. The time base can be chosen between
an internal, unstabilised crystal oscillator and an external 10 MHz reference signal. In
the experiment, an ovenized oscillator, that was disciplined by a GPS receiver (Trimble
Thunderbolt) provided a stable timebase with a mean absolute accuracy of 14 ns. The
transmitter was clocked by an identical unit, in this way residual relative drifts between
the two clocks were less than 10−11 over 100 s.
The operational principle of the timestamp unit is illustrated in Figure 5.18. A logic
high on any of the four NIM input lines initiates a trigger, signalling to the timing
control functional unit that an event has occurred. After a programmable time delay,
the pattern sampler is activated and reads in parallel the four input lines. Thus, multiple
events on diﬀerent input lines that occur almost simultaneously can be detected and are
treated as a coincidence event. The timetag associated to an event is generated by three
stages of increasing timing resolution: the slowest stage consists of a cascaded array
of 8-bit counters, the fastest of which is clocked by 1/32 of the 500 MHz fundamental
clock rate. A faster counting module (fast counter, implemented in ECL logic) uses
the 500 MHz fundamental clock directly and provides a resolution of 2 ns. To further
increase the resolution, a phase stage takes a snapshot (“phase pattern”) of the clock
waveform travelling along a sequence of delay lines at the time the event occurs. Thus,
the clock phase at the moment of the event can be reconstructed by software with a
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Figure 5.18: Functional block diagram of the timestamp unit: upon trigger by at least one of
the four NIM input channels, a 49-bit timetag with 1/8 ns resolution is created. The timetag
is buﬀered together with the trigger pattern in a FIFO memory, and ﬁnally transfered to a
digital input/output card. See text for more details.
theoretical resolution of 1/8 ns. The timing data from all three stages together with
the input pattern is collected by a latch. To minimise the deadtime after an event,
and to ensure that no events are lost, the timetag is not transferred directly to the
PC, but buﬀered in a fast, ﬁrst-in, ﬁrst-out memory (FIFO). A handshaking circuitry
takes care of proper communication with the PC via an interfacing digital input/output
card (Adlink PCI-7200 ). Several parameters of the timestamp unit, like clock source
selection, or input thresholds, can be remotely controlled from the PC.
Although the theoretical resolution of the timestamp unit is 1/8 ns, imperfect im-
plementation of the phase stage and electronic noise reduce the actual performance.
Moreover, the phase stage yields a non-uniform accuracy depending on the relative
phase Δϕ between the event and the fundamental clock. Figure 5.19a shows the colour-
coded incidence probability of the diﬀerent phase patterns (ordinate axis) as a function
of the phase delay Δϕ. Hence, the vertical sum of probabilities is 1 for each Δϕ. As
can be seen, not all patterns occur with equal probability. Additionally, the width of
the probability distribution — and accordingly the timing accuracy — depend on the
individual pattern. To obtain the average timing jitter of the timestamp unit, a stream
of digital signals that were phase stable with the reference clock was fed to the inputs,
and a histogram of the timing error was computed (Figure 5.19b). This procedure was
repeated for diﬀerent phase delays. The average standard deviation of the resulting
distributions was 340 ps.
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Figure 5.19: Measurement uncertainty of the timestamp unit. (a) Incidence probability of
the individual phase patterns as a function of phase delay Δϕ between the event signal and
the fundamental 500 MHz clock. The pattern probability distributions have unequal width,
leading to non-uniform measurement uncertainty. (b) Example of a resulting timing error
distribution for externally generated events with ﬁxed phase delay. The standard deviation
was 315 ps in this case.
Synchronisation
Based on the recorded timetags, the software-implemented synchronisation procedure
was performed on Bob’s PC. During this process, each photoevent has to be assigned an
absolute pulse number in order to allow Alice and Bob to discuss their respective choice
of basis for that pulse. The stream of digital timetags representing the detection times
of the photoevents was the only timing information available for the software synchroni-
sation algorithm. The algorithm was originally designed [184] to cope with the reduced
stability of standard, unstabilised crystal oscillators serving as master clock for both
Alice and Bob in an intra-city QKD experiment over distances in the km range. Facing
the much higher attenuation over long distances, the number of detected pulses does
not yield enough timing information to compensate large relative clock drifts. Hence,
clock signals for both Alice and Bob were derived from GPS signals as explained above
to mitigate the problem of fast drifting time references. However, the synchronisation
algorithm still had to deal with residual drifts on the order of 10−11 over 100 s and
the lack of an precise absolute time reference, as the PCs’ system clocks were only syn-
chronised to several hundred μs using the standard network time protocol (NTP). The
synchronisation algorithm has to
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a) ensure, that the local clocks at Alice and Bob run eﬀectively at the same speed
b) monitor potential drifts between the local clocks
c) compute the pulse number oﬀset ΔTAB between Alice’s transmissions and Bob’s
detections.
The situation is illustrated in Figure 5.20a: Alice transmits dim pulses with a ﬁxed
repetition rate of 10 MHz. Since not all pulses contain photons in the ﬁrst place, and
because of the high loss along the free-space link, only a few of these photons are actually
detected by Bob. These events will, however, occur in the known 10 MHz timing cycle,
forming a comb-like pattern with very few teeth. Spurious events from stray light and
to
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Figure 5.20: Schematic principle of the synchronisation algorithm. (a) The basic pulse
repetition rate and the phase of Alice’s transmission is deduced from the detected event timings.
Spurious events are suppressed by deﬁning a detection time window Δt. (b) Structure of the
transmitted frame containing a header and the potential key bits. The pseudorandom bit
sequences of the frame start identiﬁer and the frame number identiﬁer enable Bob to correctly
identify the start of the respective frames and to obtain the absolute oﬀset ΔTAB between
Alice and Bob.
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intrinsic darkcounts are distributed evenly in time, and have only a small probability of
occurring at the teeth positions of the comb.
Full synchronisation was achieved in three steps. First, a fast-Fourier-transform (FFT)
algorithm was applied to the raw event timings to obtain an initial value for the basic
pulse repetition rate of the transmitter with respect to the receiver clock. Owing to the
limited sampling time, the accuracy of the resulting value had to be enhanced by means of
a linear least square ﬁt to the arrival times modulo the raw repetition period. Together,
this provided a reﬁned value for the repetition rate. Thanks to the GPS-disciplined
clocks, only very small deviations from the theoretical value of 10 MHz occurred at
this stage. Each photoevent was accepted if it was detected within a time window
Δt around the expected arrival time or rejected as background otherwise. A software
phase-locked-loop compensated for any slow residual drifts by analysing whether photons
were arriving, on average, rather too early or too late. At the end of this stage, each
accepted photoevent had been assigned a pulse number. Yet, the global pulse number
oﬀset between Alice and Bob was still unknown. To obtain this oﬀset, the photon
stream was divided into consecutive frames of ﬁxed length, each frame starting with
two headers with pseudorandom bit sequences: A frame start identifier (FSI), and a
frame number identifier (FNI), see Figure 5.20b. The FSI was identical for all frames,
whereas the bit sequence of the FNI was shifted by one bit from one frame to the next
frame. Both pseudorandom bit sequences were known to Bob, and were not encoded
in the polarisation of the transmitted photons, but in individual pulse brightness: For
a “1”, all transmitter diodes were switched on simultaneously, whereas the pulse was
suppressed for a “0”. To enhance the signal-to-noise ratio, it was necessary to integrate
over several frames before it was possible to locate the frame start by correlating the
detected events with the known FSI bit sequence. This was eﬃciently done with fast-
Fourier-transforms. Similarly, in the last step, the absolute oﬀset of the pulse number
was determined from the shift of FNI bit sequence within the detected bit stream.
At this point, the synchronisation procedure was completed, with Bob’s detection
events being identiﬁed solely by their absolute pulse number. This enabled to initi-
ate ﬁrst the sifting process, and then the subsequent classical post-processing steps of
error correction and privacy ampliﬁcation, which will be explained together with the
experimental results in the next chapter.
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The main goal of this experiment is the generation of a secret key shared between Alice
(on La Palma) and Bob (on Tenerife). The preceeding chapters described and charac-
terised the establishment and stabilisation of the optical link using active beam steering
techniques, as well as the setup of the quantum optical transmitter and receiver. To
overcome the security and performance limitations due to the photon-number splitting
attack in the presence of high channel loss, a 3-intensity decoy-state extension to the
BB84 protocol was employed: In addition to signal pulses with mean attenuation μ,
the transmitter also emitted slightly brighter decoy pulses with a mean photon number
of μ′, and “pulses” with no light at all, μ0 = 0. By ﬁnally evaluating the detection
probabilities at the receiver corresponding to pulses of the individual classes, one can
calculate an upper bound to the fraction of tagged bits that may have leaked to the
eavesdropper without thereby causing errors in the generated key.
The key exchange results presented in this chapter were obtained during two measure-
ment campaigns. In the ﬁrst campaign, the attenuated pulse transmitter was equipped
with 4 laserdiodes, and decoy states were created by pulsing two laserdiodes simultane-
ously. However, this approach has two shortcomings: Firstly, the intensity of 2-diodes
decoy pulses is ﬁrmly linked to the intensity of the (1-diode) signal pulses and therefore
cannot be optimised separately. Secondly, the polarisation of 2-diodes decoy pulses is
not well deﬁned, prohibiting the use of these pulses for key generation. Both arguments
lead to a decreased secret key rate compared to the ideal 3-intensity decoy protocol.
For this reason, in the following campaign the transmitter module was extended to 8
laserdiodes, providing the four linear polarisation states of the BB84 protocol at two in-
dependently tunable intensities. In the following, the key exchange results are presented
and discussed separately for these two transmitter conﬁgurations.
6.1 Key exchange with 4-channel Alice
In the measurement campaign of June 2006, a 4-channel Alice module was used. The four
nearly identical laserdiodes each produce weak coherent pulses with distinct polarisation
(horizontal, vertical, diagonal and anti-diagonal linear polarisation). Originally intended
for running a pure BB84 protocol [38,185], its electronics did not allow a fast modulation
of the pulse intensity from pulse to pulse. However, pulses of increased intensity μ′ can
easily be created by simply ﬁring two randomly chosen laserdiodes simultaneously [105].
Although the resulting state is not identical to a signal pulse of lower attenuation μ′,
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an adversary has no possibility to discriminate the decoy pulses from signal pulses: The
output of k lasers ﬁring simultaneously with intensity μ is, when averaged over all k-
tupels, indistinguishable from the output of one laser ﬁring with intensity kμ, because
both states are described by the same density matrix.
For simplicity, in the experiment only decoy pulses (of higher μ′) with k = 2 were
used. For electronic reasons, the pulses generated by ﬁring two randomly chosen diodes
simultaneously had intensity μ′ that was not twice the value of μ, but slightly lower
at μ′ = 1.43μ. For the additional empty decoy pulses, the electrical pulse driving the
laserdiode was suppressed. Bright and empty decoy pulses were randomly interspersed
in the signal sequence with probabilities n′ and n0, respectively.
6.1.1 Parameter optimisation
Generally, the 3-intensity decoy-state protocol permits both signal and decoy pulses to
be used for key generation. However, a 2-diodes decoy pulse does not have a well-deﬁned
polarisation like a signal pulse, and thus cannot contribute to the sifted key. Obviously,
the same is true for the empty decoy pulses that serve to determine the background
from dark counts and stray light. In order to optimise the key generation rate, it is
therefore desirable to use a large fraction ns of the pulses for signal pulses, and only
a small fraction n′ for decoy pulses. On the other hand, too few decoy pulses lead to
poor statistical signiﬁcance of the derived fraction of tagged bits Δ. Hence, a larger
error margin δΔ would have to accommodate this uncertainty. The optimal choice of
the fraction of decoy pulses n′ and vacuum pulses n0, as well as the best value for μ
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Figure 6.1: Parameter optimisation for the 4-channel Alice. (a) Key generation rate as a
function of channel loss and mean photon number of the signal pulses for the experimental
repetition rate of 10MHz. The value of μ yielding the highest key rate (red curve) is nearly
independent of the loss. (b) Optimum choice of the fraction of signal states ns as a function
of loss, plotted for diﬀerent total numbers of emitted pulses N .
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(given the ﬁxed ratio μ′/μ = 1.43) was found by numerical optimisation of the expected
key generation rate B.
Figure 6.1a shows a contour plot of the key generation rate B as a function of channel
loss η and mean photon number μ of the signal states. The plot was computed for a
repetition rate of the transmitter ν = 107 Hz, a dark count probability Y0 = 6 · 10−6,
error correction eﬃciency f(e) = 1.22, and technical error etech = 0.02 (see §2.6.4 for
deﬁnitions). The highest achieved key rate for any value of η is marked by a red curve,
showing that μ is essentially independent of η. Optimising for an attenuation of the inter-
island link of 30 dB and above, the average photon number of the signal pulses was set
to μ = 0.27. The actual pulse intensity of the Alice module was checked by measuring
μ and μ′ in the transmitter telescope before each QKD experiment, and additionally
monitored at the second output port of the 50:50 ﬁbre beam splitter (see Figure 5.8).
The best choice of the fractions of signal pulses ns and decoy pulses n
′, n0 strongly
depends on the total number of pulses N sent during a QKD session (Figure 6.1b).
Considering a practical duration of a single QKD session of ∼ 100 s equivalent to N =
1 · 109, the probabilities of bright decoy and vacuum pulses were chosen to be n′ = 9.4%
and n0 = 3.1%, respectively. This left a useful fraction of ns = 1 − n′ − n0 = 87.5%
for the signal pulses. The actual pulse sequence was generated according to random bit
values, that were created beforehand by a physical random number generator and stored
on Alice’s hard disk.
6.1.2 Synchronisation and sifting
Under good atmospheric conditions, about 1000 photoevents per second originating from
the transmitter were recorded at the receiver. A separate transmittance measurement
using a bright continuous-wave laser source yielded a link eﬃciency Lee of 28–29 dB
between the transmitter telescope and the OGS Coude´ focus. Taking into account
the eﬃciency of the detector system (including the polarisation optics and interference
ﬁlters) of∼ 25% equivalent to further 6 dB of loss, the observed count rate1 is in excellent
agreement with the expected value of approx. 900–1100/s. Background resulted from
intrinsic detector dark counts (∼ 1000/s) and stray light from the nightly sky. Stray
light countrates varied between ∼ 200/s at new moon and up to ∼ 4000/s at full moon,
when measured with 10 nm FWHM interference ﬁlters and the full ﬁeld-of-view of the
OGS telescope (8 arcmin). Restricting the ﬁeld-of-view to about 15 arcsec (about 10 m
at La Palma) by closing an adjustable iris diaphragm in the Coude´ focus to 3 mm,
the stray light could be reduced to 400–1000/s. Larger iris diameters were required
during less favourable atmospheric conditions to allow for larger beam spot sizes due
to image blurring and image dancing. Even with the bi-directional tracking running
continuously, the 532 nm laser beacon from La Palma did not cause any augmentation
of the background count rate. The wavelength separation of the dichroic mirror together
1All count rates are given as the sum of all 4 detectors unless stated otherwise.
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with the high blocking ratio of the interference ﬁlters provided the required spectral
isolation of the quantum channel and the tracking light.
The time tags of the raw detection events (created by the timestamp unit, see §5.2.4)
were transferred to Bob’s computer for further processing. First, an initial value for the
transmitter’s pulse repetition frequency with respect to the receiver clock was obtained
by applying a fast-Fourier transform (FFT) to the the raw event timings (Figure 6.2a).
Since both clock signals at Alice and Bob were derived from the GPS-disciplined os-
cillators, local clock drifts were smaller than 10−11 over 100 s. Any residual drifts
were compensated by the phase-locked loop (PLL) of the synchronisation software (see
§5.2.4). Figure 6.2b shows a histogram of photoevent arrival times, modulo the pulse
repetition period. Atop an evenly distributed background from stray light and detector
background counts, photodetections due to attenuated pulses sent by the transmitter
accumulated around a speciﬁc time delay. Photoevents occurring within a time window
Δt around the centre of the distribution (i.e., the expected arrival time) were accepted
as originating from Alice, and rejected as background otherwise. The cumulative eﬀect
of signal pulse duration, timing jitter in the Alice electronics, reference clock and PLL
noise, timing jitter of the photodetectors, and accuracy of the timestamp unit led to
a temporal distribution of signal events with a FWHM of 4.3 ns. The clearly visible
shoulder in the distribution indicates that the main contribution came from the dura-
tion and shape of the laserdiode pulses and probably also from an increased time jitter
of the Alice electronics. Setting a value for the time window implies a trade-oﬀ between
resulting raw bit rate and error rate. Due to the low signal-to-noise ratio, a rather small
value of Δt = 5.1 ns was selected, which sacriﬁced some raw bits, but reduced the QBER
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Figure 6.2: Synchronisation of the 4-channel transmitter and the receiver. (a) FFT of raw
detection events to determine Alice’s pulse repetition rate. (b) Histogram of photoevent arrival
times. Detections within the time window Δt are accepted as received from Alice.
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to a tolerable level.
Figure 6.3 shows the resulting countrates (with 1 s wide bins) of synchronised events
and background events over a full measurement run of 1000 s. The background event
rate is fairly stable at ∼ 2000/s, but the signal countrate exhibits large ﬂuctuations over
a timescale of seconds. The signal countrate drops to∼ 100/s spurious events when Alice
stopped transmitting at t = 1000 s. These events, falling inadvertently into the detec-
tion time window Δt, led to an average contribution to the QBER of ∼ 5%. Additional
contributions came from alignment errors of the Alice module including residual bire-
fringence in the single-mode ﬁbre (0.3−0.6%) and from imperfections of the polarisation
analyser (0.85%).
As a prerequisite of the sifting process, an absolute pulse number has to be assigned to
each accepted photoevent, which were buﬀered in the PC memory until full synchroni-
sation was achieved. As described in the preceeding chapter, the global photon number
oﬀset ΔTAB was computed from pseudo-random bit sequences in the photon stream,
constituting 1.2% of the pulses. Figure 6.4 shows a correlation of the detected events
with the known frame start identifier (FSI) (a) and frame number identifier (FNI) (b) bit
sequences. The correct position of the FSI and the correct frame number clearly stand
out. Together with a basic synchronisation of the PCs’ system clocks via the standard
network time protocol (NTP), ΔTAB was obtained.
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Figure 6.4: Reconstructing the absolute pulse number by correlating known pseudo-random
bit sequences with detected events. (a) 128-bit frame start identifier within 32768-bit frame.
(b) 256-bit frame number identifier within frame.
Because of the strong ﬂuctuation of the link eﬃciency and frequent fades of the quan-
tum signal, the signal-to-noise ratio was not constant within the measurement run.
Therefore, blocks whose header was already corrupted by more than a factor of 1.1 were
discarded during the synchronisation process. This led to a raw key pair of 836 kbit
shared by Alice and Bob.
As soon as enough events were buﬀered to compute ΔTAB, basis reconciliation over
the classical 10 Mbit/s Ethernet channel was initiated and performed on-the-ﬂy for
the subsequent data. At the end of this process, Alice and Bob held a binary key of
278 kbit, which still contained errors due to experimental imperfections and potential
eavesdropping activity.
6.1.3 Distillation of the secure key
To remove the errors from the sifted key, the classical two-way error correction protocol
CASCADE [116] was applied. The algorithm works by the principle of comparing pari-
ties between blocks of key bits. This allows to detect blocks with odd numbers of errors.
When such a block is found, a binary search inside the block is performed to reveal the
position of an error. The protocol works in typically 4 or 5 passes, and each pass uses
diﬀerent block partitions, that is, diﬀerent permutations of the raw bits. After each
pass, each block contains an even number of errors, or no errors. If an error is found in
one block in pass i (which was overlooked in passes 1, ..., i− 1), the algorithm tracks the
bit back to its blocks in passes 1, ..., i − 1. By correction of the bit, there will then be
blocks with odd number of errors in passes 1, ..., i− 1. Binary searches ﬁnd these errors,
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possibly creating more blocks with odd number of errors. This is continued until no
blocks have an odd number of errors. The key to good performance in the CASCADE
protocol is the choice of block sizes in the individual passes. This choice depends on the
bit error rate e. Starting from values in the literature [115, 186], block sizes were opti-
mised for the expected error rates. For an error rate around 6%, 5 passes with block sizes
{14, 28, 64, 128, 256} were used. Instead of randomly permuting the raw bits before the
error correction to ensure homogeneous distribution of errors, the raw bits were grouped
into superblocks of 1024 bits length. The CASCADE algorithm was then performed
for each superblock separately, which allows for the disposal of blocks containing sub-
stantially more errors than on average. The criterion for discarding any one superblock
was that the fraction of disclosed bits exceeded a value of 0.48 (corresponding to ∼ 8%
QBER).
With these parameters, 25% of the superblocks were discarded because of their in-
creased error rate. The remaining 209 kbit of raw key contained e = 5.85% errors, for
the correction of which a total of ndis = 79 kbit (equivalent to 37.7% of the raw bits) were
disclosed by the error correction algorithm. Hence, the CASCADE protocol exceeded
the Shannon limit for perfect error correction only by a factor of f(e) = ndis/nsifH2(e) =
1.17, which is very close to values (1.16) reported in the literature for this error rate [186].
The last important step to a secure key is the privacy ampliﬁcation of the corrected key
in order to limit the maximum information of the perfect eavesdropper. If the reconciled
key is shortened by a fraction τ (cf. equation (2.9))
nﬁn = (1− τ)nrec , where (6.1)
τ := Δ +
ndis
nrec
+ (1−Δ)H2
(
e
1−Δ
)
, (6.2)
then Eve’s expected Shannon information is just one bit on the resulting ﬁnal key [114].
In equation (6.2), the individual contributions to τ are easy to identify: apart from the
fraction of tagged bits Δ, the second and the third terms account for the information
revealed during error correction and for the potential information leakage due to the
detected qubit error rate e, respectively. Substituting the experimental values Δ = 0.252
and ndis/nrec = 0.377, and neglecting statistical uncertainties for the moment, we obtain
a fraction 1− τ = 0.075, resulting in a secure key of 15.7 kbit. This value corresponds
to a secure key rate of Bexp = 15.8 bit/s and is valid in the asymptotic limit of inﬁnitely
long keys.
However, the limited statistics due to the ﬁnite run time of the experiment caused
an uncertainty in the determination of the parameters Δ and e, that are relevant for
the security of the ﬁnal key. For example, the error rate emeas observed in the speciﬁc
realisation of the experiment might — with some small probability p1 — be smaller than
the expected disturbance e¯ caused by some given eavesdropping strategy. It is therefore
necessary to estimate the average error rate e¯ from the measured quantity emeas. Using
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a theorem by Hoeﬀding, one can give a bound [114] on the expected error rate e¯ from
the observed quantity emeas
e¯ < emax = emeas + δe (6.3)
with the conﬁdence limit
(1− p1) > 1− exp
[−2nrec(δe)2] . (6.4)
Hoeﬀding’s inequality is applicable here, because emeas can be written as the sum of
the random variables e
(i)
meas describing the error probability for each transmitted pulse.
Moreover, since we strive for security against the most general coherent attacks, correla-
tions of the error probabilities e
(i)
meas for the individual pulses are possible, which means
that the assumptions of a Gaussian probability distribution of emeas would not be justi-
ﬁed. Limiting the probability for the expected disturbance e¯ to be higher than emax to
p1 = 10
−3, leads to δe = 0.004 for nrec = 209 kbit.
Next, we consider the uncertainty associated with the determination of the parameter
Δ. Again, the measured gain values Q0, Qμ, and Qμ′ allow only the computation of the
most likely value of Δ, but there is some ﬁnite probability p2 that the expected Δ¯ is
actually higher than Δmeas for the attack chosen by Eve. In turn, this implies that the
fraction of tagged bits (which are supposed to be known to the eavesdropper at no cost
of induced errors), are underestimated with probability p2. The statistical eﬀect due to
ﬂuctuations of the count rates recorded by Bob were accounted for by Gaussian error
propagation, see §2.6.3. Assuming Gaussian probability distributions is justiﬁed in this
case, because an attack on the photon number degree-of-freedom is always an individual
attack: The eavesdropper is assumed to learn the photon number of each transmitted
pulse via quantum non-demolition measurements without disturbing the state anyway.
Having full information on the photon number without the cost of induced perturbations,
there is no advantage of doing this measurement coherently over many pulses.
Choosing a probability for Δ¯ to be larger than some Δmax = Δmeas + δΔ of p2 = 10
−3,
results in a conﬁdence interval δΔ of 3.3 standard deviations. For a total number of
N ∼ 1 · 1010 transmitted pulses, we obtained δΔ = 0.0035. To account for the increased
uncertainty for the security of the ﬁnal key due to limited statistics, we substituted all
occurrences of Δ by Δ + δΔ, and used emax instead of e in the last term of the privacy
ampliﬁcation formula (6.2). Note that this has no impact on the error correction term
of equation (6.2), since all corrected errors and disclosed bits are counted during the
error correction phase. Therefore, there is no risk of underestimating the amount of bits
revealed during error correction. For the speciﬁc choice of security parameters p1, p2,
the privacy ampliﬁcation parameter increased to τ = 1− 0.03, reducing the key rate to
6.3 bit/s. Figure 6.5 summarises the entire process of key generation and illustrates the
individual steps, that reduce the raw key to the ﬁnal secure key.
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Figure 6.5: Distillation of the secure key, asymptotic values for the QKD experiment with
4-channel Alice.
6.2 Key exchange with 8-channel Alice
For the measurement campaign of September 2006, the 4-channel Alice module was re-
placed by an 8-channel version with improved electronics. With two laserdiodes available
for each of the four distinct polarisation states of the BB84 protocol, it was possible to
use separate diodes for the generation of signal pulses (intensity μ) and bright decoy
pulses (increased intensity μ′). Running in principle the same decoy-state protocol (two
non-zero intensities and vacuum states) as before, this allowed now to optimise the pulse
intensities for signal and bright decoy pulses independently of each other. Furthermore,
both pulse classes can be used for key generation.
Apart from these changes on the transmitter module, the experimental setup was
identical to the one used in the previous campaign. Unless noted otherwise, experimental
parameters and details were the same as described in the preceeding section.
6.2.1 Parameter optimisation
Compared to the 4-channel Alice version, the number of freely adjustable parameters
increases to 4 with the 8-channel Alice: Both the signal pulse intensity μ and the bright
decoy pulse intensity μ′, as well as the fractions of signal, bright decoy, and vacuum
pulses, (ns, n
′, and n0, respectively) need to be optimised for maximum key genera-
tion rate. As before, this was done numerically, using a linear model for the channel
transmission and taking into account the statistical eﬀects of ﬁnite key length.
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Figure 6.6: Parameter optimisation for the 8-channel Alice. (a) Expected secure key rate as
a function of channel loss η and mean photon number of bright decoy pulses μ′ for ﬁxed μ = 0.3
and N = 109. (b) Expected secure key rate as a function of the fraction of the signal pulses ns
for diﬀerent total numbers of emitted pulses N . Plotted for η = 33dB and n′ = 1−ns−0.016.
A good choice for μ had already been found in the previous simulations for the 4-
channel Alice with μ = 0.3. Starting from this value, and substituting the additional
parameters for the dark count probability Y0 = 6 · 10−6, eﬃciency of the error correction
algorithm f(e) = 1.22, pulse repetition frequency ν = 10MHz, and technical error etech =
0.02, results in an expected key generation rate B according to Figure 6.6a. There, B
was calculated as a function of channel loss η and the bright decoy pulse intensity μ′. A
value of μ′ = 0.4 is a good choice for a wide range of channel transmittance.
As before, the best choice of the fraction of decoy pulses n′, n0 heavily depends on
the total number of transmitted pulses N . Figure 6.6b shows the expected secure key
rate as a function of the fraction of signal pulses ns for QKD sessions of 10 s, 100 s, and
1000 s duration and a channel loss η = 33 dB. For the plotted curves the remaining
clock cycles were assumed to be taken up by pulses of intensity μ′, less a small fraction
n0 = 0.016 of empty pulses. Mostly for practical reasons, and since the dependency of B
on ns is relatively weak for large N , ns and n
′ were equally set to 49.2%, and a fraction
n0 = 1.6% assigned to vacuum pulses.
6.2.2 Sifting and secure key generation
The QKD experiment in September was performed under slightly better atmospheric
conditions than the experiment of the June campaign. A link eﬃciency Lee between 26
and 27 dB was measured between the transmitter telescope and the Coude´ focus of the
receiver, resulting in a count rate of ∼ 1800 photoevents per second originating from
Alice. Detector dark counts together with captured stray light from the sky accounted
for noise of similar strength, ∼ 1800/s.
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Synchronisation
Figure 6.7b shows a histogram of photoevent arrival times within the 100 ns period
between successive transmitter pulses. The distribution has a FWHM of 1.9 ns, more
than a factor of 2 narrower compared to the measurement with the 4-channel Alice
(Figure 6.2b). The FFT of the raw event timings (Figure 6.7a) exhibits a sharp peak,
indicating a reduced electronic timing jitter than before. The narrow distribution of
arrival times allowed the deﬁnition of a shorter time window Δt to reject a larger fraction
of background events. The trade-oﬀ between stronger background suppression (leading
to a lower QBER), and a reduced number of synchronised events (i.e., raw key bits) by
selecting a small time window Δt is illustrated in Figure 6.8.
In this plot, Δt was varied between 2.3 ns and 5.9 ns. As the time window becomes
shorter, more and more background events were rejected, resulting in a QBER as low as
2.41% (blue points). However, when Δt gets shorter than the arrival-time distribution of
the transmitted photons, photoevents in the wings of the distribution are unintentionally
discarded as background, reducing the number of raw key bits (red points). Together
with error correction and privacy ampliﬁcation (see below), these competing eﬀects led
to an optimal time window of Δt = 2.9 ns, giving the maximum secret key length (black
points). With this choice of Δt, around 90% of the detected signal photons lay within
the detection time window.
The resulting count rates of signal and background events are depicted in Figure 6.9
over an entire measurement run of 1000 s. The sudden increase of background events at
t = 950 s was due to the headlights of a passing car, that illuminated the OGS telescope2.
2A straight, 600 m long section of the road TF-24 runs exactly towards the OGS building such that
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Figure 6.8: Optimisation of the detection time window Δt. The competing eﬀects of min-
imising the QBER (blue triangles) and maximising the raw key length (red circles) leads to a
maximum secure key length (black squares) for Δt = 2.9 ns.
The fact that the background count rate follows to some extent the ﬂuctuations of the
signal count rate, reﬂects the partial rejection of signal events outside the synchronisation
time window. Conversely, spurious events contained within Δt contributed with ∼ 1.5%
to the quantum bit error rate. Additional contributions to the measured QBER of 2.6%
originated from imperfections and alignment errors of the transmitter (∼ 0.3%) and the
receiver (∼ 0.8%).
Sifting and post-processing
The synchronisation between Alice and Bob was completed by deriving the absolute
photon oﬀset ΔTAB from pseudo-random bit sequences in the photon stream. Despite
using the same header lengths as in the previous campaign, this time no frames were
discarded because of corrupted headers. This was due to the higher signal-to-noise ratio,
and using 4 times brighter synchronisation pulses compared to the June experiment.
Figure 6.10 shows the probability matrix of Bob’s detections depending on the po-
larisation state sent by Alice, normalised to the total number of synchronised photode-
tections. The ideally expected probabilities for coinciding and orthogonal polarisations
are 1/8, and 0, respectively, and 1/16 for complementary bases. The deviations of the
measured probabilities from the theory were partly incidental, that is, caused by the
limited counting statistics combined with strong ﬂuctuations of the link eﬃciency. Ad-
ditional errors arose from systematic eﬀects like unequal eﬃciency and illumination of
the individual single-photon detectors due to the ﬂuctuating beam mode, dark counts,
the interior of the dome is illuminated by the cone of light from car headlights when the dome slit
is pointed towards La Palma.
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Figure 6.9: Signal (green) and background (red) count rates after applying a detection time
window of Δt = 2.9 ns to the photoevent arrival times. The data points show 1-s averages; the
full lines represent a moving average over 10 s.
and drifting signal pulse intensities. These eﬀects led to a bias of the |H〉 polarisation
in the rectilinear basis (1.13 : 1) and of the |−45〉 polarisation in the diagonal basis
(1.26 : 1). It also resulted in a slight deviation of the number of events with coinciding
bases (0.487) from the theoretical value of 0.5. Variation of the QBER for the individ-
ual polarisations was less pronounced with eH = 2.2%, eV = 3.6%, e+45 = 2.7%, and
e−45 = 3.4%. Improved detector alignment and continuous monitoring of the individual
signal pulse intensities should help to decrease these eﬀects, which would otherwise have
to be taken into account in the privacy ampliﬁcation.
In total, 745 kbit of sifted key were generated out of 1.53 · 106 synchronised events.
Evaluating the count rates for signal, decoy, and vacuum pulses separately, and using
equations (2.13) and (2.14), Alice and Bob derived the fractions of tagged bits among
the signal pulses Δ = 0.275 and among the bright decoy pulses Δ′ = 0.338, in fair
agreement with expected values 0.304 and 0.370 for a mean attenuation of 33.5 dB.
To optimise the error correction eﬃciency for expected error rates in the range of
2 − 3%, the number of passes of the CASCADE error correction was reduced to 4,
and the block sizes were adapted to {30, 64, 128, 256} . With these parameters, and an
average error rate e = 2.57% integrated over all superblocks of the sifted key, 19.5%
of the sifted key bits were disclosed by the CASCADE algorithm. This is equivalent
to an error correction eﬃciency of f(e) = 1.13. Nearly half of the errors were already
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removed in pass 1, and almost the entire other half was corrected in pass 2. Although
very few errors were left to be corrected in the two remaining passes, these ﬁnal passes
are required to ensure a high probability for an error-free reconciled string. Due to the
limited amount of sifted key material, this correction probability could not be quantiﬁed
precisely. However, no errors in the reconciled strings were found in the course of the
experiments.
The privacy ampliﬁcation step has to be slightly altered to properly take into account
the two diﬀerent values of Δ and Δ′. Eﬀectively, the privacy ampliﬁcation is applied
separately to the key bits nrec originating from signal pulses and the key bits n
′
rec from
bright decoy pulses. Together, the resulting secure key length nﬁn can be expressed as
nﬁn = nrec
[
1−Δ− (1−Δ)H2
(
e
1−Δ
)]
+n′rec
[
1−Δ′ − (1−Δ′)H2
(
e′
1−Δ′
)]
− ndis. (6.5)
This shortening of the reconciled key ensures that Eve’s expected Shannon information
on the ﬁnal key is merely one bit. In the limiting case of an inﬁnitely long key, the
measured values emeas = 2.57%, Δmeas = 0.275, and Δ
′
meas = 0.338 were substituted
directly in equation (6.5), reducing the reconciled key to 0.333 of its original length.
Hence, the system yielded 253 bit/s of secure key in the asymptotic case. If we consider
the statistical eﬀects of a ﬁnite key length for the duration of the QKD session of 1000 s,
Detected
Probability
Transmitted
Figure 6.10: Matrix of the relative probabilities of Bob’s detections depending on the polar-
isation transmitted by Alice.
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4-channel Alice 8-channel Alice 8-channel Alice
Run #1 Run #2 Run #3
Channel loss η (dB) 35 33 33
Background (1/s) 2000 1700 1800
Time window Δt (ns) 5.1 2.9 2.9
Background prob. Y0 1 · 10−5 5 · 10−6 5 · 10−6
Technical error (%) < 1.0 < 1.0 < 1.0
Raw bits (kbit) 836 1530 1690
Sifted bits (kbit) 209 745 827
QBER (%) 5.85 2.57 2.86
Δ 0.252 0.275 0.317
Δ′ — 0.338 0.388
ndis/nrec 0.377 0.195 0.210
f(e) 1.17 1.13 1.12
1− τ (asymptotic) 0.075 0.333 0.263
Secure key rate Basymp (bit/s) 15.8 253 222
1− τ (stat.) (0.030) 0.285 0.234
Secure key rate Bstat (bit/s) (6.3) 231 197
Table 6.1: Experimental parameters of QKD runs performed during the June and September
campaign. The values in brackets refer to a diﬀerent choice of security parameters (see text).
and choose conﬁdence levels of 1 − p1 = 1 − p2 = 1 − 10−5 for underestimating the
expected quantities e¯, Δ¯, or Δ¯′, we obtained δe = 0.3%, δΔ = 0.024, and δΔ′ = 0.017.
Replacing the corrected quantities emeas+δe, Δmeas +δΔ, and Δ
′+δΔ′ in equation (6.5)
results in a secret key rate of 231 bit/s. The level of security achieved with the ﬁnal key
is such that Eve knows less than one bit of the ﬁnal key with probability smaller than
10−5.
Another experimental run yielded a slightly longer sifted key (827 kbit), but had a
little higher QBER of 2.86%, leading to similar secret key rates of 222 bit/s (asymptotic
value) and 197 bit/s (incorporating statistics).
6.3 Discussion
Table 6.1 summarises the results of the experimental runs performed with both the 4-
channel and the 8-channel Alice module. Although environmental conditions were very
similar for the QKD experiments in the June campaign and in the September campaign,
the realised asymptotic secure key rates diﬀer by more than one order of magnitude.
When incorporating statistical eﬀects, this factor is even larger. The data gathered with
the 4-channel transmitter did not allow the generation of a secure key for the choice
of security parameters p1, p2 used with the 8-channel Alice. This drastic diﬀerence
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becomes clear when comparing the measured results with the expected key generation
rates, calculated for the respective experimental parameters (Figure 6.11).
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Figure 6.11: Expected secure key rate (full lines), calculated with the respective parameters
of Table 6.1. The full circles represent the measured performance of successful QKD runs.
With the pure BB84 protocol (long-dashed line), secure QKD is not possible for the given
channel losses. The case of an ideal single photon source (short-dashed line) constitutes an
upper limit to the performance of an attenuated pulse system.
For medium to low channel losses, the diﬀerence between the two transmitter versions
is almost negligible. For losses exceeding ∼ 30 dB, however, the performance of the
8-channel Alice is substantially better. The experiment with the 4-channel transmitter
lay close to the edge beyond which no secure QKD is possible. Especially the use of
relatively long gate times (which was dictated by the duration of the weak coherent
pulses) limited the suppression of background events. In combination with high channel
losses, this led to a considerable contribution to the overall quantum bit error rate. In
the privacy ampliﬁcation, a high QBER has a two-fold impact on the secure key rate,
ﬁrstly via the bits disclosed by the error correction, and secondly, via the privacy ampli-
ﬁcation to compensate for Eve’s information gain from her error-inducing eavesdropping
activity. With the QBER attaining the critical error threshold, the privacy ampliﬁcation
parameter τ approaches unity, and the resulting secure key rate quickly drops to zero.
The improved pulse generation of the 8-channel transmitter enabled a factor of 2
shorter gate times, curbing the inﬂuence of background events. Together with slightly
lower channel losses and single-diode decoy pulses usable for key generation, the distill-
able secure key rate increased substantially.
Even with a narrow detection time window, an attenuated pulse system with the
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original BB84 protocol does not yield any secure key under the conditions of the inter-
island experiment. Without the decoy extension, and for channel losses exceeding 20 dB,
the PNS attack allows the eavesdropper to obtain the full key by removing and measuring
single photons from all multi-photon pulses without inducing errors. Bridging larger
channel losses and distances with an attenuated pulse system is therefore only possible by
employing a decoy state protocol. Thus, the decoy technique makes the technologically
much simpler attenuated pulse systems again competitive with single photon QKD.
Under the conditions of the inter-island experiment, a QKD system using an ideal single
photon source with same brightness as our decoy state system would have an expected
performance represented by the orange curve in Figure 6.11. For channel losses below
∼ 30 dB, the key generation rates are equal up to a constant factor and scale with η,
both in the single photon and the decoy state case. Yet, the maximal tolerable channel
attenuation is intrinsically higher for the ideal single photon system than for any decoy
state protocol, leading to signiﬁcanty diﬀerent key rates for higher attenuation. In
practice, however, it may be diﬃcult to realise single photon sources that oﬀer the same
brightness as attenuated pulse sources. In fact, when comparing the presented results
with a related experiment over the same free-space link, but using a parametric down-
conversion source [187], the secure key rate of the attenuated pulse system was a factor
of 10–100 higher, depending on the link eﬃciency.
The presented experiment worked close to the maximal tolerable channel attenuation
of our QKD system; the secure key rate is therefore very sensitive to small changes of
the channel transmittance. The maximal channel attenuation is a direct consequence of
the critical error threshold of the QKD protocol in combination with the fact that the
inﬂuence of the background-induced QBER increases with channel attenuation. Apart
from approaches to decrease the background probability Y0 (for example by reducing
the gate time, or applying narrow-band spectral and spatial ﬁltering of the incoming
light), the error tolerance of the QKD protocol can be improved (from 11% to 20%)
by employing 2-way classical post-processing schemes [84, 86]. This extends the toler-
able channel attenuation accordingly by about 5 dB. Depending on the actual channel
transmittance, one can expect a considerable improvement of the secure key rate from
2-way post-processing protocols, and a more stable key rate in the loss regime of our
experiment.
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This thesis presented the successful distribution of a secret quantum key over a real
distance of 144 km in free-space. The optical link was set up at a mean altitude of
2400m between the Canary Islands of La Palma and Tenerife, taking advantage of
the infrastructure of local observatories. The transmitter module was based upon a
simple opto-mechanical setup using attenuated laser diode pulses, and a compact 15-
cm refractive telescope. Roughly 0.1% of the transmitted photons were collected by the
1-m mirror telescope of the Optical Ground Station on Tenerife, and directed to the
polarisation analyser and single-photon detectors, that had been adapted to the optical
system of the Ground Station. Active pointing mechanisms on both the transmitter and
the receiver telescopes were employed to compensate for slowly changing atmospheric
refraction eﬀects. In this way, it was possible to perform a quantum key exchange with
a total quantum bit error ratio (QBER) of 2.56%. Residual birefringence of single-
mode ﬁbres together with imperfect alignment of polarisation components accounted
for approximately 1.1% of the measured error rate; the remaining 1.5% were due to
unﬁltered stray light and detector-intrinsic dark count events. Despite the Poissonian
nature of the emitted pulses, the secrecy of the resulting quantum key was ensured for
a channel attenuation as high as 35 dB thanks to a decoy-state extension of the BB84
protocol. In this way, average secret key rates up to 250 bit/s were achieved.
The presented outdoor experiment exceeds previous distance records of free-space
QKD by almost one order of magnitude. In contrast to recent laboratory demonstrations
with coiled ﬁbres [17, 20], it was performed under real-life conditions and bridged a
real distance between transmitter and receiver, while attaining almost the same length
of the quantum channel and achieving comparable or higher secure key rates. This
was only possible by employing a decoy-state protocol to check against the disastrous
photon-number-splitting attack, which normally opens a backdoor for the eavesdropper
in attenuated pulse systems. The eﬀectiveness of the decoy-state method thus restores
the competitiveness of the technologically much simpler attenuated pulse systems with
single photon schemes.
Still, a signiﬁcant speed-up of the pulse repetition rate of more than one order of
magnitude (with according increase in secret key rate) should easily be possible with
state-of-the-art telecommunication technology [188–190]. Stray light still had a signiﬁ-
cant impact on the QBER in our experiment. A further reduction of the detector gate
time would allow to increase the secret key rate and reduce the systems sensitivity to
ambient light. This requires faster electronics on both transmitter and receiver side, as
well as single-photon detectors with lower timing jitter. Such detectors are available
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(or emerging), but usually have their maximum sensitivity in the visible spectral range
(500−600 nm) and a small active area, which can be a problem in the presence of optical
turbulence. Narrow-band ﬁltering (below 1 nm FWHM) of the attenuated pulse source
would not only improve the indistinguishability of the individual laser diodes, but also
allow to apply the same narrow-band ﬁltering to the received photons, thereby further
reducing the inﬂuence of background. Finally, one might think about increasing the
eﬀective channel transmittance by using faster and possibly even higher-order adaptive
optics.
In summary, the presented outdoor experiment implicates the feasibility of global
quantum key distribution via low-earth-orbit satellites. Satellite pointing, acquisition,
and tracking techniques are well established and have been demonstrated with the OGS
and between the satellites ARTEMIS and SPOT-4 [191], but would possibly need reﬁne-
ment to the required level of accuracy and speed. Most importantly, our QKD experi-
ment was performed over a channel attenuation very similar to the expected attenuation
of a LEO-to-ground link.
A series of recent studies [192–194] assessed potential experimental scenarios and as-
sociated technological challenges. The scenario involving the least risk and cost consists
of one satellite in low-earth-orbit (LEO), and at least two ground stations. Downlinks
tend not to suﬀer from turbulence induced beam spreading as much as uplinks, since
the beam diameter at the top of the atmosphere will typically be larger than the beam
spread due to the passage through it (lens speckle eﬀects of the atmosphere neglected).
Conversely, an uplink beam undergoes heavy turbulence-induced deﬂections at the very
beginning of its propagation path (“shower curtain eﬀect”). Since satellite-mounted op-
tics is generally restricted in mass and dimension, a large spaceborne receiver telescope
to compensate this eﬀect would be just too expensive. For these reasons, a ﬁrst satellite
QKD experiment would comprise of a spaceborne transmitter using a relatively compact
optical communication terminal (typically 10− 15 cm diameter) with a two-axis gimbal,
and a ground-based receiver capable of tracking the satellite as it passes overhead. Apart
from the size of the telescope apertures, additional key factors governing the performance
of the optical link are the maximum range and resulting time-of-viewing determined by
the orbital height and velocity of the satellite. Assuming a 13.5-cm diameter optical
head on the satellite, and a 1-m receiver telescope on ground, the calculated link loss is
between 35 (30) dB and 13 dB for elevation angles of the satellite between 5◦(10◦) and
90◦ [192, 195].
The experimental results already laid a foundation for such a future satellite experi-
ment. First steps have been taken to reduce the size, mass, and power consumption of
the transmitter module, which is therefore well suitable for integration into a spaceborne
quantum communication terminal. Although investigations towards space qualifyability
were not attempted, the exposure to changing temperatures and vibrations during ﬁeld
tests and shipping already indicated a certain robustness of the opto-mechanical trans-
mitter design. Furthermore, it was shown that the quantum receiver optics can easily
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be integrated into an existing ground station to achieve single photon reception from an
orbiting satellite (see also [196]).
The design and the accommodation of a quantum communication transmitter in an
existing classical optical communication terminal on board a satellite has already been
investigated in a recent study [192,195]. It turns out that major subunits of the classical
terminals, such as those for pointing, acquisition and tracking as well as those providing
the required electric, thermal, and structural backbone, can be adapted as to meet the
quantum communication terminal needs. Yet, establishing and maintaining a quantum-
optical link to a fast moving target holds additional challenges.
Due to the extremely low power of the quantum signal channel, additional beacon
lasers (well isolated from the signal wavelength) are required to enable fast and precise
pointing and tracking. Even small pointing errors lead to a dramatic decrease of link
quality owing to the fast roll-oﬀ of the Gaussian intensity proﬁle combined with large oﬀ-
axis scintillations. Apart from that, the satellite motion in combination with the pointing
systems results in a relative rotation of the polarisation analysis apparatus on earth and
the satellite transmitter around the axis of their connecting line [197]. If a polarisation
encoding scheme is employed, this rotation has to be corrected for. Conceivable solutions
might be based on a polarisation reference beacon, or on a computational prediction of
the rotation angle from accurate knowledge of the satellite’s trajectory.
The altitude of a LEO satellite is typically between several hundred and a few thousand
kilometres. The International Space Station, for example, ﬂies in a LEO orbit at 350 km
altitude. Travelling at about 7 km/s, the period of a LEO satellite is approximately
90 min. Depending on the minimum elevation angle (as seen from the ground station),
at which the satellite link can be established, typical link durations are in the range of
only a few minutes, with on average just one link opportunity per night [192]. This means
that a QKD experiment will face limited raw key lengths, underlining the importance
to further investigate the associated implications for security.
To limit the inﬂuence of stray light, short detector gate times have to be used, which
requires the timing at each end to be synchronised to better than 1 ns. If using the
arrival times of the photons (key bits) to drive a software phase-locked-loop (like in
the inter-island experiment), a certain key rate is required to allow suﬃciently frequent
timing adjustments. Alternatively, periodic bright pulses of a diﬀerent wavelength could
be employed to lock the timing. In addition to clock drifts, varying Doppler shifts due
to the satellite motion will slowly change the repetition frequency. A compensation can
be calculated before the satellite pass from its telemetric data, possibly reﬁned later by
ﬁtting the orbit to the observed time-of-ﬂight1.
Free-space links between earth and space have the potential to realise global-scale
quantum key distribution since they allow, in principle, a much larger propagation dis-
tance of photonic qubits compared to present ground-based scenarios. Looking into the
1e.g., with the Geodyn II (NASA/GSFC) program, see http://ilrs.gsfc.nasa.gov/
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future, more advanced quantum communication protocols, like quantum dense coding,
or quantum secret sharing, may open up more and new applications of quantum-based
telecommunications in space.
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